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A few days ago, it caught attention that Brazil is participating in “Locked Shields,” the West’s largest cyber defense exercise, held under the framework of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).

A total of 41 countries are taking part in the exercise, but Brazil is the only representative from Ibero-America. Notably, even countries traditionally close to the U.S. and NATO—such as Colombia and Ecuador—were not invited, nor was a country as ideologically aligned with the U.S. as Milei’s Argentina.

Generally, the training aims to test joint responses to large-scale cyberattacks through realistic scenario simulations.

However, there are several inconsistencies that cast doubt on whether Brazil’s participation aligns with its national interests.

First, the agreement for Brazil’s involvement was signed under the Bolsonaro administration, but the Lula government seemingly lacked the political will or interest to withdraw—which is regrettable.

Second, in practice, Brazil still lacks a comprehensive national cyber defense system. The Cyber Defense Command (ComDCiber), established not long ago, was originally intended for this purpose but ended up being restricted solely to protecting the Brazilian Army’s own systems. Given the absence of a broader cyber defense strategy, what tangible benefits could Brazil gain from these exercises? Very few.

Integration into NATO’s cyber warfare structures will likely lead Brazil to acquire NATO systems, adopt its doctrines, and request their specialists to train our own hypothetical future cyber forces. This, of course, will create a level of dependence in our forces that is poorly aligned with Brazil’s strategic interests and future challenges.

For instance, according to the F5Labs report “Cyberattacks Targeting Latin America,” the primary source of cyberattacks against Ibero-America is the U.S. In second place is Lithuania—also a NATO member and located in the Baltic region, where NATO’s Collaborative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is based.

Moreover, when considering Brazil’s interest in relying on NATO for cyber defense, it’s crucial to note that Brazil routinely uses U.S. Big Tech hardware and software (including operating systems) across all sectors—even within state institutions.

The problem is that, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, all Windows products come with built-in “backdoors” that facilitate access by the NSA (U.S. National Security Agency).

The implication is that tying our cybersecurity to NATO strategies and systems will, in fact, reduce our cybersecurity due to the intentional fragility of the hardware and software commonly used by Western allies and the U.S.’s notorious practice of spying even on its allies.

Outside the military, Brazil’s Federal Police (PF) also bases its cyber strategy on foreign technology—specifically Israel’s, such as the Cellebrite Premium software. In recent years, the PF has effectively served as a tool of influence for the CIA and Mossad in Brazil. The use of Israeli software could make the country vulnerable to Israeli espionage. It’s worth recalling that Brazil has already been spied on by Israel in the past and was even the target of an assassination of a key nuclear scientist by Israeli agents.

To understand the gravity of the issue, note that this is not an isolated case. In March 2024, the Cyber Defense Command participated in “Defence Cyber Marvel 4,” a UK-coordinated exercise that included Ukraine. Then, in October 2024, Brazil hosted “Guardião Cibernético 6.0,” which again primarily involved NATO countries.

Given the growing importance of cyber warfare in the era of hybrid conflicts, what we see is that Brazil remains in an excessively dependent position in this critical domain.