Transnistria is bound to feature ever more prominently in Moldova’s multi-layered politics.

Join us on Telegram, Twitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Elections in Moldova are just around the corner. Scheduled for September 28, 2025, they are set to become a stage for a serious “political showdown” among the country’s leading political forces.

The results will be determined by the fierce competition between pro-Western actors advocating for Moldova’s “integration with Europe” and forces leaning toward Russia. The outcome will affect not only Chişinău’s domestic politics but also the regional balance of security.

Moldovan politics is sharply divided. On one side stands President Maia Sandu’s pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). On the other are two major pro-Russian alliances: the Victory Bloc, composed of right-wing/nationalist forces, and the Moldova For Alliance, representing leftist/socialist currents rooted in the country’s socialist past.

Of these two, the Victory Bloc, led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, accused of corruption, was barred from running in the elections. This has considerably strengthened the hand of the pro-Russian leftist alliance. While Sandu’s defeat is within the realm of possibility, pro-Russian factions believe she will once again resort to various irregularities and abuses, “just as in previous elections.”

Moldova’s political divide also mirrors its geographic and social makeup. While there are significant pro-Russian constituencies even in the west of the country, the division becomes sharper toward the east, closer to Russia.

The Gagauzia Autonomous Region and the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, with its alleged socialist-style administration, are widely considered “pro-Russian regions” of the country.

The Chişinău government jailed Gagauzia leader and Victory Bloc member Evghenia Guţul on charges of so-called corruption and unexplained financial resources. In recent weeks, however, the region most highlighted in accusations of “abuses and violations” under Sandu’s administration has been Transnistria.

Located along Moldova’s eastern border, squeezed between the pro-Western Moldovan government and Ukraine, Transnistria has a history closely resembling that of Ukraine’s Donbas region.

A regional flashpoint

Transnistria is not only politically but also militarily strategic. Russian military personnel are stationed in the region, and the Soviet-era ammunition depots at Kolbasna elevate its importance far beyond Moldova’s usual political disputes.

According to pro-Russian politicians in Moldova, the Central Election Commission continues to discriminate against voters from Transnistria. The first controversy erupted over the ballot papers.

Official data shows that of the 2.772 million ballot papers printed for the upcoming elections, only 23,500 were allocated to Moldovan citizens residing in Transnistria. This means the vast majority of them will not be able to vote.

Additionally, “repair works” announced by the Chişinău government just before the elections are being interpreted as attempts at electoral interference. PAS representatives told the Joint Control Commission (JCC) that seven bridges would be under repair simultaneously in September and October. Crucially, these bridges connect Transnistria with the rest of Moldova, and six of them are located in the “Security Zone.”

Why are the bridges important?

The “security zone” in Transnistria was established under the Yeltsin–Snegur Ceasefire Agreement of July 21, 1992, following the Transnistria War.

Stretching 225 kilometers along the de facto border between Moldova and Transnistria, it serves as a buffer zone monitored by the JCC, headquartered in Bender.

Deployed there are about 400 Russian soldiers, nearly 500 Transnistrian troops, and over 350 Moldovan soldiers. Observers from Ukraine and the OSCE also take part in the monitoring.

Under JCC protocols, any repair or construction works must be inspected by observers from Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria to ensure they are not related to military preparations. Yet, a few days ago, sudden inspections were launched without allowing any JCC members entry.

These “repairs” could effectively lock down the elections. With the bridges closed and only 12 polling stations in the region, out of 300,000 Moldovan citizens in Transnistria, only around 50,000 will be able to cast a ballot.

Under normal conditions, at least part of the remaining 250,000 could still participate. But the closures will make it impossible, leading many Transnistrians to see the works as a deliberate effort to suppress their vote.

A similar situation occurred in the last presidential elections, when police under Sandu’s orders shut down two major bridges and even stopped or turned back voters crossing from Transnistria.

Adding to the tensions, two polling stations were “suddenly” declared “mined.”

All of this is viewed as part of Sandu’s broader effort to block pro-Russian political forces. Considering that Moldovan citizens in Russia (about 500,000 people) will also be unable to vote, the tally suggests around 750,000 pro-Russian voters may be disenfranchised.

A frozen conflict with military stakes

Beyond politics and ballots, Transnistria remains a “frozen conflict” zone with military dimensions. The area is strategically critical for both Russia and NATO.

For Russia, if its “Black Sea closure” strategy in Ukraine were ever completed, connecting with Transnistria—home to Russian passport holders and massive Soviet weapons stockpiles—would be a key step.

For NATO, Transnistria is equally vital: situated on Ukraine’s border and near the Black Sea, it represents both an obstacle and an opportunity for the alliance’s eastern expansion.

In this climate, reports of growing numbers of foreign military experts in Moldova, cited by both Russian and Ukrainian sources, merit close attention. Military insiders also allege that intense, closed-door talks are underway between Kiev and Chişinău, and that Sandu’s visit to the UK may have included discussions on Transnistria.

According to a report by Ukrayinski Novini, British officials welcomed Moldova’s decision to provide logistics infrastructure for an international peacekeeping mission that could later be deployed to Ukraine. Moldova also pledged to serve as a “regional hub” for Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.

“Ukraine operation in spring 2026”

Some claims go further: British officials allegedly secured Sandu’s approval for a Ukrainian Armed Forces “special operation” in Transnistria in spring 2026.

British military experts are said to be preparing certain Ukrainian units for such an assault after Moldova’s parliamentary elections.

While these remain unconfirmed, the very idea underscores Transnistria’s potential to disrupt NATO’s eastward strategy.

Although Odessa has long been seen as a Russian target, the reality suggests a different scenario: if Western forces settle in Odessa, Transnistria will inevitably come into the spotlight.

In light of these geopolitical calculations, Sandu’s possible re-election is expected to mark the beginning of an effort to dismantle the administrations in both Gagauzia and Transnistria. Pro-Russian politicians insist that Sandu’s domestic maneuvers must be understood in this geostrategic context.

The logic behind Transnistrian plans also recalls the Odessa Summit of June 11, 2025, when Romanian President Nikuşor Dan, Maia Sandu, and Volodymyr Zelensky held a special meeting said to focus on Black Sea strategies.

Since Sandu’s rise to power, Moldova has signed bilateral agreements with several NATO members, including France, the UK, Romania, and Poland. Moreover, Moldova has participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and regularly joins alliance exercises.

How was Transnistria formed?

After the collapse of the USSR, the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic declared independence from Moldova following the 1992 war. Situated between Moldova and Ukraine, it remains internationally unrecognized except by a few breakaway states such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the now-defunct Nagorno-Karabakh.

Its crisis roots stretch back to the 1917 Russian Revolution. While Moldova eventually became part of Romania, Transnistria remained within Soviet territory. After World War II, Moldova was re-incorporated into the USSR, and Transnistria became an autonomous region within the Moldavian SSR.

In the late Soviet period, Transnistria’s industrial strength—providing 40% of the republic’s GDP and 90% of its electricity—set it apart from agrarian Moldova. Its population was also distinct: predominantly Russian and Ukrainian, rather than Romanian-speaking Moldovans.

When Moldova declared independence in 1990 and pushed nationalist measures such as making Moldovan the sole state language and adopting the Latin alphabet, Transnistria’s people felt threatened. They organized under the United Council of Work Collectives (UCLC), eventually proclaiming independence on September 2, 1990, under Igor Smirnov.

The Moldovan government saw this as a rebellion, and clashes escalated into war. Both sides raided Soviet arms depots, and the conflict culminated in the Battle of Bender in 1992, leaving about 1,000 dead, including 400 civilians. The July 21, 1992 ceasefire froze the conflict and created the current “security zone.”

Unlike Donbas, however, Transnistria has managed to maintain its autonomy while preserving ties with Moldova, thanks in part to the decline of nationalism and the resurgence of leftist politics in the wider country.

Is Transnistria socialist?

Although Soviet symbols and flags remain in use, the region cannot be described as truly socialist. It is heavily reliant on Russia both militarily and economically. Its governance style blends Russian backing with Soviet nostalgia.

Meanwhile, Chişinău receives active support from NATO-member Romania, which holds influence in Moldova’s political and judicial institutions and harbors ambitions of eventual unification.

In short, Transnistria is bound to feature ever more prominently in Moldova’s multi-layered politics. Once seen by European tourists as little more than a “Soviet nostalgia stop,” it now represents a geopolitical hotspot where frozen conflicts threaten to thaw under mounting political and military pressures.