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In a week where the expectations of many Atlanticists regarding the Kursk adventure continue to deteriorate, we continue to witness successive media circus episodes surrounding the conflict in Ukraine. Between a Trump apparently concerned with a “lasting” peace in Ukraine, a “Europe” that insists on classifying the Russian Federation as a “threat,” a Zelensky aligned with EU powers but seemingly more open to starting negotiations, a Macron who claims to speak for all of Europe and states that “Putin cannot be trusted,” a Von Der Leyen who insists on a massive increase in military spending, and a Ukrainian delegation in Riyadh that, after the degrading spectacle at the White House, ultimately, a few days later, and after a decisive defeat in the Kursk adventure, comes to accept a proposal for an immediate ceasefire—all these episodes, seemingly contrasting, end up fitting together perfectly, complementing each other like a deck of cards at Trump’s service.

To understand how they fit together, the best way to approach them is to start with the last of these episodes: the farce of the negotiations in Saudi Arabia. It is no secret to anyone, whether they agree with the position and aspirations of the Russian Federation or not, what is intended with what has been termed the “Special Military Operation”: to demilitarize, denazify, neutralize Ukraine militarily, preventing its integration into NATO, and to protect Russian populations from the xenophobic persecutions recorded after the Euromaidan coup.

Nevertheless, the Russians have never shied away from leaving open lines of dialogue, as demonstrated when they went to Saudi Arabia to confer with the U.S. delegation. True to their nature, they did not mince words, play games, or send smoke signals. They were very clear that they are not prepared to negotiate fragile and temporary solutions, but only solid, lasting understandings that consider the Russian Federation’s security concerns. This situation has not changed, as the mainstream press now reports that Russia has made a list of demands for them to accept the ceasefire.

Nevertheless, Marco Rubio, after negotiating an agreement with the Ukrainian delegation for the famous “rare earths,” ensuring their supposed exploitation by the U.S., told anyone who would listen that the progress would now be the subject of a concrete proposal to the Russian Federation. The tone was clear and aimed to make people believe that the Americans are hopeful about the outcome of this entire mediation process. Are they?

Let us return to the Russian Federation and ask the following question: to what extent will the proposal for an immediate ceasefire, made at a time when Moscow’s forces have achieved a resounding and humiliating victory in the Kursk region, be to the liking of the Russian delegation? Will any of the objectives so often emphasized by the Kremlin be guaranteed? Can it be inferred from the immediate ceasefire that Ukraine accepts all the demands of the Russian side? And is it believable that, with the Russian Federation in a position of primacy in the conflict, it would throw it all away with a ceasefire? Especially when, contrary to what was announced, the U.S. never actually stopped supplying weapons and intelligence to Ukraine?

As we all heard in the mainstream press, Marco Rubio informed journalists that the supply of weapons to Ukraine had resumed. This means that it was never actually suspended. The time between one act and the other, just two days, would make the materialization of the suspension impossible considering the necessary bureaucratic deadlines. Therefore, if the U.S. did not suspend the supply of weapons to Kiev’s forces, and, on the contrary, supposedly even resumed it, what signal does this send to the Russian Federation? A signal that they want to negotiate? That they are acting in good faith? That they are genuinely interested in pressuring Kiev to accept negotiations?

It does not seem so to me, and, on the contrary, the message that may be conveyed is the opposite, namely that the ceasefire will serve the Kiev regime to regroup, consolidate forces, and rearm. If this were not the case, what would be the purpose, in a phase of discussing a ceasefire proposal, of resuming a supply that was never, in fact, suspended? What message will this send to Russia? That the U.S. wants to stop the war, but does not want to stop the supply of weapons? At the very least, it is contradictory and seemingly pointless.

Therefore, given this reality, it is not at all credible that the Russian Federation will accept the proposal for an immediate ceasefire—let us note that Lavrov has already mentioned several times that the Kremlin will no longer be swayed by “naivety”—we must ask ourselves, considering all these factors, whether it is acceptable to assume that the American proposal is genuine and that the intentions of the White House are genuine. How can they, who have access to all the information, believe that the Russian Federation will accept, without further ado, a proposal of this type, without any guarantees being provided and while continuing to supply weapons to Kiev? As Ushakov, Putin’s advisor, said, the Kremlin is interested in a lasting peace, not an “interval.”

The Russian non-acceptance will be very plausible, particularly following the presentation of demands that Kiev will not be prepared, from the outset, to accept. Even if, for diplomatic reasons, Moscow’s rejection is expressed with all due care, so as not to justify the definitive distancing of the other parties. This does not mean that the Russian representatives do not know what is on the table, the real intentions of the White House, and the possibility that, for domestic consumption in the U.S., the non-acceptance of the ceasefire proposal will be used further to demonize the Kremlin. Something that, in these times, will hardly concern the Russians and their representatives.

Indeed, it is not unprecedented if Trump and his cronies address the American people and say that the Russian Federation does not want to give up anything, does not want to concede anything, and, therefore, is not interested in “stopping the conflict immediately.” If, for domestic consumption in the U.S., this discourse works, from a material perspective, looking at the balance of forces on the ground, why would Moscow concede in its intentions, given that it is in a position of military primacy? Especially when Moscow has always stated that it does not want “just an end” to the conflict and that this “end” must be accompanied by the resolution of the underlying problems.

This Russian position can only seem outrageous to Westerners and Americans who are intoxicated by the propaganda that initially said that “Ukraine was winning the war” and “Russia was going to be defeated on the battlefield,” later that “the conflict is stalemated,” or, already under Trump, that “both sides are losing and Russia has already lost a million men.” For those who knew, from the first day, that this would be a conflict lost for the West, unless it ended in a situation where everyone would lose, that is, in nuclear Armageddon, it is no surprise that the Kremlin does not give up on its objectives, since, given the state of affairs, if it does not achieve them in negotiations, it achieves them on the battlefield.

Let us return to domestic consumption and the circus to confuse and convince the Western peoples. In a situation where the Russian Federation remains intransigent in its aspirations, as is expected, I believe that Trump will need the “agreement” on his “raw” mineral lands, as a trump card to play before his public. After all, for what other reason would so much importance be given to an agreement that, considering the knowledge about recorded mineral reserves, has a very limited material effectiveness? Given that the territory controlled by the Kiev regime does not include mineral reserves of great importance, since those existing in that region are already in the possession of the Russians or in territory considered “occupied” by the Russian Federation, why would Washington place so much emphasis on a handful of nothing?

The importance attributed to the mineral agreement by the White House is explained by the fact that this understanding constitutes a trump card, for domestic play, at the disposal of the new administration led by Donald Trump. As a businessman, to be able to continue the Ukrainian venture, after the predictable rejection or presentation, by the Russians, of demands that the U.S. will have difficulty guaranteeing, Trump needs, at least, two arguments: 1. To convince the American people that it is the Russians or the Ukrainians themselves—or even the Europeans—who do not want to make concessions with a view to an understanding, as they did not accept the “reasonable, sincere, and generous” proposal of “President Trump”; 2. The maintenance of spending on Ukraine is safeguarded because “President Trump” made a mineral agreement with Kiev, which guarantees the payment to the U.S., with interest, of the amounts advanced, past or future.

In other words, if the Russians do not want peace, the Ukrainians do not accept it, or the Europeans boycott it, Trump will always have the necessary cards to convince the MAGA people that he did everything to end the war, but didn’t succeed. But even if he does not succeed, he still ensures that the U.S. does not come out harmed by the situation. And thus, Trump gets out of the Ukrainian problem, staying in it, but being able to say that he is not responsible and that, in any case, he has guaranteed access to “valuable” mineral reserves that largely compensate for the costs. Will the war continue? Yes! But Trump will be able to say that it is not his fault and that, unlike Biden, he found a way to compensate taxpayers for the expenses made. Of course, this is a fallacy, as we all know how much U.S. multinationals have appropriated assets under the possession of the Kiev regime.

If this is the case, and I believe it may go this way, at least Trump will want to have a wide range of options that allow him to gracefully escape to one side or the other. He will continue, in any case, not only to sell weapons to Ukraine, but also to the European Union and other “allies,” something he will not want to give up. If the conflict stops under the conditions he desires, Trump will count on those mineral reserves in Ukraine, which will largely compensate for the end of the weapons business with Ukraine and all the money the U.S. has lent them.

This is, therefore, the dual role of the problematic mineral agreement with Zelensky. It allows for argumentative reinforcement in any situation. The mineral agreement guarantees the payment of past amounts, if the war ends or the U.S. withdraws from it, and of future amounts, if the war continues. Before the American people, Trump will always come out on top.

Therefore, for Trump, everything seems to boil down to ensuring that he has at his disposal a wide range of equally advantageous options that provide justifications before the American people. However, there is something that may not fit well into this strategy. And this doubt lies in the fact that no reserves of “rare earths” are known in Ukraine, and even considering other mineral reserves, it is in the territory that Russia considers its own—the Donbass—that the largest and most valuable reserves are found. Hence, one should question to what extent the intention of the ceasefire, associated with the maintenance of arms flows to Ukraine and, in conjunction with the Russian distancing from the ceasefire proposal, does not have yet another option up Trump’s sleeve.

As someone who loves to talk about cards, this seems like a real player’s move. If the Russian Federation does not accept the ceasefire, or any proposal to divide the disputed lands, guaranteeing the U.S. access to at least part of the largest and most valuable mineral reserves in the region, the U.S. cannot only further demonize the Kremlin before American voters, but also justify the continuation of the war, the sale of weapons, and attempt to aspire—which we know is an illusion—to the reconquest, at least partial, of the Donbass, thus giving practical effect to the mineral agreement they made with Zelensky’s gang.

In other words, the practical material effect of the mineral agreement, if suspicions regarding the meager reserves in Kiev’s possession are confirmed, only occurs if the Russian Federation agrees to negotiate—through concessions demanded by Kiev—the division of lands in its possession or about to be, or, if this does not happen—as is expected that Russia will not accept—through a reconquest by forces loyal to Kiev of part of these lands. Without verification of one of these situations, from the outset, the mineral agreement is nothing more than a trump card for domestic consumption. Be that as it may, the U.S. always wins. They win from the Russians, if they concede (buying peace through territorial concessions) and from the Europeans, because they buy more weapons; they win from the Ukrainians, if the Russians do not concede, and from the Europeans, who continue, in any situation, on the path of militarization.

Hence, in practice, I tend to believe that Zelensky has bought, in this way, through the promise of future proceeds, the support he needs to continue the war, trying to get the Russians to agree to a 30-day pause in the conflict, which, without changing much, would at least temporarily stop the war machine that the West indirectly led the Russian Federation to build. They can also use the rejection of the ceasefire to try to distance some of Russia’s allies, through the dissemination of information that this time it would be Russia, and not Ukraine, that is rejecting the end of the fighting and the containment of the conflict. This will be another trump card at Trump’s disposal, to try to bring Russia to the negotiating table.

Trump hopes, through these stratagems, to be able to blackmail the Russian Federation with more sanctions, international isolation, and arms supplies to Ukraine—where the supposed resumption of supplies fits wonderfully—to obtain territorial concessions, where the mineral reserves are located. Will Russia allow itself to be dragged into such a situation? It does not seem so to me, but in Trump’s mind, this will make a lot of sense. But, somewhere, the theory expressed by Marco Rubio that “Russia is also losing” and that Russia is also interested in stopping the conflict fits in, trying to convey that the desperation is not only Kiev’s, but also Moscow’s.

At the same time as this is happening and Trump is opening all these options, we must also listen carefully to the words of Peter Hegseth in Brussels. If the tone of Rubio and Trump oscillates towards the need to stop immediately the Ukrainian conflict, only now knowing that they intend to do so superficially and without presenting the guarantees for which the Russians have fought so hard—although they have repeatedly stated that they reject a Ukraine in NATO—the tone of Hegseth, on the other hand, has been more directed towards the need for Europe to assume its defense, take responsibility in the conflict, and face, itself, the threats that loom over it. It is not worth mentioning what those threats are.

Combining these two discourses, we have the complete picture, also understanding that what seems to be a contradiction between European behavior and Trump’s aspirations is, in fact, no contradiction at all, quite the contrary. Taking Trump as a kind of demon who brought with him the military collapse of Ukraine, the European Union, after three years of hiding from Europeans the real situation on the ground, now takes advantage of the demonization of the Trump administration as a counterpoint to the sanctification it makes of the Kiev regime. A regime that has now aligned itself with… Trump. Closing an apparently “irreconcilable” circle.

The fact is that the resistances and rejections expressed by the EU “leaders” to the strategy followed by the Trump administration, regarding negotiations with the Russian Federation and the intention—at least enunciated and now embodied in a simple “ceasefire“—to put an end to the war in Ukraine, are tremendously contradictory with the practical decisions taken by the EU itself, with such more aligned decisions with the aspirations of these “new” U.S. than the apparently conflicting discourse might lead one to believe. Once again, Peter Hegseth said, in Brussels, for all to hear, that it was time for Europe to remove the Ukrainian burden (“unburden”) from the shoulders of its Atlantic allies, so that they can face even more tremendous challenges, which only the U.S. can and have an interest in facing.

Hence, this circus of appearances during which we witness a kind of complot against Trump, by the “leaders” of the European Union, when analyzed in depth and beyond appearances, allows us to see that, in some way, the EU remains aligned with the hegemonic strategy of the U.S.—which did not end under Trumpism. The European Union, faced with the “desertion” of the U.S., instead of demanding from them the responsibilities that fell to them, immediately aligned itself with the discourse conveyed by Peter Hegseth and, against the aspirations of the European peoples, voluntarily accepted the proposal of desertion from Washington and began to comply with the order enunciated by the White House, betting everything on the militarization of the European Union. Even guaranteeing Trump a prize for the “desertion”: the exponential increase in European spending within the framework of an increasingly obsolete NATO.

Clearly, and contrary to appearances, the European Union of the vehement Von Der Leyen not only does not clash with Trump’s aspirations, but facilitates his task concerning the Ukrainian disaster. As if its role were to facilitate his task, helping him to divert attention from the essential. The EU diverts attention from Trump, assumes the weight of the U.S. burden, freeing them for their Pacific venture. All this while seeming very angry with the new administration, but doing everything so that its actions converge with the hegemonic strategic needs of the U.S.

The EU, assuming the financing of the project and the increase in European spending on armaments, allows Trump to maintain the range of options I mentioned earlier. If he continues within the conflict, Trump has the justification of Russian, Ukrainian, or European intransigence; if he wants to leave, Trump sells weapons to the EU and Ukraine and, even if the conflict ends, Trump always guarantees, in the increase of European funds for defense, the gains he could get from the conflict, and with interest. He also guarantees, if the conflict ends on his terms, a portion of the minerals that currently are in the possession of the Russian Federation. The U.S. will never lose, no matter the alternative. At least I believe this is Trump’s aspiration, an aspiration that clashes with the fact that it is very difficult for Russia to allow itself to be blackmailed or dragged into a situation where the winners are the U.S., at the expense of Russia itself. I do not see Moscow in such a state of desperation. On the contrary, the desperation is on the side of Kiev and the European Union, and it is from these that Trump will take the scalp.

Hence, we must clearly distinguish between what Trump’s entourage says when it refers to “the President wants to end this problem.” Everything has to do with optics, with “ending” meaning not being held responsible for what happens. Hence, by blaming Russia, Ukraine, the EU, or Biden, Trump has at his disposal a wide range of cards that, at least in his Machiavellian mind, allow him to get out of this conflict gracefully. Trump gets out of the conflict, which does not mean that the conflict does not continue and that the U.S. does not continue to send its weapons there. Trump, on the other hand, no matter what happens, will always come out clean and with gains—even if virtual or future—to present to his supporters, which ’justify’ the failure of the negotiations.

As the player he is, Trump wants to keep all the cards on the table. The EU, despite the bluff, ensures Trump access to the final prize.