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Four years ago, when the Biden administration took office, I mapped out the likely trajectory of its future policy toward China in a lengthy article titled Hybrid War on China that was subsequently published in a Chinese news outlet. I argued that the U.S., faced with the emergence of a multipolar world order, was growing increasingly desperate to arrest the decline of its hegemony and would pursue an aggressive policy based on the rigid assertion of its liberal ideology. I expected it would continue to frame it as an existential battle between democracy and authoritarianism although that narrative, and the ideology underpinning it, was becoming increasingly ineffective – many societies had developed antibodies against the messianic promotion of Western liberalism. My analysis stood the test of time until the Biden administration was relegated to the dustbin of history. Now, in order to speculate about the evolution of China-U.S. relations we must overhaul that analysis to take into account the ideological thrust, ambitions and sweeping reforms of the new administration.

Trump’s team encompasses a variety of perspectives on how to assert U.S. leverage in the competition with China. The ideological biases and vested interests of Trump’s advisors and supporters may explain the dissonance in messaging conveyed by the president and the rest of his administration. Marco Rubio, as Trump’s Secretary of State, views China as a totalitarian threat to American influence, Michael Waltz, the National Security Advisor, also sees the challenge from China in ideological and existential terms, highlighting the long-term implications of China’s rise. Conversely, Elon Musk admires China’s technological and industrial advancements and opposes economic decoupling from China. He advocates for a cooperative rather than confrontational approach, positioning himself as a mediator between the U.S. and China.

While some analysts believe that this dissonance is purely the result of a multiplicity of perspectives, others view it as a deliberate act of duplicity designed to keep Beijing off balance so that the current administration can advance initiatives with a diminished risk of reprisal.

Six months before Trump was elected president, Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank that led Project 2025 – a sort of road map for Trump 2.0 – had actually recommended a policy of deliberate ambiguity toward China to determine the tempo, tenor, and contours of Sino-U.S. competition in the coming years.

A bipartisan think tank, Brookings, echoed that recommendation as Trump was forming his cabinet.

Regardless of whether the ambiguity is strategic or not, the very unpredictability of Trump’s approach – a barrage of explosive and often contradictory public statements, a rapid shift from threats and provocations to warm personal diplomacy – makes it exceedingly hard to forecast what he might ultimately do. During his first presidency U.S.-China relations largely followed long-term trends, Washington continued to sponsor and direct anti-government forces in Hong Kong as they set the city on fire in an attempted colour revolution designed to undermine its status as a global trade and financial hub, ramped up anti-China hysteria in the media and imposed sanctions when local authorities restored order.

Trump’s scapegoating of China with regards to the U.S. trade deficit inspired impromptu tariffs against China in May 2019 that triggered a subsequent drop in stock prices across Asia, creating ripple effects across the globe.

Biden never rolled back Trump’s tariffs, if anything the Biden administration raised the stakes against China by imposing export controls on U.S. high-tech products, including advanced semiconductors used to power artificial intelligence (AI) platforms, and piled on more pressure by roping in European and Asian allies.

Some researchers have suggested that Trump’s seemingly irrational and volatile behaviour makes him an ideal conveyor of a U.S. policy based on the strategic ambiguity that gained much currency during the Nixon’s administration and was described as the Madman Theory. It dates back to at least 1517 when Niccolò Machiavelli wrote in The Prince that sometimes it is “a very wise thing to simulate madness.” The inklings of an idea that appeared in the work of Machiavelli eventually inspired a coterie of Harvard University scholars that included Henry Kissinger to ponder the limitations of rationality in grand strategy during the late 1950s and early 1960s – a rational U.S. president would seek to avoid a nuclear confrontation at all costs, but a “convincingly mad” one could credibly threaten large risks and therefore make the adversary blink first.

What is certain is that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis China predates Trump’s presidency. In the last ten years, Washington’s attitude to China shifted dramatically. From viewing it as a partner in global governance to describing it as a strategic competitor, to labelling it a systemic rival that poses direct challenges to U.S. interests.

Let’s look at the language used by the U.S. State Department in a statement about U.S.-China relations dated 13 February 2025: The United States works to deter China’s aggression, combat China’s unfair trade policies, counter China’s malicious cyber activity, end China’s global trafficking of fentanyl precursors, mitigate China’s manipulation of international organizations, and promote accountability for China’s violations of human rights within China and around the globe. […] In its bilateral economic relations with China, the United States will place U.S. interests and the American people first and work to end China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal economic practices.

It certainly sounds bellicose, but we should put this rhetoric into context. A hostile posture to intimidate and dominate the adversary is part and parcel of the aggressive negotiation tactics that Trump and his team favour. This declaration of intent, which draws from the mendacious repertoire of anti-China propaganda, seems designed to up the ante in the trade war with China, while avoiding to cross Beijing’s red lines.

Another recent provocation designed to gain leverage in negotiations involves Taiwan. As Taipei was negotiating arm purchases with Washington, including coastal defense cruise missiles and HIMARS rockets, amounting to between $7 billion to $10 billion, the U.S. needed to pump up Taipei’s spirits. To this effect, the U.S. Department of State’s official website removed the statement that the U.S. “does not support Taiwan’s independence” from the fact sheet on its relations with Taiwan. In case you wonder, on the same page it reiterated Washington’s adherence to the “one-China policy.” Clearly, the principle of non-contradiction doesn’t apply to U.S. official statements.

The new administration continued the traditional U.S. policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ on the Taiwan question that was a built-in feature of both the 1952 San Francisco Treaty orchestrated by John Dulles and the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué issued during Nixon’s visit to China.

In May 2022, the Biden administration had also removed wording such as “not supporting Taiwan’s independence” from its website, only to quietly restore it less than a month later.

Since the Taiwan question is a ‘trump card’ that Washington routinely plays to gain leverage with both Beijing and Taipei, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon its current policy toward Taiwan.

Trump appointed Ivan Kanapathy as senior director for China and East Asia policy at the National Security Council (NSC). A former Marine, he was director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the NSC in the previous Trump administration after serving as a military attaché in Taiwan. In several articles he penned for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and for the think tanks he is a member of (CSIS, Council on Foreign Relations and Beacon Global Strategies) he argued that offering Taipei an unconditional security guarantee could strengthen radical pro-independence factions that are less cautious about Beijing’s red lines. He affirmed that needlessly provoking China is not in America’s interest and that a security guarantee would be counterproductive to overall military deterrence because it would reduce pressure on the Taiwanese authorities to further increase defense spending, marginalizing effective capability enhancements such as additional defensive munitions and drones. Kanapathy also shared his view that Trump will likely place a larger emphasis on “reducing free-riders.” In other words, U.S. vassals in the Asia-Pacific, like their European counterparts, will be pressured to spend more on defense and thus purchase more U.S. weapon systems.

It was also suggested that Washington should bring key players in the Global South, such as India and Vietnam, deeper into the U.S. fold. For example, supporting India’s role in Central Asia or arms markets was proposed as a strategy to challenge Russia’s position and create friction with China.

For all the provocations that Washington will continue to orchestrate, mainly through its proxies, the U.S. has a compelling reason for avoiding a full-blown conflict with China. The Pentagon is aware that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is not tilted in its favour. According to its most recent annual report on China, the country now has the largest navy in the world and the largest air force in the region—and one should note that China, unlike the United States, can devote these considerable assets almost entirely to Asia-Pacific.

Although Washington will likely avoid any kinetic escalation as it tries to reorganize its military industrial complex, a wild card is the neocon foreign policy elite and its political machine – it has operated unchecked for decades, despite catastrophic failures. Whilst this elite appears to have been sidelined, we should keep in mind that it has the ability to adapt, rebrand and infiltrate any U.S. administration, and has a vested interest in stoking conflicts and advocating for military action.

The Sino-Russian partnership – a bulwark against U.S. efforts to undermine China

The enhanced, mutually beneficial, strategic partnership between China and Russia, that “strategic nightmare” for the U.S. that former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned about nearly thirty years ago, is making it remarkably more difficult for Washington to tackle China.
The surge of diplomatic engagement, military cooperation, energy deals, cultural exchange, and technology transfers illustrates deepening ties. Between 2000 and 2021, China’s annual trade with Russia grew eighteen-fold, and this process only accelerated after the further imposition of sanctions against Russia in 2022. The Sino-Russian collaboration has extended to the Arctic, with increased joint efforts across various domains, as noted in a 2024 Pentagon report.

U.S. efforts to prop up its waning global influence are met with obstacles that extend beyond the Sino-Russian no-limit partnership. The synergy that this partnership has generated is far greater than the sum of its parts. The two countries established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) the world’s largest regional organization in terms of geographic scope and population. In November 2022, the SCO emphasized enhancing regional cooperation through partnerships with other organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to create a sort of “Greater Eurasian Partnership.” As a new framework, SCO could replace obsolete Euro-Atlantic models that granted unilateral advantages to certain states. China and Russia also co-founded the BRICS to promote a multipolar international order as an alternative to the U.S.-led disorder. This platform has proven very appealing to Global South countries – it gives them a collective voice to share their grievances with regard to lack of representation in global governance and increases their ability to resist U.S. pressures, sanctions and tariffs.

As more countries reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar and try out common strategies to oppose U.S. coercion, Washington is unlikely to abandon the fantasy of driving a wedge between China and Russia because it considers their partnership “the greatest threat to vital U.S. national interests in sixty years”, and the key challenge to an international order dominated by the U.S.

For this reason, ambiguity and deception will likely underpin Washington’s diplomatic engagement with China and Russia. Such engagement is being conceptualized as the most promising one to both avoid military confrontation at a time when the U.S. isn’t yet prepared for it, and to offer both real and imaginary incentives to ensure the Sino-Russian partnership won’t deepen even further.

To offset what the Council on Foreign Relations has dubbed the “Axis of Upheaval” (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) U.S. analysts recommend to focus on economic growth at home while putting more pressure on allies to increase defense spending and pull their weight. And if they drag their feet, the threat of tariffs is supposed to frighten them into submission.

In the meantime, the U.S. will try to cultivate what it calls the “global swing states”: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey – middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order.

To pursue the objective of making America fitter to stem the tide that is fast eroding its dominance, Trump’s team is targeting the woke ideology and scrapping policies that have undermined social cohesion and productivity. It is also addressing wasteful Pentagon spending and inefficiency, and streamlining the government apparatus – the decision to overhaul USAID and NED could serve the purpose of redirecting resources to covert operations, especially in places like Africa or Asia where China’s Belt and Road has achieved remarkable progress. Moreover, in the age of social media, artificial intelligence and cognitive warfare there are cheaper and more effective ways to manipulate public opinion. The Trump administration will also continue imposing tariffs in an attempt to circumvent foreign competition, reshore supply chains and reindustrialize the country. Many analysts expect the tariffs will boost inflation and slam GDP growth.

In the shadow of the continuing hegemony of the financial sector it is highly debatable whether it is even possible to boost the real economy.

Confronted with China’s unrelenting technological progress – China’s leadership in most areas of AI has come to light – the U.S. has been forced to take a hard look at itself.

But for all his campaign promises, Trump won’t be able to bring about a “reinvigorated” and “renewed” America for a simple reason – more privatization, deregulation and unfettered capitalism, ruthless individualism, unchecked greed and self-interest, and a notion of government devoid of any sense of social responsibility is not a cure, it’s a disease. When individuals are forced into relentless competition for survival, they lose any sense of shared responsibility. In fact, it leads to extreme inequality and the concentration of power in few hands. It is also destroying lives. Over the past two decades, deaths of despair from suicide, drug overdose and alcoholism have risen dramatically, and now claim hundreds of thousands of American lives each year. Of course it’s easier to accuse China of supplying Fentanyl than addressing the root causes of its abuse.

As Richard Wolff pointed out,“empires often react to periods of their own decline by over-extending their coping mechanisms. Military actions, infrastructure problems, and social welfare demands may then combine or clash, accumulating costs and backlash effects that the declining empire cannot manage. Policies aimed to strengthen empire—and that once did—now undermine it. Contemporary social changes inside and outside the empire can reinforce, slow, or reverse the decline. However, when decline leads leaders to deny its existence, it can become self-accelerating.”

The Trump administration is aware that running a grotesque Truman Show as the Biden team did in a ridiculous attempt to deny reality, can only accelerate the downfall. In 2021 a senile Joe Biden used his first address before a global audience to declare that “America is back, the transatlantic alliance is back.” Four years later, on the same stage, at the Munich Security Conference, vice-president JD Vance told members of that alliance that they should “step up while America focuses on areas of the world that are in great danger.” He didn’t elaborate on the danger, there was no need to. Two days earlier in Brussels, Pentagon’s chief Pete Hegseth had already informed them that “The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing trade-offs to ensure deterrence does not fail. As the U.S. prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front.”

In 2025, the world is neither bipolar, as it was during the Cold War, nor is it unipolar, as it was in the 1990s; the strategic environment has changed beyond recognition and the U.S. cannot dominate every square of the chessboard. As Washington prioritizes projecting power in what it calls the Indo-Pacific, the Pentagon will reallocate there the forces that it plans to pull out of Europe and accelerate its military build-up in the region.

I expect all DIMEFIL (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and legal) instruments will continue to play a role in the U.S. strategy and policy towards China.

However, the competition between the American and the Chinese systems has a distinct cultural and civilizational dimension. Trump’s “revolution of common sense” is a return to conservative values, but the economy and society are so broken that it will take a long time for the country to gain a competitive edge over China, if ever. MAGA is a clumsy attempt to install a new cultural software without upgrading the system and that’s why it will fail.

What distinguishes a true society from a mere collection of individuals is cooperation – people working together to produce public goods that benefit all members of the society. Although societies differ in their tolerance of inequality, there is always a point beyond which unequal division of rewards ceases to seem legitimate. When people feel that they are not getting their fair share, they begin to lose trust and withdraw their cooperation. Which is a real problem since generalized trust is a critical ingredient for collective action, economic growth, and effective governance. According to all surveys, Americans’ trust in their government remains very low (around 22%) and has been declining for much of the 21^st century.

As John Gray observed in his recent book, New Leviathans: Thoughts after Liberalism, “In the competition with China, Western capitalism is programmed to lose. Only if the Chinese leadership makes a major mistake can the West hope to prevail. […] Systems in which market forces are directed by the state have an inherent advantage over those in which the government is captured by corporate power.”