U.S. is the real loser if Senate passes virtue signaling Russia sanctions

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September 7, 2026

By Jennifer KAVANAGH

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As the Senate returns to Washington for its last week in session until mid-September, it faces a long to-do list. But for many senators, the top priority is not enacting legislation that will help Americans but instead rushing to approve the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, known colloquially as the “Russia sanctions bill.”

A passion project of the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, the bill is intended to increase economic pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The legislation’s backers hope that, by choking off funding for Russia’s war effort, they can force Moscow to make greater concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the four-year old conflict in Ukraine.

But this logic and the bill itself are fundamentally flawed. The new legislation will have a limited effect on Russia’s fortunes; as has been the case since the beginning of the war, additional economic punishments are unlikely to be decisive in Putin’s calculus. In fact, the bill is more likely to harden the Russian position than to soften it.

The bill contains three main types of provisions. First, it codifies and expands sanctions against Kremlin officials, Russian oligarchs, and Russian banks and corporations. Second, it cracks down on Russia’s shadow fleet, increasing penalties against tankers and companies accused of trying to smuggle oil or evade the Western price cap on Russian oil sales.

Third and most significantly, it grants the president the authority to impose up to 100% tariffs on the top five buyers of Russian oil and natural gas, though it exempts allies who are reducing their purchases from Russia over time. The bill also allows the president to waive required penalties if deemed important for U.S. national security.

To be sure, if the new bill is passed by Congress and implemented by the White House, it will be economically painful for Russia. The sanctions it prescribes would fully sever Russian banks and energy corporations from the SWIFT system, including Gazprombank, which handles energy transactions. The bill also threatens secondary sanctions and loss of access to SWIFT for third-party intermediaries that continue to process payments from or interact with sanctioned entities. Combined with the bill’s measures aimed at Russia’s shadow fleet, these new sanctions will further complicate any Russian efforts to export oil.

However, after more than four years of sanctions, Russian banks and corporations have already developed alternatives. For example, they can turn to small regional banks that have little exposure to U.S. markets. They can also rely on layered shell companies that work through friendly countries, transactions conducted through “stablecoin” digital currencies, and even direct country-to-country bartering in which Russian commodities are swapped for machinery, microelectronics, or other goods. None of these approaches is convenient, but they will allow Russia to weather even the more draconian penalties included in the new bill.

The bill’s tariff provisions are likely to have even less effect on Russia’s revenues. Theoretically, the legislation targets the top five buyers of Russian oil and gas, a list that would include key U.S. allies like France, Japan, Spain, Turkey, and Belgium. But members of Congress, fearful of giving Trump more authority to use tariffs punitively against U.S. allies, included a waiver for countries that account for less than 15% of Russian exports and are working to decrease their dependency on Russia over time. This list applies to just about every country that might be hit with tariffs for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas, except for three: China, India, and Hungary.

Even if Trump chooses to apply tariffs to these countries, the consequences may be worse for the United States than for Russia.

Tariffs on India could cause Russia real economic pain, as New Delhi has shown itself to be sensitive to threats of U.S. economic penalty. But if the conflict in Iran continues to snarl oil markets, India will face constraints on its ability to shift its demand for oil elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has already tried sanctions on India as a way to pressure Russia, and it didn’t work. It did, however, damage U.S. ties with an important partner in Asia.

China is the leading buyer of both Russian natural gas and oil, and likely the primary target of the bill’s writers. But using tariffs to penalize Chinese oil purchases would be suicidal for Trump. He’s already run the experiment of putting 100% tariffs on Chinese goods, back on Liberation Day in April 2025. The result was so bad for the U.S. economy that it led to the original Trump TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out).

Since then, China has shown its willingness to use its dominance in rare earth minerals to retaliate against what it sees as unfair U.S. trade practices, and it would likely do so again if Trump levies tariffs under the authority of the new legislation. But even smaller tariffs on China are unlikely, since Trump is unlikely to do anything in the near term that derails his September meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

In the end, the new legislation is unlikely to be the knockout blow that forces Putin to give up on his core demands. The tariff provision may affect Russian oil and gas income on the margins, but its effect will be limited by the Trump administration’s higher priority political goals. Russia’s economy is under strain, but it can withstand the modest costs that Graham’s sanctions bill will impose while sustaining the war effort.

More importantly, the legislation’s underlying premise — that increased economic pressure is the key to ending the war in Ukraine — is as incorrect today as it was back in 2022. Putin has made clear time and again that he is willing to pay a very high price to achieve what he considers to be an acceptable outcome in Ukraine. He views the war as existential, for Russia and for himself personally, and has been largely insensitive to economic levers since the conflict began. This is unlikely to change.

In fact, the new legislation is much more likely to strengthen Russia’s resolve and work against peace. It may do this in two ways. First, it fuels Putin’s narrative that the conflict in Ukraine is really a war between Russia and the West, a storyline that can shore up domestic support and that increases the risks that the war eventually widens. Second, it confirms for Moscow that the United States is not actually interested in peace or in serving as a mediator but rather continues to harbor Biden administration-era hopes of weakening Russia over the long-term.

Many in the U.S. Congress probably realize this but will vote for the bill anyway, a virtue signaling gesture taken at the expense of the voters who elected them. In fact, if there is a loser from this legislation it will be the United States, which will face economic uncertainty and the loss of geopolitical influence as more countries tire of the United States using the dollar as a weapon and look for alternatives.

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.

Tags:

China Conflict Donald Trump India Russia Sanctions Ukraine United States

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