Turkey managed the strategic advantage it gained after the fall of the Assad regime with a cautious foreign policy. This approach, which could be described as diplomatic appeasement, limited military activity on the ground and avoided excessive visibility in political transition processes.

Ankara shaped and implemented its new Syria policy along the lines of “regional ownership”. It did not rush into action regarding the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), an issue at the centre of its Syria policy, and instead supported the organisation’s efforts to seek common ground with Damascus.

Turkey embraced this process both to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity, and as a balancing strategy to block the YPG’s quest for international legitimacy. During this period, the YPG managed to buy time for itself by signing an agreement with Damascus, thereby escaping military pressure from both Ankara and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s administration.

Ankara adopted a similar appeasement policy towards Israel’s aggressive stance in Syria. Faced with Israel’s attempts to weaken the new Damascus administration and expand its own sphere of influence within Syria, Turkey activated diplomatic negotiations and intelligence mechanisms, and opted for technical talks to avoid direct military conflict.

During this time, Israel destroyed the military capacity of the new Syrian regime, expanded its territorial control over the Golan Heights, and carried out a symbolic air strike on Damascus to “protect” the Druze in the south.

But at this point, the strategy of appeasing both Israel and the YPG is not yielding results.

Israel seeks to create a direct sphere of influence in southern Syria, both to exclude Turkey from the region and to weaken the Damascus government, thereby creating an unstable and weak Syria. Developments centred on Sweida and policies pursued along sectarian fault lines also target the security architecture that Turkey seeks to establish within Syria.

Establishing dominance

Syria has become a new front for the strategic competition between Turkey and Israel. At this point, it seems difficult for Ankara to turn the tide without taking a more explicit deterrent stance against Israel’s regional interventionism.

Israel wants to establish absolute dominance in Syrian airspace. It is trying to shape the field with regular air strikes and intelligence operations in Syria.

Turkey, on the other hand, is aware that the only way to balance these asymmetric interventions is to strengthen the Damascus administration’s military capacity. Tel Aviv has declared Turkey’s institutionalisation of military cooperation with Damascus, and the signing of base agreements, as a “red line”.

Yet, this so-called red line appears more like a strategic bluff than a real deterrent. This is because Israel directly targeting Turkey’s military elements in Syria would mean inviting Ankara into a direct military conflict. Neither Tel Aviv nor Washington can risk such a scenario if Turkey acts decisively.

Israel’s policy in Syria is not limited to creating a new zone of influence by instrumentalising the Druze minority as a proxy actor to shape dynamics in southern Syria. The YPG issue is also a critical part of this equation. Israel is pursuing a strategy of narrowing Turkey’s room for manoeuvre on the ground through the YPG.

This strategy is being pursued not only on the ground, but also in the diplomatic arena, as Tel Aviv seeks to push the YPG beyond Turkey’s red lines by extending indirect security guarantees to the group. In other words, the YPG is counting on the possibility that Israel will target Damascus if the Sharaa administration or Turkey launches a military operation against it.

Israel’s goal is to prevent a possible agreement between the YPG and Damascus, weaken Turkey’s balancing capacity, and steer US policy on Syria in an anti-Turkey direction. Israel has allegedly lobbied Washington to replace figures perceived as close to Turkey’s position, such as Turkey’s US ambassador, Thomas J Barrack, with more Israel-aligned voices.

Ankara, meanwhile, is pursuing a clear threshold strategy on the YPG. Statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reveal that Turkey has given the YPG a certain amount of time, and expects the organisation to reach an agreement with Damascus during that period. Turkey sees this reconciliation as the key not only to neutralising the YPG, but also to strengthening Syria’s political unity.

Sustainable agreement

If this expectation is not met, however, Ankara has clearly stated that it will put the military option on the table more forcefully. This shows that Turkey prioritises transforming the YPG, but that it is also preserving the option of weakening it militarily if necessary.

For Ankara, the YPG issue is no longer limited to tensions with Washington. It is also emerging as a critical point of friction with Israel.

Turkey must consider three strategic scenarios for the future of the YPG. The first is to dominate and control the YPG. This option requires long-term intelligence and field dominance – but the current situation suggests that Ankara is not willing to choose this option.

The second is to transform the organisation by supporting a sustainable agreement between the YPG and Damascus. This model is possible with political coordination, and it would benefit both Ankara and Damascus. It would also reinforce Turkey’s policy of disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and weaken Israel’s attempts to exert influence over the Kurds.

The third option is to weaken the YPG through military force. Although this option is operationally feasible, it carries serious political risks. Such an intervention could negatively affect the disarmament process of the PKK within Turkey, damage relations with the US, push Turkey into an aggressive position in the field, and weaken the support of Arab countries. It could also make the Damascus regime more vulnerable to Israel.

Turkey now needs a more active strategy to counter Israel’s aggression. Strengthening military and diplomatic institutionalisation with Damascus, deepening joint diplomacy with Arab countries, and either integrating or neutralising the YPG before it becomes a threat should be the cornerstones of this strategy.

Turkey must go beyond appeasement and challenge Israel’s game with a cogent and proactive military-diplomatic strategy if it hopes to stop further deterioration of its strategic depth in Syria – and offset Israel’s growing influence.

Original article:  www.middleeasteye.net