By Geoff LAMEAR

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A new narrative has taken hold: Ukraine is no longer losing. According to this line of argument, Ukraine’s deep strike capability coupled with Russia’s looming economic and demographic crisis has created conditions where Russia will be forced to accede to a bargain that is more palatable for Ukraine and the West. This narrative has prompted Washington to explore augmenting Ukraine’s deep strike capability with Tomahawk missiles, and President Donald Trump even speculated that Ukraine would be able to reclaim its prewar borders. But given that the Russians have not changed their attritional strategy, and have enhanced their own deep strike capability, it’s worth examining the challenges involved in achieving this outcome.

The administration has oscillated between a conciliatory and confrontational stance towards Russia in bringing about a resolution to the Ukraine war, and this shift in rhetoric may just be the latest iteration in Trump’s pursuit of a deal. If so, there are still key challenges to overcome.

But Ukraine is fighting a war of attrition. Its advantages mean that Ukraine can achieve short-term gains like the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive or the 2024 Kursk counteroffensive; it cannot overturn long-term trends. Russia still enjoys a 2:1 artillery advantage based on Ukraine’s own estimates and is massively outproducing NATO in most deep-strike capabilities. Firepower is key in an environment where trench warfare, not maneuver, dominates. And this is why Russia is willing to tolerate economic sanctions and continued attrition: the fundamentals favor Russia in a marathon, even if they don’t in a sprint.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s disadvantages are not just material, but human. Ukraine has been attempting to preserve its young population to set conditions for a post-war recovery, and instead conscripts middle-aged men. But Ukraine has effectively hit its cap on new recruits under these constraints. For over a year, Ukraine has even been retaining amputees. An infantryman who loses a leg to a drone attack or an eye to shrapnel might be repurposed to conduct maintenance or to operate a tank.

Russia’s slow-roll westward may also snowball as Ukrainian manpower depletes. Ukraine’s manpower is its center of gravity; it cannot defend everywhere. As it becomes attrited, it has fewer personnel to defend the remaining front. Even now, some sections of the front are defended by landmines to offset the numerical disadvantage Ukraine faces.

If, on the other hand, this reflects an about-face in policy, then the United States still faces key dilemmas.

Foremost, the United States now has an economic stake in Ukraine after the approved mineral rights agreement between the two countries. As Russia pushes further west into the Donbas, much of the key minerals that the United States has future claim to will fall to Russia. Since attritional warfare favors Russia long-term, prolonging the war risks losing even more to the Russians.

The current mechanism for supporting Ukraine is using our European allies as  middlemen to pay for American weapons which are then transferred to Ukraine. Doing so ostensibly allows Europe to attrite Russia while securing revenue for the American defense base. But there is an opportunity cost in pursuing this course.

If Europe focuses its defense expenditures on buying American weapons for use in Ukraine, this prevents it from acquiring capabilities for its own defense. Consider Russia’s recent air incursions in Estonia and Poland. This reflects a real gap in NATO capabilities to rapidly detect and cost effectively secure its airspace. Addressing these gaps not only gives NATO more security, but it gives the United States more flexibility to deprioritize European commitments. Nurturing European dependence on America’s military is likely more costly than the revenue generated from foreign military sales.

Moreover, with estimates of Russia being able to reconstitute its military within five years post-war, Europe needs to establish credible deterrence. Deterrence lies in the capability of applying power, not the application of power itself. If Russia experiences pain, this is not a lesson in itself; but if Russia fears the potential pain which NATO could cause, this deters aggression. Latent power drives deterrence—and this means a stronger European industrial base and deeper alliance integration between European member states. Fostering Europe’s strategic autonomy is the best course for extricating the United States from an indefinite obligation.

Finally, American economic power is unlikely to change Russia’s willingness to persist in Ukraine. For one, Russia views Ukraine as a threat to its core interests, the same way Americans would be alarmed if China built a robust military alliance in Mexico. No amount of economic punishment can change this strategic determination. Furthermore, sanctions have not altered Russia’s willingness to fight in three years. In practice it has reinforced the trend of countries lowering dollar reserves, which directly erodes the purchasing power of Americans.

The United States could capitalize on the current impasse on Ukraine by focusing on encouraging European strategic autonomy. The more that NATO allies can pick up, the more the United States can prioritize disengagement. America First means America, first. Europe should be encouraged to serve its own interests.

Original article: RealClearWorld