Ankara and Tel Aviv’s overlapping ambitions in Syria reveal a convergence of interests, exploiting the country’s collapse to reshape the region in their favor.
By Malek Al-KHOURY
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Israel’s recently halted war on Gaza has laid bare the ambitions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to expand the occupation state’s territorial reach in Palestine and the wider region.
This drive comes amidst internal debates over the identity of the so-called Jewish state – a discussion that began well before 2023’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, during Netanyahu’s standoff with the Supreme Court, and continues to this day.
Tel Aviv’s intentions have rapidly translated into action. The government has shown determination to re-occupy Gaza, extended its reach into southern Lebanon, and taken control of significant parts of Mount Hermon and the Quneitra region in Syria. Politicians and commentators in Israel openly call for settlement expansion in these areas, reflecting a long-standing strategic and ideological agenda.
These moves starkly contrast with the repeated calls from Arab and Muslim-majority countries for a two-state solution that requires Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 borders. Meanwhile, Israeli officials remain steadfast in their plans to consolidate control over the West Bank and formally annex the Syrian Golan Heights.
Post-Assad Syria’s pivot
Recent developments in Syria expose Israel’s growing appetite for expansion. Following the departure of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from Damascus last month, Israel launched its most extensive air and ground offensive in Syria since 1974.
Official Israeli statements have increasingly referenced Syria’s internal affairs. Foreign Minister Israel Katz recently justified intervention to “protect Syrian minorities” such as the Kurds and Druze, signaling broader strategic ambitions.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also weighed in, warning that unchecked Israeli expansion could extend “as far as Anatolia.” Syria’s fractured state has made the country a shared interest between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Last month, then US President-elect Donald Trump’s speech seemed to validate Turkiye’s long-standing aspirations in Syria, referring to an “unfriendly takeover” of the country, which Turkiye has wanted “for thousands of years.” He also alluded to the rebels being Turkish proxies, stating: “Those people that went in are controlled by Turkey.”
A divided Syria
Syria has increasingly become the stage for a fragmented geopolitical tug-of-war. Turkiye and Israel appear to be carving out spheres of influence rather than heading toward direct confrontation. The de facto leader in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (previously known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani), has already assured Israel of his intention to avoid conflict, hinting at a preference for coexistence over confrontation.
This competition reflects broader international interests in Syria’s strategic geography, a vital nexus in the heart of the Levant connecting the Persian Gulf, Turkiye, Asia, and Europe. Over the years, powerful players, including Iran, Russia, the US, and Israel, have intervened, each seeking to secure their interests in the country.
Turkiye has relied heavily on the extremists of Al Qaeda-affiliated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to project its power, culminating in symbolic victories such as Turkish spy chief Ibrahim Kalin praying at the Umayyad Mosque and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s high-profile meeting with Sharaa atop Mount Qasioun in Damascus.
Meanwhile, Israel is exploring its own tools for intervention. A steady stream of reports of atrocities by HTS fighters against minorities could provide Israel with a pretext for deeper involvement.
Netanyahu’s regional vision
Netanyahu’s ambitions are not limited to Syria. In a New York meeting with Erdogan before 7 October 2023, the two leaders discussed reviving the Haifa–Ceyhan pipeline project to export gas. While the feasibility of this initiative remains uncertain, it highlights their mutual interest in exploiting Syria’s geography.
Netanyahu has also consistently emphasized the need to control the West Bank as part of his vision to consolidate a “Jewish state.” Recent calls within Israel to reclaim the Sinai and retain strategic positions in southern Lebanon underline a broader agenda to expand influence under the guise of protecting minorities.
This strategy, sometimes framed as an “Alliance of Minorities,” is a recurring theme in the occupation state’s West Asia policy. Turkiye, too, has leveraged sectarian movements to extend its reach.
Turkish flags fly in northern Lebanon, while HTS fighters stage parades in Syria’s Deir Ezzor. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has sided with Ankara, while Druze Sheikh Muwafaq Tarif in Israel has advocated cooperation with Tel Aviv, reflecting a region divided by competing loyalties and strategic alignments.
Israeli officials have also consistently called for alliances with Syrian Kurds, while France and Germany seek to establish channels with Syria’s Christians, Kurds, and Alawites. These actions prompted Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to ironically criticize Paris’ meddling in Syria’s affairs.
These maneuvers have sparked heated debates among Syrians, with social media platforms becoming online battlegrounds for discussions on the country’s future. Some advocate for secular governance, while others call for partition or the defense of minority rights.
According to Israel Hayom, Israeli officials are considering a conference to divide Syria into cantons, further illustrating Tel Aviv’s growing interest in reshaping the region’s borders. Energy Minister Eli Cohen has proposed a regional conference to stabilize Syria, facilitating an eventual Israeli withdrawal while safeguarding strategic interests.
Mediterranean rivalries
Netanyahu’s ultimate goal appears to be expanding Israeli control into Syria, leveraging minority alliances to justify intervention. Simultaneously, Erdogan aims to assert dominance through Islamist blocs, creating a complex web of competing interests.
Amid these developments, Lebanon has emerged as a focal point for broader Mediterranean rivalries. The country’s new administration’s first official visit was from Cyprus, with Italy and Greece extending the initial invitations. This coincided with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) meeting with Greece’s president and the signing of a bilateral strategic treaty.
After years of waning influence in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, reacting to Turkish expansion, is renewing its clout in the country among its traditional Sunni allies and other sects, with the Saudi ambassador notably meeting with the Alawite Islamic Council in Tripoli, and throwing his weight behind the nomination of Christian former army chief Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s new president. These moves are part of Riyadh’s new strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean to thwart Ankara’s plays for dominance.
The competition for Syria and the wider region is no longer confined to military engagements but has evolved into a broader struggle for economic and political dominance. Syria will remain a key, albeit fragmented state caught between the ambitions of regional and global powers.
Original article: thecradle