By Zachary PAIKIN and George BEEBE

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The Helsinki Accords of 1975 show that an acceptable compromise to end the Russia-Ukraine War is possible.

Talks to end the Russia-Ukraine war are now advancing at a frenetic pace following the August 15 summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska. Discussions continue this week as members of the “coalition of the willing” meet in Paris to deliberate on so-called “security guarantees” for Ukraine. However, it remains uncertain whether agreed-upon measures will prove acceptable to Russia. There also remains the major sticking point of Putin’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the rest of the heavily fortified Donetsk region as a precondition for agreeing to a ceasefire.

The Trump-Putin summit occurred, unintentionally but symbolically, just two weeks after the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (also known as the Helsinki Accords). This document marked the high point of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and played a major role in eventually ending the Cold War. Finland hosted a conference earlier this summer to mark the anniversary, in its role as chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for 2025. In Washington, this significant milestone passed without much fanfare.

The lack of celebration is understandable. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which followed decades of declining trust in relations between Russia and the West, offers a visual reminder of just how far away we are from operating a shared security system based on common tools and principles in the wider Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. Still, the adoption of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 offers lessons that remain pertinent to the task of achieving peace in Ukraine and stability in Europe today.

First, and most famously, the Helsinki Final Act resulted in mutual recognition between the two Cold War-era blocs and the acceptance of the post-Second World War territorial status quo. Today, we are confronted with a similar challenge: Russia’s revision of the post-Soviet territorial status quo and annexation of parts of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

De jure recognition of these annexations should be out of the question, as they contravene the cardinal norm of territorial integrity (although US recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea has been mooted by Trump). That said, the principle remains the same: can Ukraine and Russia agree to disagree for now and defer this issue to future negotiations?

Neither Russia nor Ukraine has succeeded in realizing its territorial claims. Ukraine cannot realistically retake all of its sovereign territory by force. Meanwhile, Putin has made an initial move in the direction of compromise by dropping his previous position, outlined in June 2024, that Ukrainian forces must vacate the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions that Moscow claims to have annexed. However, his insistence on a Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk remains.

Accepting this demand would be exceedingly difficult for Kyiv, especially given its strategic significance and the amount of blood that has been spilled in its defense. Given that a pullback from Donetsk would significantly increase Ukraine’s vulnerability to another Russian attack, Kyiv wants Western security “guarantees” in exchange for any territorial concessions.

Original article:  nationalinterest.org