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The phone call on 18 March between Presidents Trump and Putin has happened. It was a success, insofar as it allowed both sides to label the result as ‘positive’. And it did not lead to a breakdown (by virtue of the smallest of concessions from Putin – an energy infrastructure truce) – something easily it could have done (i.e. devolve into impasse – with Trump excoriating Putin, as he has done to Zelensky), given the fantastical and unrealistic expectations being woven in the West that this would be the ‘decider meeting’ for a final division of Ukraine.

It may have been a success too, insofar as it has laid the groundwork for the absent homework, now to be handled by two teams of experts on the detailed mechanics of the ceasefire. It was always a puzzle why this had not been earlier tackled by the U.S. team in Riyadh (lack of experience?). It was, after all, because the ceasefire was treated as a self-creating entity, by virtue of an American signature, that western expectations took flight in the belief that details did not matter; All that remained to do – in this (flawed) estimation – was to ‘divvy out the cake’.

Until the mechanics of a ceasefire – which must be comprehensive since ceasefires almost always break down – there was little to discuss on that topic on Tuesday. Predictably, then, discussion (reportedly) seemed to have turned to other issues: mainly economic ones and Iran, underlining again that the negotiation process between the U.S. and Russia does not boil down to just Ukraine.

So, how to move to ceasefire implementation? Simple. Begin to unravel the ‘cats cradle’ of impedimenta blocking normalised relations. Putin, plucking out just one strand to this problem, observed that:

“Sanctions [alone] are neither temporary nor targeted measures. They constitute [rather], a mechanism of systemic, strategic pressure against our nation. Our competitors perpetually seek to constrain Russia and diminish its economic and technological capacities … they churn out these packages incessantly”.

There is thus much cumulated geo-strategic debris to be addressed, and corrected, dating back many years, before a Big Picture normalisation can start in earnest.

What is apparent is that whilst Trump seems to be in a tearing hurry, Putin, by contrast, is not. And he will not be rushed. His own constituency will not countenance a hastily fudged accord with the U.S. that later implodes amidst recriminations of deceit – and of Moscow again having been fooled by the West. Russian blood is invested in this strategic normalisation process. It needs to work.

What is behind Trump’s evident hurry? Is it the need for breakneck speed on the domestic front to push ahead, before the cumulated forces of the opposition in the U.S. (plus their brethren in Europe) have the time to re-group and to torpedo normalisation with Russia?

Or does Trump fear that a long gap before ceasefire implementation will enable opposition forces to push for the recommencement of arms supplies and intelligence sharing – as the Russian military steamroller continues its advance? Is the fear, as Steve Bannon has warned, that by rearming Ukraine, Trump effectively will ‘own’ the war, and shoulder the blame for a massive western and NATO defeat?

Or, perhaps Trump anticipates that Kiev might unexpectedly cascade into a systemic collapse (as occurred to the Karzai government in Afghanistan). Trump is acutely aware of the political disaster that befell Biden from the images of Afghans clinging to the tyres of departing U.S. transport planes (à la Vietnam), as the U.S. evacuated the country.

Yet again, it might be something different. I learned from my time facilitating ceasefires in Palestine/Israel that it is not possible to make a ceasefire in one place (say Bethlehem), whilst Israeli forces were concurrently setting Nablus or Jenin ablaze. The emotional contagion and anger from one conflict cannot be contained to one locality; it would overflow to the other. It was tried. The one contaminated the implied sincere intentions behind the other.

Is the reason for the Trump haste mainly that he suspects his unconstrained support for Israel eventually will lead him to embrace major war in the Middle East? The world of today (thanks to the internet) is much smaller than before: Is it possible to be a ‘peacemaker’ and a ‘warmaker’ simultaneously – and have the first taken seriously?

Trump and those U.S. politicians ‘owned’ by the pro-Israeli lobby, know that Netanyahu et al. want the U.S. to help eliminate Israel’s regional rival – Iran. Trump cannot both retrench the U.S. as a western hemisphere ‘Sphere of Influence’, yet continue to throw the U.S.’ weight around as world Hegemon, causing the U.S. government to go broke. Can Trump successfully retrench the U.S. to Fortress America, or will foreign entanglements – i.e. an unstable Israel – lead to war and derail Trump’s administration, as all is intertwined?

What is Trump’s vision for the Middle East? Certainly, he has one – it is one that is rooted in his unstinting allegiance to the Israeli interest. The plan is either to destroy Iran financially, or to decapitate it and empower a Greater Israel. Trump’s letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.

A day after his missive, Trump said the U.S. is “down to the final moments” with Iran:

“We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon. Something is going to happen very soon. I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem”.

U.S. journalist Ken Klippenstein has noted that on 28 February, two B-52 bombers flying from Qatar dropped bombs on an “undisclosed location” – Iraq. These nuclear-capable bombers were carrying a message whose recipient “was clear as day; The Islamic Republic of Iran”. Why B-52s and not F-35s which also can carry bombs? (Because ‘bunker-buster’ bombs are too heavy for F-35s? Israel has F-35s, but does not have B-52 heavy bombers).

Then on 9 March, Klippenstein writes, a second demonstration was made: A B-52s flew alongside Israeli fighter jets on long-range missions, practicing aerial refuelling operations. The Israeli press correctly reported the real purpose of the operation – “readying the Israeli military for a potential joint strike with the U.S. on Iran”.

Then, last Sunday, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz boasted that multiple Anglo-U.S. airstrikes “took out” top Houthi officials, making it very clear that this is all about Iran:

“This was an overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out. And the difference here is, one, going after the Houthi leadership, and two, holding Iran responsible”.

Marco Rubio elaborated on CBS: “We’re doing the entire world a favour by getting rid of these guys”.

Trump then followed up with the same theme:

“Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire!” 

In a further piece, Klippenstein writes:

“Trump’s menu of options for dealing with Tehran now includes one he didn’t have in his first term: full-scale war – with “nuclear weapons on the table” (the Trident II low-yield option) Pentagon and company contracting documents I’ve obtained describe “a unique joint staff planning” effort underway in Washington and in the Middle East to refine the next generation of “a major regional conflict” with Iran. The plans are the result of a reassessment of Iran’s military capabilities, as well as a fundamental shift in how America conducts war”.

What is new is that the “multilateral” component includes Israel working in unison with Arab Gulf partners for the first time, either indirectly or directly. The plan also includes many different contingencies and levels of war, according to the documents cited by Klippenstein, from “crisis action” (meaning response to events and attacks), to “deliberate” planning (which refers to set scenarios that flow from crises that escalate out of control). One document warns of the “distinct possibility” of the war “escalating outside of the United States Government’s intention” and impacting the rest of the region, demanding a multifaceted approach.

War preparations for Iran are so closely restricted, that even contracting companies involved in war planning are prohibited from even mentioning unclassified portions, notes Klippenstein:

“While a range of military options are often provided to presidents in an attempt on the part of the Pentagon to steer the President to the one favoured by the Pentagon, Trump already has shown his proclivity to select the most provocative option”.

“Equally, Trump’s green light for the Israeli air-strikes on Gaza, killing hundreds, [last] Monday, but ostensibly targetted on the Hamas leadership can be seen as consonant with the pattern of taking the belligerent option”. 

Following his successful assassination of Iran’s top general Qassim Suleimani in 2020, Trump seems to have taken the lesson that aggressive action is relatively cost-free, Klippenstein notes.

As Waltz noted in his press interview:

“The difference is these [Yemen attacks] were not pinpricks, back and forth, what ultimately proved to be feckless attacks. This was an overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out”.

Klippenstein cautions that, “2024 may be behind us but its lessons aren’t. Israel’s assassination of top Hezbollah officials in Lebanon was largely perceived by Washington to be a resounding success with few downsides. Trump likely took back the same message, leading to his strike on [the] Houthi leadership this week”.

If western observers are seeing all of what’s going on as some repeat of Biden’s tit-for-tat or limited attacks by Israel on Iran’s early warning and air defences, they may be misunderstanding what’s going on behind the scenes. What Trump might now do, which is right out of the Israeli playbook, would be to attack Iran’s command and control, including Iran’s leadership.

This – very certainly – would have a profound effect on Trump’s relations with Russia – and China. It would eviscerate any sense in Moscow and Beijing that Trump is agreement capable. What price then his ‘peacemaker’ ‘Big Picture’ reset were he, in the wake of wars in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, to start a war with Iran? Does Trump see Iran through some disturbed optic – that in destroying Iran, he is bringing about peace through strength?