By Sabine BEPPLER-SPAHL

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Whenever Germans head to the polls, one question dominates all debate: How strong will the populist AfD become this time? Last Sunday’s district and mayoral elections in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)—Germany’s most populous state—provided a stark answer.

While Germany’s state broadcaster spoke of a “sigh of relief” when the ruling CDU emerged victorious with 33.3% of votes, keeping the AfD in third place at 14.5%, this narrative of triumph masks a far more troubling reality for Germany’s political elite.

Minister President Henrik Wüst, despite his CDU’s electoral win, admitted he could no longer “sleep peacefully” given the AfD’s result. His anxiety is well-founded. Though his party technically won, the CDU achieved its worst post-war result in the state. Meanwhile, the traditionally dominant SPD collapsed to a mere 22.1%—also its worst performance ever, following an already disastrous showing five years prior.

The AfD, by contrast, nearly tripled its 2020 result under circumstances that would have crippled any other party.

Fighting with One Hand Tied

This was no level playing field. The AfD’s structural weaknesses in western Germany meant the party could only field candidates in 60% of district constituencies. In 40% of constituencies, voters had no AfD option at all. The disparity was even more pronounced in mayoral races, where the party managed candidates in just 86 of 373 districts.

Yet where the AfD did compete, it struck fear into the establishment—most spectacularly in Gelsenkirchen, Hagen, and Duisburg, where AfD candidates forced runoff elections against CDU and SPD opponents. Hermann Binkert of polling institute Insa called this a “significant result,” noting that parties typically perform worse in local elections than federal ones. He believes these results signal the AfD’s potential ceiling of 33% nationwide support.

The AfD’s candidate shortage isn’t merely organizational incompetence—it’s the product of systematic intimidation. In the election run-up, international headlines reported seven deaths among AfD candidates, prompting questionable speculations even party leader Alice Weidel seemed to endorse on social media.

But murder plots aren’t necessary to explain the AfD’s recruitment challenges. No party in post-war Germany has faced such comprehensive state and societal assault. Standing as an AfD candidate—or even openly supporting the party—carries immense personal risk:

• Public sector employees face job loss after domestic intelligence classified the party as “confirmed right-wing extremist”
• Supporters find their cars vandalized
• Party offices are attacked
• Campaign events require heavy police protection
• Campaign workers face regular assault and intimidation

This state-sanctioned ostracism means only those with strong nerves and little to lose professionally or socially will campaign for the party. This partly explains why the party relies heavily on pensioners—and why several of the deceased candidates were either already suffering from serious health problems, or were even over 80.

The hysterical, threatening atmosphere has made elections for the AfD infinitely more difficult than for established parties. It’s no exaggeration to say that with this massive assault on populists, German elections are no longer truly free and fair.

This dynamic is starkly visible in the upcoming mayoral runoffs. That the AfD finished first with over 30% in the significant cities of Gelsenkirchen and Duisburg represents a shock and humiliation for the establishment. Their response? A desperate call to uphold the “firewall” against democracy itself.

Leading CDU politicians demanded that there should be no cooperation with the AfD even on a local level, and that all “democrats” vote against AfD candidates regardless of merit. SPD’s Sarah Phillip declared it the “shared responsibility of all established parties to push back the AfD.” This anti-populist conspiracy reveals the establishment’s contempt for voters’ actual preferences.

Yet there’s a strange dialectic at work: the establishment’s increasingly authoritarian tactics have strengthened populist resolve. Those who’ve lost trust in the system, despite relentless smear campaigns, vote AfD with even greater conviction—and mounting contempt for the establishment. The NRW elections prove the catastrophic failure of establishment anti-populist strategy.

The Western Breakthrough

These results carry profound significance beyond NRW. This election wasn’t just a mood check on the ruling CDU-SPD federal government—it was a crucial test of AfD strength in western Germany, long considered a bulwark against populism whose support base was concentrated in former East German states like Thuringia and Saxony.

For decades, NRW—the industrial heartland where trade unions held sway—was SPD country and the bedrock of Germany’s post-war two-party system. In 2014, before the refugee crisis, nearly 70% voted CDU or SPD (37.5% CDU, 31.4% SPD), while the AfD managed just 2.5%. Even in 2020, the AfD remained at only 5.5%.

The establishment’s complacent belief that western success was ‘God-given’ rested on the condescending assumption that only eastern Germans were susceptible to populism due to alleged authoritarianism.

The NRW election reveals how dramatically Germany’s power balance has shifted—and continues shifting nationwide. It’s barely an exaggeration to speak of revolution, progressively rendering established parties irrelevant. The SPD has long ceased being a workers’ party, scoring only among students and civil servants while hemorrhaging working-class votes to the AfD, as political scientist Stefan Marschall observes.

Political scientist Norbert Kersting points to AfD structural weaknesses—diverse candidates who haven’t distinguished themselves through “constructive local politics.” But the sustained attacks have forced the party to become more professional, organized, and politically convincing.

It’s not the AfD that appears inept—it’s the established parties failing their people. This failure is evident in all three cities where AfD candidates reached mayoral runoffs. Gelsenkirchen, Hagen, and Duisburg suffer from widespread poverty, deindustrialization, drugs, crime, spiraling social spending, and high migrant populations. Gelsenkirchen serves as a haven for gangs smuggling poor refugees from other EU countries, housing them in squalid conditions while skimming their welfare payments.

If the AfD wins any mayoralty, it would constitute a political earthquake. Though tactical voting campaigns make victory unlikely, the AfD will already be setting the agenda and defining debates. In Duisburg, the embattled SPD candidate even felt compelled to attack his own party, telling Bild: “I became a member of the Party of Labor, I’m for social justice. I don’t want to be cheated and screwed over.”

The New Reality

The AfD is here to stay, even in Germany’s far west—crucial because populists can only truly achieve power by consolidating their base in the more populous western regions. As Focus chief correspondent Ulrich Reitz puts it: “The West is where the political music is played. And the AfD has now become a strong Western party with these local elections. Because that’s what the voters wanted.”

The populist revolution continues unabated. But the beleaguered establishment will do anything to stop this dynamic, becoming ever more authoritarian in the process. This ensures even more voters will ask themselves which side they’re on: an establishment using state power to crush its challengers, or the force demanding change? The answer will determine Germany’s future.

Original article:  europeanconservative.com