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ISTANBUL – The scene is a Circassian restaurant off fabled Istiklal street in historic Beyoglu. On the table, a geopolitical banquet – served by some of the best independent analytical minds from Bursa to Diyarbakir. The menu, apart from a meze feast, is simple: only two broad questions about Sultan Erdogan’s approach to BRICS and to Syria.

Here’s a concise synopsis of our dinner – more relevant than a torrent of Western-manufactured word salads. Enjoy it with a hefty dose of the best arak. And let the table have the first – and last – word.

On BRICS: “Türkiye feels itself as part of the West. If we look at our political party leaderships and Turkish elites, right-wing or left-wing, there’s no difference. Maybe a little bit part of the East… Ankara is using its membership in BRICS as a bargaining chip against the West.”

Türkiye simultaneously could be a member of BRICS and NATO?

“Erdogan has no clear future plans. After Erdogan there’s no clear answer for the future of the AKP party. They could not establish a normal, permanent system. We have a governmental system just for Erdogan. We are receiving gas from Russia. We buy materials from China, assembling them in Turkish factories and selling them to Europe and the U.S. We have advantages in foreign trade compared to the EU, according to statistics published by the Turkish government. The biggest trade deficit is against Russia – and then China. This is our special position – and explains why Ankara does not want to lose the Eastern option. And at the same time we depend on the West to defend ourselves. All that explains our unique foreign policy behavior.”

So there’s no guarantee Ankara will agree to become a BRICS partner?

“No. But Ankara will not completely close the door to BRICS. Türkiye knows the West is losing its power. There are new dynamics, rising powers, but at the same time we are not a completely independent power.”

On the three pillars of Turkish society: “You can’t think about geopolitics without ideology. Erdogan and the AKP decided that it’s only possible to integrate Türkiye with a liberal-Islamist project. Almost two generations have grown with them – and they don’t know what happened before. They are neo-Ottomans, Islamists, pro-Arabization guys. In Türkiye, if someone openly supports Islamism, he is Arabized, ideologically. Here we have three pillars. The first one is a nationalist view – we have right Kemalism and left Kemalism. The other one is a Western perspective. And the third one is Islamist, also divided in two factions; one is nationalist and the other is liberal Islamist, integrated with Western institutions, NGOs and capital. That’s why we can say that wokeism and Islamism are different sides of the same coin. These guys are using the Turkish state to maneuver in the broader Middle Eastern geography – but in fact they are focused on Western-minded neoliberal economy, politics, society.”

Neo-Ottomanism, revived: “The West planned Syria together with them – the neo-Ottomans. During the Gaza war they kept sending oil to Israel, it was a P.R. thing for Erdogan, he needs to give this message to the grassroots anti-imperialist, Islamist part of Turkish society. The problem for Erdogan is that Türkiye is different from Arab countries, while Turkish capital is connected to the West, some of it connected with Russia, and Türkiye is dependent as much as 40% on Russian energy. Ankara needs to act in a balanced way, but that does not change the whole picture: Capital that supports Erdogan, and benefits from Erdogan, including 40% of the Turkish exports going to Europe. When it comes to BRICS, they can try to manage the relationship but they will never agree to join the BRICS directly.”

The Sultan never sleeps: “Erdogan is a pragmatist. Ideological. He can sell out the Palestinians – easily. He may be very powerful, and grasp how the state system works, but he does not enjoy total obedience from society to rule. That’s why he’s always aiming for some sort of balance.”

Can we say that with Greater Idlibistan under the control of Türkiye’s MIT – with Jolani as one of their main assets, if not the top asset – the MIT knew about the capabilities of HTS, and they knew this would stop in Aleppo?

“Not all the way to Damascus. That was the original plan. The aim of the operation was attacking the regime, The aim was not the conquest of Damascus. This was the best unexpected result of the attack. The military leadership of HTS said, “we lost our best warriors in the first moments of the operation”. But then came the collapse of the Syrian Army.”

So what does Erdogan really want? Rule over Aleppo or over the whole of Western Syria?

“Syria was part of the Ottoman empire. In his dreams, this is still the Ottoman empire. But he knows Türkiye’s limits in trying to rule over Syria – and the Arab world, enraged, could align against Türkiye. It’s possible – partly – to have a proxy government in Damascus. This is what Erdogan wanted from the Assad government only six months ago. Erdogan was begging to Assad, ‘please come to the table’. It turned out that he was actually sincere. Jolani said “we were really anxious that Assad would accept the offer by Erdogan’. This was the Assad government’s big mistake. Assad had already lost the ability to rule the country. Ankara never wanted the sudden collapse of the Assad government. To rule this chaos is not easy. And Türkiye does not have the military capacity to do it. HTS also does not. And without Türkiye HTS cannot survive.”

So Syria as a province of neo-Ottomanism is not gonna happen?

“This is not just Türkiye’s strategy. This is American and Israeli strategy – to cantonize Syria. So they achieved something, but it’s not finished. We don’t know what’s gonna happen. Remember before October 7, geopolitically no one could foresee what happened in Gaza. In Turkey’s case, this was a joint project. It began in 2011. The main goal was so obvious, to integrate Syria into the Western world. That failed, but the Americans stayed there, because they created a brand called ‘ISIS’, American investment in the Kurds, and in the end Türkiye, what they got was Idlib; it was necessary at the time, because Syria, Russia, Iran, they are not like the Americans or American-connected Islamists, they are not a destructive power. Step by step they wanted to “earn” Türkiye, with the Astana process. Türkiye in the end stuck with the American policy, they waited and waited and waited, and now they have something other than what they wanted. And that’s an alarming situation for Türkiye – because they don’t want Syria to be partitioned. It’s not even certain that the Americans will let Türkiye train the new Syrian army. The West now has total economic leverage.”