The case remains relevant today because it is being leveraged by Javier Milei’s government to justify closer ties with Israel.
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On the morning of July 18, 1994, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in downtown Buenos Aires, leveling the building and killing 85 people, with over 300 injured.
The attack occurred two years after the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina, which left 22 dead and 242 wounded. Both attacks took place during the presidency of Carlos Menem, a government that was pivotal for Argentina as it marked a transition to neoliberalism, featuring mass privatizations and a partial dollarization of the economy.
But on the geopolitical front, the Menem administration is more remembered for the apparent “secret war” that unfolded within the country, involving intelligence agencies and subversive groups from various nations.
The most widely accepted version of the AMIA case goes as follows: To retaliate against the cancellation of a nuclear technology transfer agreement between Argentina and Iran, the Iranian government (then under President Akbar Rafsanjani) orchestrated an act of revenge, with operatives from the Lebanese Hezbollah carrying it out.
This narrative, elevated to “official truth,” was supported by intelligence reports from the U.S. and Israel. It led to Argentina designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and the rupture of previously friendly relations between Argentina and Iran.
But what if this popular version is wrong?
Recently, a former aide to Judge Juan José Galeano—who oversaw the investigation and trial from 1994 to 2005—revealed details that cast doubt on the established narrative. According to Claudio Lifschitz, Galeano’s former assistant and a former Argentine security official, no concrete evidence linking the Iranian government to the attack was ever found. On the contrary, Lifschitz claims that the evidence increasingly pointed toward elements within Argentina’s intelligence service, SIDE.
Lifschitz first entered the public eye in this case when he released a video recording of a meeting between Galeano and Carlos Telleldín, in which the judge allegedly offered money to the supposed supplier of the van used in the attack—in exchange for confessing that he had sold it to Mohsen Rabbani, the cultural attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires. According to Lifschitz, one of the key pieces of evidence that could exonerate Iran is the fact that SIDE had illegally wiretapped—without a court order—the Iranian Embassy and the Iranian Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, amassing thousands of hours of recordings without a single indication that any Iranians frequenting these places had prior knowledge of the attack.
The real mastermind, Lifschitz alleges, was Jaime Stiuso, deputy chief of SIDE’s counterintelligence division (Section 85) and the officer in charge of intelligence investigations for the AMIA case. According to Lifschitz, Telleldín had actually sold the van used in the attack to a SIDE agent. Furthermore, Stiuso—who had close ties to Mossad and the CIA—was allegedly responsible for constructing the accusation made by prosecutor Alberto Nisman that then-President Cristina Kirchner had sought to cover up Iranian involvement in the case.
The former Argentine intelligence agent claims he heard directly from Stiuso that Mossad was the real force behind the attacks—though it remains difficult to verify whether this conversation actually took place.
The case remains relevant today because it is being leveraged by Javier Milei’s government to justify closer ties with Israel, to the point where the Argentine president has labeled Iran as an “enemy state of Argentina.”
