Washington’s rhetoric of a “Unified Syria” is largely propagandistic when viewed in light of the multilayered web of interests and covert alliances on the ground.

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The recent statements by the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, may at first glance appear to reflect diplomatic commitment, but developments on the ground and the U.S.’s covert alliances reveal that this rhetoric is largely a propaganda maneuver.

Speaking to the Associated Press (AP), Barrack emphasized that the “deaths and massacres” on both sides of the conflict in southern Syria are unacceptable, stating: “I believe the current Syrian government, which is a new government with very few resources to address the emerging issues, is doing the best it can.”

However, if we are to speak of “territorial integrity” in the context of a new Syria, it is clear that the U.S.’s de facto policy in Syria actually serves to strengthen structures that weaken the country’s territorial unity. On the ground, the U.S. has established a fragile balance between Syria’s new government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While this balance may give the appearance of localized stability in the short term, it carries the potential to pave the way for Syria’s long-term fragmentation. These entities are ideologically, ethnically, and politically at odds, with starkly conflicting expectations for a new Syria.

Red Lines in the Damascus—SDF Talks

The Damascus administration’s plans to integrate the SDF into the New Syrian Army, dismantle its autonomous structure, and transfer control of northeastern resources (oil, borders, educational institutions) to the Syrian state are clear.

The SDF, meanwhile, although it continues its contacts with the new Syrian administration, maintains a series of “red lines”: preserving autonomous administration, integrating its forces into the army independently of the central command, receiving a share of resources, and maintaining control over the borders.

In this scenario, the U.S. — a power that has provided extensive military and political support to both sides over time — appears to be attempting to “gloss over” this deeply uncertain process with diplomatic statements and messages of goodwill.

Israel’s Proxy Strategy

Israel, which has effectively “entered” the Syrian arena through the Suwayda clashes, likely sees the criticisms voiced by its greatest ally’s special envoy as a mere formality. Israel’s main strategy here is to sever southern Syria from Damascus and create new zones of control via proxy forces under the pretext of border security.

In other words, while there is rhetorical emphasis on a “Unified Syria,” what is being built on the ground is an increasingly entrenched multi-structure reality. A possible agreement between the SDF and HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), for example, is not just about two armed groups sitting at the negotiating table; it encapsulates the conflicting interests of regional and global actors.

The negotiations between the SDF and HTS do not only involve these two actors; the balance includes the intervention of the U.S., Israel, and Turkey. Turkey, operating on the assumption that these negotiations will proceed parallel to the PKK’s disarmament process, seeks to secure its “share” in the governance of the new Syria.

The SDF, which received the most comprehensive support from the U.S. during the Trump era, is aware that such direct military and political backing may not continue under the Democrats. Furthermore, Washington’s regional priorities have shifted. Therefore, the SDF is striving to secure a balanced but strong position against HTS, with the primary goal of ensuring its continued existence. It is among the claims reported in Israeli and regional media that the group has engaged in a series of meetings not only with the U.S. but also with Israel.

Israel, for its part, is determined to exploit the “power vacuum” emerging in the new Syria to the fullest extent. What began under the guise of border security has now merged with Israel’s structural expansionist policy. Should Israel decide to “accelerate” its operations in Syria, it is well aware that Damascus may not be able to mount a serious resistance.

Is the Damascus Government Falling Short?

The new government led by Shara has so far failed to demonstrate the capacity to bear the role of “new leadership.” It faces a governance crisis, ethnic massacres that have sparked international condemnation, ongoing clashes with Israel, and severe economic issues.

Thus, the Damascus government finds itself compelled to “find middle ground” with the SDF, the U.S., and even Israel in order to secure its hold on power.

Within this equation, the perception of Iran as the “primary threat” on a regional level offers significant clues about the future of current power struggles.

The “Iran Threat” Will Determine the Balance

Despite suffering a severe blow with the fall of the Assad regime, Iran remains one of the strongest actors in the region. The SDF’s potential to serve as an “independent balancing force” against Iran perfectly aligns with the interests of the Tel Aviv—Washington axis. Therefore, in negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, the scenario in which the SDF’s demands gain weight and the central government’s power is curtailed is highly probable.

Despite the U.S.’s diplomatic calls for “unity,” the SDF’s de facto autonomy, its capacity to continue negotiations with Damascus thanks to current power balances, and the U.S.—Israel strategy of positioning against Iran all stand in the way of any real unification of Syria. Under current circumstances, it is nearly impossible for the new Syrian government under Shara to evolve into a stable and functioning structure. Ongoing military, political, and economic crises, coupled with the overarching “main threat is Iran” strategy, necessitate the continuation of the existing fragmented structure.

In conclusion, Washington’s rhetoric of a “Unified Syria” is largely propagandistic when viewed in light of the multilayered web of interests and covert alliances on the ground. With the U.S. and Israel seeking to expand the anti-Iran front, the scenario in which the SDF continues to play a strong role outside the framework of the central government remains the most likely outcome.