The fact that the core of liberalism is now adopting protectionist economic measures also represents a significant ideological blow to the liberal elites of countries affected by imperialism and international capitalist exploitation.
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Beyond the Ukrainian issue and the criticism of illegal immigration, the other main hallmark of Trumpism is the defense of protectionist economic measures as tools for reindustrialization, job creation, and the recovery of economic prosperity.
In concrete terms, since taking office, Donald Trump has made numerous promises to impose higher customs tariffs—and has indeed begun implementing some. The U.S. has imposed a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports (with exemptions for shipments under $800), as well as a 25% tariff on Canadian and Mexican imports.
It is well known that these tariffs will result in higher prices for American consumers—and the risk of shortages of certain products cannot be ignored—but in theory, these tariffs will serve as an incentive for American businesses to invest in the production of many goods that are currently imported. It is worth recalling that the U.S. was an industrial nation until the neoliberal era ushered in by Reagan, when the phenomenon of factories relocating to the Third World transformed American society into one centered on consumption and services.
In light of this scenario, many objections to American protectionism have been raised, particularly from the establishment of academic economists, staunch believers in “free markets.” However, despite the U.S. having established itself as the ideological pillar of liberalism, in the economic sphere, it has frequently resorted to protectionism as a tool to safeguard domestic industries.
One of the first protectionist measures in the country’s history, for example, was the Tariff of 1789, enacted during George Washington’s presidency. This tariff, which imposed duties on the importation of foreign goods, primarily aimed to generate revenue for the federal government but also served to protect nascent U.S. industries from British competition. Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, was one of the main advocates of protectionism during this period. Hamilton argued that the government should adopt policies to promote industrialization, including protective tariffs, subsidies, and investments in infrastructure.
This economic perspective came to be known as Hamiltonianism, and it was so successful that it influenced the German economist Friedrich List to develop his own nationalist economic theory, which in turn influenced Bismarckian industrialization.
Throughout the 19th century, protectionism became a central policy of the U.S., particularly during the period known as the “Era of American Systems.” Henry Clay, one of the leading political figures of the time, advocated for an economic system that combined protective tariffs, infrastructure investments, and a national bank to strengthen the U.S. economy.
The Tariff of 1816 was a significant milestone in this process. It established higher rates on imported manufactured goods, especially textiles and iron, to protect domestic industries. This tariff was followed by other protectionist measures, such as the Tariff of 1828, known as the “Tariff of Abominations,” which further increased import duties. Although controversial, this tariff reflected the growing support for protectionism in the industrialized North, in contrast to the opposition from the agricultural South, which relied on cheap imports and cotton exports.
During the Civil War (1861-1865), protectionism intensified. The federal government, dominated by Northern Republicans, passed a series of high tariffs to finance the war effort and protect Northern industries. After the war, protectionism remained a central policy, with tariffs such as the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which raised import duties to record levels.
In the early 20th century, protectionism continued to be a defining feature of U.S. economic policy. While the Payne-Aldrich Tariff maintained high rates, the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, passed during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, reduced some tariffs, reflecting a temporary trend toward free trade.
However, protectionism returned with force after World War I. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 raised import duties to protect U.S. industries from post-war European competition. This tariff was followed by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, one of the highest in U.S. history.
It was particularly from Roosevelt’s presidency onward, and even more so after World War II, that the discourse of free trade began to dominate unequivocally in the U.S. By then, however, U.S. industry was already in a sufficiently advantageous position compared to most of its competitors and could afford to lower trade barriers.
What this historical reflection demonstrates, however, is that Trump’s economic protectionism has roots in the very history of U.S. development and is not an invention, even if protectionism is dismissed as “heterodox” by the liberal economists who dominate this sector in the academic establishment.
Trump’s objective is twofold: 1) To convince foreign companies that depend on the U.S. market to relocate production units to the country to avoid dealing with import tariffs; 2) To create a favorable environment (by reducing competition with foreign companies) for the establishment of American businesses that can undertake import substitution in numerous sectors.
All these objectives are rational, and tariffs are a historically used tool to achieve them, but they rarely work alone. Typically, they are accompanied by other measures, such as subsidies for sectors that are intended to be promoted. Conversely, many state subsidies are under scrutiny in the Trump administration, including those directed at the strategic semiconductor sector. In this sense, it is possible that the results of Trump’s tariff policy will not be as significant as those achieved by 19th-century presidents.
From outside the U.S., however, where many countries will be targeted by higher tariffs, this new trend could be advantageous insofar as it will force various countries around the world to rely less on their trade relations with the U.S., reinforcing the multipolar transition. Simultaneously, the fact that the core of liberalism is now adopting protectionist economic measures also represents a significant ideological blow to the liberal elites of countries affected by imperialism and international capitalist exploitation.