In a few months, we will understand how much the agreement has served realpolitik for regional transformation.
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An unexpected agreement, perhaps
Amidst little general attention, something particularly significant for the future of relations between Arabia and Asia has taken place in recent days: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have signed a historic cooperation agreement, destined to change the geometry of the two regions. Or so it seems.
The signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on September 17 represents a crucial moment in the reconfiguration of the security architecture spanning the Gulf and South Asia. Although Riyadh and Islamabad have maintained long-standing military cooperation ties since the 1950s—with Pakistani troops stationed in the Kingdom for training and protection of sensitive sites—the new agreement elevates decades of practice to a formal treaty. By establishing that “any aggression against one of the two countries will be considered an aggression against both” and encompassing “all military means” from armed forces to intelligence sharing and, potentially, nuclear cooperation, the agreement translates a relationship of patronage and pragmatism into a joint defensive umbrella.
This development must be read in a dual context: Saudi Arabia’s diversification of security partnerships following the loss of U.S. guarantees and Pakistan’s search for renewed relevance amid economic fragility and regional tensions. For Riyadh, the pact strengthens deterrence against Iran and, more recently, Israel, after the attack on Doha heightened fears of unchecked military conduct in the region. It also protects the Kingdom’s bets by deepening ties with a long-standing partner of Beijing, while signaling to Washington its ability to act autonomously. For Islamabad, the agreement consolidates its position as the only Muslim-majority nuclear power with a credible role in Gulf security, securing crucial Saudi credit lines at a time of precarious reserves and heightened political instability. However, this symbolic elevation from supplicant to strategic partner carries the risk of overextension and potential entanglement in conflicts—from Yemen to Iran—that Pakistan may not be able to manage.
The regional implications are manifold. First, the SMDA agreement ties Gulf and Asian security more closely together, inserting Pakistan as a formal player in the Gulf security equation and drawing Riyadh into South Asian disputes, from Pakistan’s border tensions with India and Iran to Taliban-held Afghanistan. Second, it complicates Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning partnership with India. New Delhi, which imports about a fifth of its crude oil from Riyadh and hosts over 2.5 million Indian workers in the Kingdom, has invested heavily in energy, trade, and defense ties with Saudi Arabia, including joint exercises and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) launched at the 2023 G20 summit.
The symbolism of Riyadh formally tying itself to Islamabad belies Delhi’s narrative of Pakistan as an isolated country, raising concerns that Saudi strategic calculations may weaken India’s position as Riyadh’s preferred Asian partner and indirectly accelerate India’s strategic embrace of Israel.
Israel’s view
Israel will also take note. Saudi Arabia’s reaffirmation of its bond with Pakistan suggests that, even as it flirts with normalization with Tel Aviv under U.S. encouragement, Riyadh is unwilling to abandon its old security partners. Pakistan’s role, though complicated, is not expendable. Conversely, Tehran will likely continue its efforts to rebuild dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council, as demonstrated by Ali Larijani’s visit to Riyadh on September 16, but will interpret the Saudi-Pakistani pact as a formal alignment of the Kingdom with a neighbor of Iran.
Pakistan’s internal dynamics add another layer of complexity. The Sharif government, fresh from a near-crisis with India in the spring of 2025 and after increasing defense spending by 20% in its 2025-26 budget and establishing a new Army Command for missile forces, has shown restraint abroad and determination at home. The diplomatic capital gained through careful crisis management is now the basis for the Saudi embrace. No defense treaty, however, can compensate for Pakistan’s structural vulnerabilities: a small tax base, stagnant exports, ongoing recovery from flooding, and persistent militant violence. Without transparency and parliamentary oversight, there is a risk that secret commitments could undermine rather than strengthen Pakistan’s credibility.
Careful balancing will be essential for both sides. Saudi Arabia’s multi-vector foreign policy—mediation with Iran under Chinese auspices, investment in India’s technology sector, maintaining OPEC+ coordination with Russia, and reassuring Washington of its usefulness—leaves little room for exclusive alignments. For its part, Pakistan must translate symbolic recognition into lasting influence without succumbing to overcommitment, using the pact to expand defense cooperation, secure investment, and strengthen its influence in multilateral forums.
In a region where symbols influence perceptions as much as concrete instruments, the Saudi jets that escorted Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s arrival in Riyadh were more than just a diplomatic show: they signaled to the entire region that Pakistan has been reinserted into the Gulf’s evolving security architecture not merely as a supplicant, but as a partner whose geographic location and military capabilities continue to matter. Whether this symbolism materializes will depend less on ceremonial displays than on internal reforms and disciplined foreign policy. In the shifting geometry of the Gulf and South Asia, recognition is important, but so are capability and clarity.
Both Israel, which now risks seeing its influence across the ‘Shiite area’ diminished, and the United States, which may soon be forced to contend with unexpected regional pressures capable of shifting it from its established position, will have to come to terms with this.
In a few months, we will understand how much the agreement has served realpolitik for regional transformation.
