World
Lorenzo Maria Pacini
September 15, 2024
© Photo: Public domain

We have reached that moment in history when once again the Islamic peoples come together for the “holy war” and this time the conflict will take place on a much higher level.

❗️Join us on TelegramTwitter , and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Turkish proposal

As we predicted, Turkey’s turn has shuffled all the cards on the table. Not only has the Ankara government formally applied for membership in the BRICS+, but it is now proposing to set up an Islamic alliance to fight Israel. Beyond factionalism and personal feelings, the significance of this event must be analysed very carefully.

First of all, Turkey is a Sunni Islamic country, a denomination to which the vast majority of the world’s Islamists belong; Shias, on the other hand, make up between 10 and 15 per cent of the total number, mainly concentrated in the Gulf countries, particularly Iran.

Shiites‘ are generally defined as the supporters of “Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin of the Prophet and husband of his daughter Fatima, and his lineage, and ”Sunnis’ as those who accept the legitimacy of the succession to the Prophet by the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ’Uthman) and the subsequent victory of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphal dynasties. In these terms, the distinction is imprecise; in fact, it projects onto the conflicts of the seventh and eighth centuries a distinction that became more defined over time and reflects the subsequent situation. Common to all Shi’a is loyalty to the House of ‘Ali as a guide for the community. This loyalty was consolidated in doctrinal terms around the middle of the 8th century in the rejection of the legitimacy of both the Umayyads and the later Abbasid dynasty, which had risen to power by claiming membership of the Prophet’s clan (and thus with the initial support of a section of the future Shiites). However, loyalty to the House of ‘Ali, initially of a political order, took on a predominantly religious significance in the course of the history of the different Shiite traditions. The first civil wars initially revolved around the person who was to lead the community; these conflicts were as much political as ‘religious’; for those fighting them, according to the sources, both power and salvation were at stake.

The split between Shiites and Sunnis arose in the shadow of these conflicts, and from a subsequent reflection on them. In fact, it is not just a disagreement over the person of the guide (imam), but a different religious conception of his role, and more generally, of the axis of spiritual, rather than political, authority. In the period of the fitan, (second half of the 7th century), there are different political and doctrinal orientations, including various ‘parties’ that support the different pretenders to the caliphate, or refuse to take a political position. In general, for Sunnis, the supreme spiritual authority does not reside in a single political-religious leader, regardless of the person, but in a religious knowledge spread throughout the community, which does not correspond to the political authority of the caliph. This political authority is nevertheless accepted, but its acceptance is no longer considered decisive for salvation, as long as one behaves as a good Muslim, following the religious Law, the Tradition of the Prophet (sunna) and the consensus of the community.

And do not forget the historical events of the last century. Turkey has ample reason to reject the West, which not only restricted her European expansion in the past centuries in the imperial period, but also tampered with her development in several ways in the 20th century, trying to make her into a marionette-country of the British and then the Americans, posing constant dangers at her borders and involving her in secondary conflicts that had not minor international consequences. A sort of historical revanche would be seen as more than legitimate.

Let us bear in mind that the first major promoter of an anti-Israeli struggle has always been Iran, which since the Revolution has confirmed its religious intent to liberate Palestine from the Zionist occupation forces. The Resistance Front, which has been set up over the years to fight ISIS terrorism, has also always represented a curb for Israeli expansionism – and it is no coincidence that it was an openly Zionist neocon American president, Donald Trump, who killed General Qassem Soleimani.

Iran has already repeatedly dreaded not only an anti-Israeli alliance, which it has in fact managed to bring about by popular and diplomatic agreements between various countries, but also now has a legitimate mandate for a special anti-Israeli military operation. The infamous ‘revenge’ will not be long in coming. The Iranians are strategists with millennia of experience, they move with precision and patience. It should not surprise us if it turns out, one day, that Ankara’s proposal was prompted by Tehran, nor should such news upset us because Iran has always promoted an Islamic alliance for a common front since the time of Khomeini.

The objective risk

There remains an unresolved international relations problem: Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and plays an indispensable strategic role for the Atlantic Alliance in controlling the Mediterranean and access to the East . Since then, Turkey has always played a kind of double game, alternating support for the West with support for the East, without ever taking a definitive and permanent position.

Joining the BRICS+, with their very likely development in strategic terms now just around the corner, opens up an excellent opportunity for the member countries, but casts quite a few doubts on the shadows that Turkey continues to hide. The same applies to the suggested Islamic alliance. In particular:

– Strategically, Turkey has one of the largest armies in the world, it is positioned in a geographically indispensable area for the West-East connection and NATO has invested heavily in it. Strategically, Turkey cannot be ignored. It is an ally that must be kept in good stead, avoiding making it incoherent. NATO knows this and does not want to let it slip away. A Turkey that puts forward an Islamic military proposal becomes uncontrollable for the Anglo-Americans and could even act completely independently in the European context and beyond.

– From a diplomatic point of view, Turkey could offer itself as a perennial bridge between NATO and the BRICS+, ushering in a new era of international relations, where, as has already been said many times, the BRICS+ are in fact a geo-economic partnership with political power. Things would change in no small measure. NATO is a military alliance but needs to deal differently if it is to survive. Alternatively, Turkey would mark a definitive breaking point, dealing a huge blow to the Atlanticists and forcing a major retro-front, or the opening of civil destabilisation and conflict to provoke a reassessment of the political break. What is certain is that Turkey is an Islamic country and inevitably the preference for the Islamic Alliance remains the most natural direction.

Turkey will therefore have to make a choice, as it is unlikely that the other countries that will eventually join the alliance will allow it to remain in two contradictory realities. The choice might take time: if this were an American stratagem to deceive Islamic countries, this would prove disastrous for Turkey; if, on the other hand, it is just a matter of political timing, then it might be very useful to have an extended preparation time.

Erdogan’s proposal can also be analysed according to certain elements:

– He wants to affirm Turkey’s position as the historical protector of the Ummah (the international Islamic community) since the time of the Ottoman Empire;
– It wants to affirm Turkey’s position at the top of the regional military hierarchy;
– It is aware that the Gulf countries will never submit to its authority willingly, so it must gain a political and a strategic advantage;

– It must secure its position in the management of the key points of the oil market (Turkey manages part of Azerbaijan’s export to Israel via Georgia), as Ankara owns neither the oil nor the pipeline through which it transits.

Turkey has already shown in the past that it knows how to play with rhetoric to persuade the crowds. This should warn the governments of the Islamic faith around the world in no small measure.

The integrity of Iran

Unlike Turkey and other Islamic majority countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently maintained a consistent stance towards fighting the Zionist entity and the Great Satan (US+UK+Israel) in general.

The spirit of the Revolution initiated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has never changed. The political form of today’s Iran – an imperfect theocratic or semi-theocratic republic, to be precise, with a President who governs in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Guide who is the spiritual figure of reference for the continuation and preservation of the Revolution and who also has a political function – is emblematic as far as the Islamic world in general is concerned, because it represents a model of success, autonomy and independence, ‘neither with the West, nor with the East’ as Khomeini repeated. This has made Iran a global reference point for the fight against Zionism and the occupation in Palestine.

This integrity clashes with the lack of integrity of other Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which is regarded as a puppet of the Great Satan, linked at many levels with the decision-making bodies in Washington and Tel Aviv, as the period of intense ISIS terrorist activity has also shown.

In order to have an Islamic alliance that is truly such, a hierarchy must first be established and doctrinal issues clarified, which are by no means secondary to the Islamic world. In this sense, Turkey does not appear to be the best candidate to act as a bridge for mediation, because it has repeatedly opposed Iran’s interests, has not demonstrated consistency with religious precepts, and has not actually fought Zionism to date. Actions speak louder than words.

A complicated religious future

One point of enormous importance remains to be addressed, perhaps the one that dictated Erdogan’s choice most of all: the eschatological question.

For Islam – as for Christianity – Jerusalem is the Holy City and plays a central role in the end of time, as the sacred texts indicate. The seizure of Jerusalem has been the cause of bloody wars for centuries and in the 20th century found a dramatic twist with the advent of the Zionist entity known as the State of Israel, occupying the sacred lands of Palestine. It is also true that for centuries in those lands the three great monotheistic religions have coexisted, managing to maintain Jerusalem as the religious ‘capital’ of all three denominations. But one thing is not at all tolerable, neither for Muslims nor for Christians: that Israel should wipe out the Palestinians, who are religiously Islamic and Christian, ethnically mostly Arab. Ethnic and religious problems are mixed up here, well known since the time of the Dreyfus Declaration. Over the decades, the Zionist occupier has unceasingly demonstrated and repeated its hatred of the natives, perpetrating a ritual slaughter that still goes on before the eyes of the whole world in a deplorable manner.

The decision to wage a jihad against Israel is consistent with religious dictate and the eschatological fulfilment of the Scriptures.

Is there a fear of some sort of revival of the Ottoman Empire? Not necessarily, but it is not to be ruled out either. Erdogan’s determination, unfinished historical processes, the eschatological dimension of the conflict in Palestine and the advent of a multipolar world have yet to find a balance and shape the new entities that will characterise the near and now imminent future.

An Islamic front against Israel?

We have reached that moment in history when once again the Islamic peoples come together for the “holy war” and this time the conflict will take place on a much higher level.

❗️Join us on TelegramTwitter , and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Turkish proposal

As we predicted, Turkey’s turn has shuffled all the cards on the table. Not only has the Ankara government formally applied for membership in the BRICS+, but it is now proposing to set up an Islamic alliance to fight Israel. Beyond factionalism and personal feelings, the significance of this event must be analysed very carefully.

First of all, Turkey is a Sunni Islamic country, a denomination to which the vast majority of the world’s Islamists belong; Shias, on the other hand, make up between 10 and 15 per cent of the total number, mainly concentrated in the Gulf countries, particularly Iran.

Shiites‘ are generally defined as the supporters of “Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin of the Prophet and husband of his daughter Fatima, and his lineage, and ”Sunnis’ as those who accept the legitimacy of the succession to the Prophet by the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ’Uthman) and the subsequent victory of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphal dynasties. In these terms, the distinction is imprecise; in fact, it projects onto the conflicts of the seventh and eighth centuries a distinction that became more defined over time and reflects the subsequent situation. Common to all Shi’a is loyalty to the House of ‘Ali as a guide for the community. This loyalty was consolidated in doctrinal terms around the middle of the 8th century in the rejection of the legitimacy of both the Umayyads and the later Abbasid dynasty, which had risen to power by claiming membership of the Prophet’s clan (and thus with the initial support of a section of the future Shiites). However, loyalty to the House of ‘Ali, initially of a political order, took on a predominantly religious significance in the course of the history of the different Shiite traditions. The first civil wars initially revolved around the person who was to lead the community; these conflicts were as much political as ‘religious’; for those fighting them, according to the sources, both power and salvation were at stake.

The split between Shiites and Sunnis arose in the shadow of these conflicts, and from a subsequent reflection on them. In fact, it is not just a disagreement over the person of the guide (imam), but a different religious conception of his role, and more generally, of the axis of spiritual, rather than political, authority. In the period of the fitan, (second half of the 7th century), there are different political and doctrinal orientations, including various ‘parties’ that support the different pretenders to the caliphate, or refuse to take a political position. In general, for Sunnis, the supreme spiritual authority does not reside in a single political-religious leader, regardless of the person, but in a religious knowledge spread throughout the community, which does not correspond to the political authority of the caliph. This political authority is nevertheless accepted, but its acceptance is no longer considered decisive for salvation, as long as one behaves as a good Muslim, following the religious Law, the Tradition of the Prophet (sunna) and the consensus of the community.

And do not forget the historical events of the last century. Turkey has ample reason to reject the West, which not only restricted her European expansion in the past centuries in the imperial period, but also tampered with her development in several ways in the 20th century, trying to make her into a marionette-country of the British and then the Americans, posing constant dangers at her borders and involving her in secondary conflicts that had not minor international consequences. A sort of historical revanche would be seen as more than legitimate.

Let us bear in mind that the first major promoter of an anti-Israeli struggle has always been Iran, which since the Revolution has confirmed its religious intent to liberate Palestine from the Zionist occupation forces. The Resistance Front, which has been set up over the years to fight ISIS terrorism, has also always represented a curb for Israeli expansionism – and it is no coincidence that it was an openly Zionist neocon American president, Donald Trump, who killed General Qassem Soleimani.

Iran has already repeatedly dreaded not only an anti-Israeli alliance, which it has in fact managed to bring about by popular and diplomatic agreements between various countries, but also now has a legitimate mandate for a special anti-Israeli military operation. The infamous ‘revenge’ will not be long in coming. The Iranians are strategists with millennia of experience, they move with precision and patience. It should not surprise us if it turns out, one day, that Ankara’s proposal was prompted by Tehran, nor should such news upset us because Iran has always promoted an Islamic alliance for a common front since the time of Khomeini.

The objective risk

There remains an unresolved international relations problem: Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and plays an indispensable strategic role for the Atlantic Alliance in controlling the Mediterranean and access to the East . Since then, Turkey has always played a kind of double game, alternating support for the West with support for the East, without ever taking a definitive and permanent position.

Joining the BRICS+, with their very likely development in strategic terms now just around the corner, opens up an excellent opportunity for the member countries, but casts quite a few doubts on the shadows that Turkey continues to hide. The same applies to the suggested Islamic alliance. In particular:

– Strategically, Turkey has one of the largest armies in the world, it is positioned in a geographically indispensable area for the West-East connection and NATO has invested heavily in it. Strategically, Turkey cannot be ignored. It is an ally that must be kept in good stead, avoiding making it incoherent. NATO knows this and does not want to let it slip away. A Turkey that puts forward an Islamic military proposal becomes uncontrollable for the Anglo-Americans and could even act completely independently in the European context and beyond.

– From a diplomatic point of view, Turkey could offer itself as a perennial bridge between NATO and the BRICS+, ushering in a new era of international relations, where, as has already been said many times, the BRICS+ are in fact a geo-economic partnership with political power. Things would change in no small measure. NATO is a military alliance but needs to deal differently if it is to survive. Alternatively, Turkey would mark a definitive breaking point, dealing a huge blow to the Atlanticists and forcing a major retro-front, or the opening of civil destabilisation and conflict to provoke a reassessment of the political break. What is certain is that Turkey is an Islamic country and inevitably the preference for the Islamic Alliance remains the most natural direction.

Turkey will therefore have to make a choice, as it is unlikely that the other countries that will eventually join the alliance will allow it to remain in two contradictory realities. The choice might take time: if this were an American stratagem to deceive Islamic countries, this would prove disastrous for Turkey; if, on the other hand, it is just a matter of political timing, then it might be very useful to have an extended preparation time.

Erdogan’s proposal can also be analysed according to certain elements:

– He wants to affirm Turkey’s position as the historical protector of the Ummah (the international Islamic community) since the time of the Ottoman Empire;
– It wants to affirm Turkey’s position at the top of the regional military hierarchy;
– It is aware that the Gulf countries will never submit to its authority willingly, so it must gain a political and a strategic advantage;

– It must secure its position in the management of the key points of the oil market (Turkey manages part of Azerbaijan’s export to Israel via Georgia), as Ankara owns neither the oil nor the pipeline through which it transits.

Turkey has already shown in the past that it knows how to play with rhetoric to persuade the crowds. This should warn the governments of the Islamic faith around the world in no small measure.

The integrity of Iran

Unlike Turkey and other Islamic majority countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently maintained a consistent stance towards fighting the Zionist entity and the Great Satan (US+UK+Israel) in general.

The spirit of the Revolution initiated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has never changed. The political form of today’s Iran – an imperfect theocratic or semi-theocratic republic, to be precise, with a President who governs in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Guide who is the spiritual figure of reference for the continuation and preservation of the Revolution and who also has a political function – is emblematic as far as the Islamic world in general is concerned, because it represents a model of success, autonomy and independence, ‘neither with the West, nor with the East’ as Khomeini repeated. This has made Iran a global reference point for the fight against Zionism and the occupation in Palestine.

This integrity clashes with the lack of integrity of other Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which is regarded as a puppet of the Great Satan, linked at many levels with the decision-making bodies in Washington and Tel Aviv, as the period of intense ISIS terrorist activity has also shown.

In order to have an Islamic alliance that is truly such, a hierarchy must first be established and doctrinal issues clarified, which are by no means secondary to the Islamic world. In this sense, Turkey does not appear to be the best candidate to act as a bridge for mediation, because it has repeatedly opposed Iran’s interests, has not demonstrated consistency with religious precepts, and has not actually fought Zionism to date. Actions speak louder than words.

A complicated religious future

One point of enormous importance remains to be addressed, perhaps the one that dictated Erdogan’s choice most of all: the eschatological question.

For Islam – as for Christianity – Jerusalem is the Holy City and plays a central role in the end of time, as the sacred texts indicate. The seizure of Jerusalem has been the cause of bloody wars for centuries and in the 20th century found a dramatic twist with the advent of the Zionist entity known as the State of Israel, occupying the sacred lands of Palestine. It is also true that for centuries in those lands the three great monotheistic religions have coexisted, managing to maintain Jerusalem as the religious ‘capital’ of all three denominations. But one thing is not at all tolerable, neither for Muslims nor for Christians: that Israel should wipe out the Palestinians, who are religiously Islamic and Christian, ethnically mostly Arab. Ethnic and religious problems are mixed up here, well known since the time of the Dreyfus Declaration. Over the decades, the Zionist occupier has unceasingly demonstrated and repeated its hatred of the natives, perpetrating a ritual slaughter that still goes on before the eyes of the whole world in a deplorable manner.

The decision to wage a jihad against Israel is consistent with religious dictate and the eschatological fulfilment of the Scriptures.

Is there a fear of some sort of revival of the Ottoman Empire? Not necessarily, but it is not to be ruled out either. Erdogan’s determination, unfinished historical processes, the eschatological dimension of the conflict in Palestine and the advent of a multipolar world have yet to find a balance and shape the new entities that will characterise the near and now imminent future.

We have reached that moment in history when once again the Islamic peoples come together for the “holy war” and this time the conflict will take place on a much higher level.

❗️Join us on TelegramTwitter , and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Turkish proposal

As we predicted, Turkey’s turn has shuffled all the cards on the table. Not only has the Ankara government formally applied for membership in the BRICS+, but it is now proposing to set up an Islamic alliance to fight Israel. Beyond factionalism and personal feelings, the significance of this event must be analysed very carefully.

First of all, Turkey is a Sunni Islamic country, a denomination to which the vast majority of the world’s Islamists belong; Shias, on the other hand, make up between 10 and 15 per cent of the total number, mainly concentrated in the Gulf countries, particularly Iran.

Shiites‘ are generally defined as the supporters of “Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin of the Prophet and husband of his daughter Fatima, and his lineage, and ”Sunnis’ as those who accept the legitimacy of the succession to the Prophet by the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ’Uthman) and the subsequent victory of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphal dynasties. In these terms, the distinction is imprecise; in fact, it projects onto the conflicts of the seventh and eighth centuries a distinction that became more defined over time and reflects the subsequent situation. Common to all Shi’a is loyalty to the House of ‘Ali as a guide for the community. This loyalty was consolidated in doctrinal terms around the middle of the 8th century in the rejection of the legitimacy of both the Umayyads and the later Abbasid dynasty, which had risen to power by claiming membership of the Prophet’s clan (and thus with the initial support of a section of the future Shiites). However, loyalty to the House of ‘Ali, initially of a political order, took on a predominantly religious significance in the course of the history of the different Shiite traditions. The first civil wars initially revolved around the person who was to lead the community; these conflicts were as much political as ‘religious’; for those fighting them, according to the sources, both power and salvation were at stake.

The split between Shiites and Sunnis arose in the shadow of these conflicts, and from a subsequent reflection on them. In fact, it is not just a disagreement over the person of the guide (imam), but a different religious conception of his role, and more generally, of the axis of spiritual, rather than political, authority. In the period of the fitan, (second half of the 7th century), there are different political and doctrinal orientations, including various ‘parties’ that support the different pretenders to the caliphate, or refuse to take a political position. In general, for Sunnis, the supreme spiritual authority does not reside in a single political-religious leader, regardless of the person, but in a religious knowledge spread throughout the community, which does not correspond to the political authority of the caliph. This political authority is nevertheless accepted, but its acceptance is no longer considered decisive for salvation, as long as one behaves as a good Muslim, following the religious Law, the Tradition of the Prophet (sunna) and the consensus of the community.

And do not forget the historical events of the last century. Turkey has ample reason to reject the West, which not only restricted her European expansion in the past centuries in the imperial period, but also tampered with her development in several ways in the 20th century, trying to make her into a marionette-country of the British and then the Americans, posing constant dangers at her borders and involving her in secondary conflicts that had not minor international consequences. A sort of historical revanche would be seen as more than legitimate.

Let us bear in mind that the first major promoter of an anti-Israeli struggle has always been Iran, which since the Revolution has confirmed its religious intent to liberate Palestine from the Zionist occupation forces. The Resistance Front, which has been set up over the years to fight ISIS terrorism, has also always represented a curb for Israeli expansionism – and it is no coincidence that it was an openly Zionist neocon American president, Donald Trump, who killed General Qassem Soleimani.

Iran has already repeatedly dreaded not only an anti-Israeli alliance, which it has in fact managed to bring about by popular and diplomatic agreements between various countries, but also now has a legitimate mandate for a special anti-Israeli military operation. The infamous ‘revenge’ will not be long in coming. The Iranians are strategists with millennia of experience, they move with precision and patience. It should not surprise us if it turns out, one day, that Ankara’s proposal was prompted by Tehran, nor should such news upset us because Iran has always promoted an Islamic alliance for a common front since the time of Khomeini.

The objective risk

There remains an unresolved international relations problem: Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and plays an indispensable strategic role for the Atlantic Alliance in controlling the Mediterranean and access to the East . Since then, Turkey has always played a kind of double game, alternating support for the West with support for the East, without ever taking a definitive and permanent position.

Joining the BRICS+, with their very likely development in strategic terms now just around the corner, opens up an excellent opportunity for the member countries, but casts quite a few doubts on the shadows that Turkey continues to hide. The same applies to the suggested Islamic alliance. In particular:

– Strategically, Turkey has one of the largest armies in the world, it is positioned in a geographically indispensable area for the West-East connection and NATO has invested heavily in it. Strategically, Turkey cannot be ignored. It is an ally that must be kept in good stead, avoiding making it incoherent. NATO knows this and does not want to let it slip away. A Turkey that puts forward an Islamic military proposal becomes uncontrollable for the Anglo-Americans and could even act completely independently in the European context and beyond.

– From a diplomatic point of view, Turkey could offer itself as a perennial bridge between NATO and the BRICS+, ushering in a new era of international relations, where, as has already been said many times, the BRICS+ are in fact a geo-economic partnership with political power. Things would change in no small measure. NATO is a military alliance but needs to deal differently if it is to survive. Alternatively, Turkey would mark a definitive breaking point, dealing a huge blow to the Atlanticists and forcing a major retro-front, or the opening of civil destabilisation and conflict to provoke a reassessment of the political break. What is certain is that Turkey is an Islamic country and inevitably the preference for the Islamic Alliance remains the most natural direction.

Turkey will therefore have to make a choice, as it is unlikely that the other countries that will eventually join the alliance will allow it to remain in two contradictory realities. The choice might take time: if this were an American stratagem to deceive Islamic countries, this would prove disastrous for Turkey; if, on the other hand, it is just a matter of political timing, then it might be very useful to have an extended preparation time.

Erdogan’s proposal can also be analysed according to certain elements:

– He wants to affirm Turkey’s position as the historical protector of the Ummah (the international Islamic community) since the time of the Ottoman Empire;
– It wants to affirm Turkey’s position at the top of the regional military hierarchy;
– It is aware that the Gulf countries will never submit to its authority willingly, so it must gain a political and a strategic advantage;

– It must secure its position in the management of the key points of the oil market (Turkey manages part of Azerbaijan’s export to Israel via Georgia), as Ankara owns neither the oil nor the pipeline through which it transits.

Turkey has already shown in the past that it knows how to play with rhetoric to persuade the crowds. This should warn the governments of the Islamic faith around the world in no small measure.

The integrity of Iran

Unlike Turkey and other Islamic majority countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently maintained a consistent stance towards fighting the Zionist entity and the Great Satan (US+UK+Israel) in general.

The spirit of the Revolution initiated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has never changed. The political form of today’s Iran – an imperfect theocratic or semi-theocratic republic, to be precise, with a President who governs in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Guide who is the spiritual figure of reference for the continuation and preservation of the Revolution and who also has a political function – is emblematic as far as the Islamic world in general is concerned, because it represents a model of success, autonomy and independence, ‘neither with the West, nor with the East’ as Khomeini repeated. This has made Iran a global reference point for the fight against Zionism and the occupation in Palestine.

This integrity clashes with the lack of integrity of other Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which is regarded as a puppet of the Great Satan, linked at many levels with the decision-making bodies in Washington and Tel Aviv, as the period of intense ISIS terrorist activity has also shown.

In order to have an Islamic alliance that is truly such, a hierarchy must first be established and doctrinal issues clarified, which are by no means secondary to the Islamic world. In this sense, Turkey does not appear to be the best candidate to act as a bridge for mediation, because it has repeatedly opposed Iran’s interests, has not demonstrated consistency with religious precepts, and has not actually fought Zionism to date. Actions speak louder than words.

A complicated religious future

One point of enormous importance remains to be addressed, perhaps the one that dictated Erdogan’s choice most of all: the eschatological question.

For Islam – as for Christianity – Jerusalem is the Holy City and plays a central role in the end of time, as the sacred texts indicate. The seizure of Jerusalem has been the cause of bloody wars for centuries and in the 20th century found a dramatic twist with the advent of the Zionist entity known as the State of Israel, occupying the sacred lands of Palestine. It is also true that for centuries in those lands the three great monotheistic religions have coexisted, managing to maintain Jerusalem as the religious ‘capital’ of all three denominations. But one thing is not at all tolerable, neither for Muslims nor for Christians: that Israel should wipe out the Palestinians, who are religiously Islamic and Christian, ethnically mostly Arab. Ethnic and religious problems are mixed up here, well known since the time of the Dreyfus Declaration. Over the decades, the Zionist occupier has unceasingly demonstrated and repeated its hatred of the natives, perpetrating a ritual slaughter that still goes on before the eyes of the whole world in a deplorable manner.

The decision to wage a jihad against Israel is consistent with religious dictate and the eschatological fulfilment of the Scriptures.

Is there a fear of some sort of revival of the Ottoman Empire? Not necessarily, but it is not to be ruled out either. Erdogan’s determination, unfinished historical processes, the eschatological dimension of the conflict in Palestine and the advent of a multipolar world have yet to find a balance and shape the new entities that will characterise the near and now imminent future.

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.

See also

October 7, 2024
September 30, 2024
September 4, 2024

See also

October 7, 2024
September 30, 2024
September 4, 2024
The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.