Editor's Сhoice
June 27, 2025
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With a US-brokered ceasefire temporarily halting direct hostilities between Tel Aviv and Tehran, the Persian Gulf states are confronting a new strategic equation: A humbled Iran is dangerous, but a triumphant Israel is worse.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

At his 16 June press conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boldly declared, “We are changing the face of the Middle East,” as occupation forces pounded Axis of Resistance targets on multiple fronts. Netanyahu’s “change” was launched three days earlier with blistering strikes on Tehran, its military and nuclear facilities, and the assassinations of its top military commanders and nuclear scientists.

Tel Aviv’s direct clashes with Tehran were intended to push the region decisively to the edge of a broader war – one currently only paused by a US-imposed ceasefire on Tel Aviv.

For Arab states of the Persian Gulf – especially those allied with Washington – the sudden halt exposed a harsh reality: If Tel Aviv emerges from this confrontation dominant, the Arab world loses its last meaningful leverage.

A decisive Israeli victory over Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen would eliminate the last deterrents to Tel Aviv’s openly-touted, regional territorial expansion into Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine – even Jordan and Iraq. The Palestinian cause – long a strategic pressure card for Arab governments – would be dismantled overnight. And Gulf rulers, once shielded by regional rivalries, would find themselves beholden to an emboldened occupation state.

But only 11 days later, and despite US President Donald Trump’s claim of “obliterating” Iran’s nuclear program, US intelligence concluded that Tel Aviv’s – and later, Washington’s strikes – had only delayed Tehran’s enrichment cycle by a few months, key sites remained intact, and Iran had managed to move much of its enriched uranium prior to the attacks.

Even after the ceasefire took hold, Iran allegedly launched missiles toward Israel – though it swiftly denied this, while Trump publicly rebuked both sides and hailed the pause.

Netanyahu’s post-war ambitions

Long before any direct war with Iran, prominent Israeli ministers had already called for the formal annexation of the occupied West Bank, planned Gaza’s long-term reoccupation, distributed maps erasing the 1967 Green Line, and accelerated settlement construction.

Even before the 7 October 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, ministers in Netanyahu’s cabinet had pushed for annexing the occupied West Bank, dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA), and permanently occupying Gaza. Israeli officials have announced their readiness for 2025 as the “Year of Israeli Sovereignty” over “Judea and Samaria” (occupied West Bank), after preparing the necessary infrastructure for it.

If Iran could be sidelined, they believed, Hezbollah weakened, and Syria now governed by a western-installed administration with deep roots in Al-Qaeda, Tel Aviv would be free to redraw borders, entrench settlements, and pursue mass displacement with minimal resistance.

Even the threat of regional backlash had diminished in the minds of Israel’s right-wing government officials. The defeat or marginalization of the Axis of Resistance would remove the last meaningful brake on Israeli ambitions – enabling Tel Aviv to recast the political geography of the region from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean in line with maximalist Zionist goals of a ‘Greater Israel.’

The realist school of international relations proposes a concept called “Leveraging Military Victory,” which is really quite simple: When a party wins a major war, it can use its newly gained power and reputation to push for previously impossible policy changes. The victorious army is stronger, its enemies are weaker, and everyone has just seen that it is ready and capable of fighting – so, for a brief time, the map of regional bases becomes loose clay that the victor can shape to his liking.

If Israel had emerged as the clear victor, it would willfully seek to overturn the strategic balance that has defined borders and power centers in West Asia for decades. Arab states that once unknowingly relied on Iran’s deterrent umbrella to curb Israel’s vast regional designs would be stripped of their last buffer if the Islamic Republic were to fall now.

Tel Aviv would wield unchecked influence, not just over Palestine, but over its Arab neighbors, through economic coercion, political dictates, and a re-engineered regional security order centered around its own dominance.

Why Arab states need Iran to endure

Almost overnight, Iran’s Persian Gulf and Arab “frenemies” came to the stark realization that their decades-long desire to have Iranian power neutralized must be recalculated. They had thrived off the security umbrella that Tehran had provided, and without it, could become pawns in Israel’s hegemonic agenda.

For decades, a delicate balance of power defined West Asia. Neither Iran nor Israel could fully dominate because both faced serious costs to aggression. Iran’s network of allies – from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces in Yemen – served as a counterweight to US-Israeli designs. This balance gave Persian Gulf Arab states space to maneuver, even as they opposed Tehran rhetorically.

Today, that calculus has changed. The Trump-backed ceasefire may have halted the worst of the clashes, but it has also underscored how close Israel came to unilaterally reshaping the region. An Israeli victory would dismantle the existing balance and elevate Tel Aviv as the region’s sole hegemon.

In its place would emerge an occupation state emboldened to act with impunity. Iran’s endurance is not just a strategic preference – it is a necessity for preserving the last vestiges of Arab agency in the region.

This poses direct threats to neighboring states. Jordan faces the specter of West Bank annexation and potential mass refugee flows from Gaza. Egypt is alarmed by the possibility of Palestinians being pushed into Sinai, a scenario President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has called a red line.

Regionally, weakening Iran would reduce Tehran’s ability to fund and arm Palestinian resistance factions, reducing the Israeli and western need for Egyptian – and Qatari – mediation in future conflicts. Egypt relies on Israeli gas, which accounts for about 15–20 percent of its consumption; Tel Aviv has already halted supplies after closing its Leviathan and Kreish gas fields during the recent escalation, leaving Egyptian factories without fuel. In this way, Egypt may find itself forced to negotiate from a weaker position on issues of borders, energy, and security arrangements.

Lebanon remains under threat of constant Israeli provocation, with Israeli strikes on the state increasing during the war with Iran. It is no secret that Tel Aviv has long dreamed of annexing Lebanese territory to access the Litani River, and why stop there, where all obstacles are removed?

Syria has already seen the occupation of large areas of its southern territory by Israeli occupation forces, with field reports confirming that Tel Aviv has expanded to include the entire Golan Heights (around 1200 km²) plus about 500 km² in southwestern Syria. Israeli forces have also taken control of the Mantara Dam, Quneitra’s main source of water, providing them with an important strategic advantage in the face of any potential threat.

Even more critically, Gulf states would lose their strategic relevance. If Iran is neutralized, Washington no longer needs the Saudis, Emiratis, or Qataris to contain Tehran. Their utility as strategic partners erodes. What replaces it is a new US-Israel power axis where Persian Gulf states are merely clients, not partners.

Their influence in Washington would plummet, as would their ability to extract security guarantees, arms deals, or diplomatic support.

Between deterrence and domination

The war on Gaza and the Israel–Iran escalation have forced a sobering reassessment in Persian Gulf capitals. While these states long viewed Iran as a rival and threat, the specter of Israeli supremacy has revealed Tehran’s deterrent value. Iran’s capacity to arm resistance factions, challenge US dominance, and disrupt Israeli expansion gave Arab states room to breathe. Without it, their options narrow dramatically.

This is why, behind closed doors, many Gulf officials now quietly hope for an outcome that preserves Iran’s role. Not because they admire Tehran, but because they fear a future dictated by Tel Aviv. A weakened Israel – checked by a resilient Axis of Resistance Axis – ensures continued relevance and bargaining power for the Arab monarchies.

Indeed, several Gulf analysts have already warned that the post-ceasefire order could mark the end of any Arab strategic independence. The normalization wave with Israel, once seen as an economic hedge, is now viewed as a liability. This sentiment is increasingly common among Arab elites, who now see balance – not domination – as the only path to security.

Interestingly, this new understanding may usher in a strategic departure from seeking US protection, and drive these rulers to seek mediation with global powers like China and Russia to help implement new regional security arrangements. The Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iran reconciliation, after all, delivered a successful and enduring peace between the regional rivals, one that has not gone unnoticed in Arab capitals. It was a deal that Washington could not and would not have ever sought.

During the past week’s dangerous military confrontation, Iran launched retaliatory ballistic missile strikes targeting Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar – Washington’s largest military installation in the Persian Gulf and the headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM). The attack, which Iran dubbed ‘Operation Glad Tidings of Victory,’ marked a significant escalation and exposed how quickly Gulf states – especially those hosting US forces – could be pulled into a direct war.

In this post-ceasefire moment, the true fault line in West Asia is no longer simply Iran versus the rest of the Persian Gulf. It is between those who seek a multipolar region, with space for Arab autonomy, and those who would see it ruled from Tel Aviv.

For Washington’s Arab allies, the uncomfortable truth is that an enduring Iranian deterrent may be their last safeguard against an era of Israeli domination.

Original article: thecradle.co

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.
For Arab states, an enduring Iran is far better than a victorious Israel

With a US-brokered ceasefire temporarily halting direct hostilities between Tel Aviv and Tehran, the Persian Gulf states are confronting a new strategic equation: A humbled Iran is dangerous, but a triumphant Israel is worse.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

At his 16 June press conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boldly declared, “We are changing the face of the Middle East,” as occupation forces pounded Axis of Resistance targets on multiple fronts. Netanyahu’s “change” was launched three days earlier with blistering strikes on Tehran, its military and nuclear facilities, and the assassinations of its top military commanders and nuclear scientists.

Tel Aviv’s direct clashes with Tehran were intended to push the region decisively to the edge of a broader war – one currently only paused by a US-imposed ceasefire on Tel Aviv.

For Arab states of the Persian Gulf – especially those allied with Washington – the sudden halt exposed a harsh reality: If Tel Aviv emerges from this confrontation dominant, the Arab world loses its last meaningful leverage.

A decisive Israeli victory over Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen would eliminate the last deterrents to Tel Aviv’s openly-touted, regional territorial expansion into Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine – even Jordan and Iraq. The Palestinian cause – long a strategic pressure card for Arab governments – would be dismantled overnight. And Gulf rulers, once shielded by regional rivalries, would find themselves beholden to an emboldened occupation state.

But only 11 days later, and despite US President Donald Trump’s claim of “obliterating” Iran’s nuclear program, US intelligence concluded that Tel Aviv’s – and later, Washington’s strikes – had only delayed Tehran’s enrichment cycle by a few months, key sites remained intact, and Iran had managed to move much of its enriched uranium prior to the attacks.

Even after the ceasefire took hold, Iran allegedly launched missiles toward Israel – though it swiftly denied this, while Trump publicly rebuked both sides and hailed the pause.

Netanyahu’s post-war ambitions

Long before any direct war with Iran, prominent Israeli ministers had already called for the formal annexation of the occupied West Bank, planned Gaza’s long-term reoccupation, distributed maps erasing the 1967 Green Line, and accelerated settlement construction.

Even before the 7 October 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, ministers in Netanyahu’s cabinet had pushed for annexing the occupied West Bank, dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA), and permanently occupying Gaza. Israeli officials have announced their readiness for 2025 as the “Year of Israeli Sovereignty” over “Judea and Samaria” (occupied West Bank), after preparing the necessary infrastructure for it.

If Iran could be sidelined, they believed, Hezbollah weakened, and Syria now governed by a western-installed administration with deep roots in Al-Qaeda, Tel Aviv would be free to redraw borders, entrench settlements, and pursue mass displacement with minimal resistance.

Even the threat of regional backlash had diminished in the minds of Israel’s right-wing government officials. The defeat or marginalization of the Axis of Resistance would remove the last meaningful brake on Israeli ambitions – enabling Tel Aviv to recast the political geography of the region from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean in line with maximalist Zionist goals of a ‘Greater Israel.’

The realist school of international relations proposes a concept called “Leveraging Military Victory,” which is really quite simple: When a party wins a major war, it can use its newly gained power and reputation to push for previously impossible policy changes. The victorious army is stronger, its enemies are weaker, and everyone has just seen that it is ready and capable of fighting – so, for a brief time, the map of regional bases becomes loose clay that the victor can shape to his liking.

If Israel had emerged as the clear victor, it would willfully seek to overturn the strategic balance that has defined borders and power centers in West Asia for decades. Arab states that once unknowingly relied on Iran’s deterrent umbrella to curb Israel’s vast regional designs would be stripped of their last buffer if the Islamic Republic were to fall now.

Tel Aviv would wield unchecked influence, not just over Palestine, but over its Arab neighbors, through economic coercion, political dictates, and a re-engineered regional security order centered around its own dominance.

Why Arab states need Iran to endure

Almost overnight, Iran’s Persian Gulf and Arab “frenemies” came to the stark realization that their decades-long desire to have Iranian power neutralized must be recalculated. They had thrived off the security umbrella that Tehran had provided, and without it, could become pawns in Israel’s hegemonic agenda.

For decades, a delicate balance of power defined West Asia. Neither Iran nor Israel could fully dominate because both faced serious costs to aggression. Iran’s network of allies – from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces in Yemen – served as a counterweight to US-Israeli designs. This balance gave Persian Gulf Arab states space to maneuver, even as they opposed Tehran rhetorically.

Today, that calculus has changed. The Trump-backed ceasefire may have halted the worst of the clashes, but it has also underscored how close Israel came to unilaterally reshaping the region. An Israeli victory would dismantle the existing balance and elevate Tel Aviv as the region’s sole hegemon.

In its place would emerge an occupation state emboldened to act with impunity. Iran’s endurance is not just a strategic preference – it is a necessity for preserving the last vestiges of Arab agency in the region.

This poses direct threats to neighboring states. Jordan faces the specter of West Bank annexation and potential mass refugee flows from Gaza. Egypt is alarmed by the possibility of Palestinians being pushed into Sinai, a scenario President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has called a red line.

Regionally, weakening Iran would reduce Tehran’s ability to fund and arm Palestinian resistance factions, reducing the Israeli and western need for Egyptian – and Qatari – mediation in future conflicts. Egypt relies on Israeli gas, which accounts for about 15–20 percent of its consumption; Tel Aviv has already halted supplies after closing its Leviathan and Kreish gas fields during the recent escalation, leaving Egyptian factories without fuel. In this way, Egypt may find itself forced to negotiate from a weaker position on issues of borders, energy, and security arrangements.

Lebanon remains under threat of constant Israeli provocation, with Israeli strikes on the state increasing during the war with Iran. It is no secret that Tel Aviv has long dreamed of annexing Lebanese territory to access the Litani River, and why stop there, where all obstacles are removed?

Syria has already seen the occupation of large areas of its southern territory by Israeli occupation forces, with field reports confirming that Tel Aviv has expanded to include the entire Golan Heights (around 1200 km²) plus about 500 km² in southwestern Syria. Israeli forces have also taken control of the Mantara Dam, Quneitra’s main source of water, providing them with an important strategic advantage in the face of any potential threat.

Even more critically, Gulf states would lose their strategic relevance. If Iran is neutralized, Washington no longer needs the Saudis, Emiratis, or Qataris to contain Tehran. Their utility as strategic partners erodes. What replaces it is a new US-Israel power axis where Persian Gulf states are merely clients, not partners.

Their influence in Washington would plummet, as would their ability to extract security guarantees, arms deals, or diplomatic support.

Between deterrence and domination

The war on Gaza and the Israel–Iran escalation have forced a sobering reassessment in Persian Gulf capitals. While these states long viewed Iran as a rival and threat, the specter of Israeli supremacy has revealed Tehran’s deterrent value. Iran’s capacity to arm resistance factions, challenge US dominance, and disrupt Israeli expansion gave Arab states room to breathe. Without it, their options narrow dramatically.

This is why, behind closed doors, many Gulf officials now quietly hope for an outcome that preserves Iran’s role. Not because they admire Tehran, but because they fear a future dictated by Tel Aviv. A weakened Israel – checked by a resilient Axis of Resistance Axis – ensures continued relevance and bargaining power for the Arab monarchies.

Indeed, several Gulf analysts have already warned that the post-ceasefire order could mark the end of any Arab strategic independence. The normalization wave with Israel, once seen as an economic hedge, is now viewed as a liability. This sentiment is increasingly common among Arab elites, who now see balance – not domination – as the only path to security.

Interestingly, this new understanding may usher in a strategic departure from seeking US protection, and drive these rulers to seek mediation with global powers like China and Russia to help implement new regional security arrangements. The Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iran reconciliation, after all, delivered a successful and enduring peace between the regional rivals, one that has not gone unnoticed in Arab capitals. It was a deal that Washington could not and would not have ever sought.

During the past week’s dangerous military confrontation, Iran launched retaliatory ballistic missile strikes targeting Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar – Washington’s largest military installation in the Persian Gulf and the headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM). The attack, which Iran dubbed ‘Operation Glad Tidings of Victory,’ marked a significant escalation and exposed how quickly Gulf states – especially those hosting US forces – could be pulled into a direct war.

In this post-ceasefire moment, the true fault line in West Asia is no longer simply Iran versus the rest of the Persian Gulf. It is between those who seek a multipolar region, with space for Arab autonomy, and those who would see it ruled from Tel Aviv.

For Washington’s Arab allies, the uncomfortable truth is that an enduring Iranian deterrent may be their last safeguard against an era of Israeli domination.

Original article: thecradle.co