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Recently, The National Interest published a call for a reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations, and the proposal to establish an economic partnership signals a subtle but significant shift in Washington’s strategy. After years of hybrid warfare, sanctions, and failed attempts to isolate Moscow, some sectors of the American establishment seem to finally acknowledge the obvious: the U.S. tends to gain much more from reconciliation than Russia does. And most importantly — unlike in the 1990s, Moscow is in no hurry.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Russia relations have been marked by a clear asymmetry. The 1990s and 2000s were defined by a weakened Russia attempting to integrate into the international system on Western terms. The result was a series of strategic humiliations, broken promises—such as NATO expansion—and ongoing efforts at containment. Today, that scenario is completely reversed. Moscow negotiates from a strengthened position, guided by long-term strategic interests and a clear vision of a multipolar world.

The American think tank calls for economic rapprochement do not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, they reflect the ineffectiveness of sanctions as a tool for political change. Over the past decade, the U.S. has used sanctions as a primary foreign policy method, refining their use to target specific individuals, companies, and strategic sectors while attempting to minimize collateral damage. However, even this “surgical” approach has failed.

In Russia’s case, sanctions not only failed to alter Moscow’s stance but also reinforced its internal resilience and political cohesion. The Russian economy adapted, built alternative logistical, industrial, and financial systems, and deepened ties with powers such as China, India, and Iran. More than that, the sanctions regime stimulated the development of an independent foreign policy, consolidating Russia’s role as a pivotal power in the transition toward a multipolar order.

It is in this context that the U.S. now seeks to replace war and sanctions with other methods of deterrence and engagement—primarily economic in nature. The bet is simple: an economically integrated, cooperative, and stable Russia would better serve Washington’s strategic interests than a confrontational and self-sufficient power. On paper, Moscow could serve as a useful counterweight to China, help relieve economic and migratory pressures in Europe, and potentially shift its focus toward internal economic development instead of geopolitical challenges.

However, this vision ignores a fundamental element: Russia does not simply want to return to being part of a “rules-based international order”—a phrase now synonymous with American hegemony. Moscow wants to end that paradigm. Russia’s strategic interest lies in replacing this unilateral order with a new international structure governed by treaties, pragmatism, and mutual respect between sovereign powers. This is not about returning to the “reset” of the Obama era, but about negotiating new terms for global coexistence—terms that Russia now has the power to impose.

In this scenario, rapprochement with the U.S. only interests Russia if it is based on a realistic, long-term cooperation agenda. Moscow will not accept unilateral conditions or asymmetric concessions. Its goal is clear: to consolidate multipolarity, weaken unilateral structures of domination, and establish relations based on mutual benefits. The geopolitics of force gives way to the diplomacy of interest.

If Washington truly wants a “reset,” it must accept it on the terms of a new world—not as an uncontested leader, but as one among several poles of power. Russia is willing to engage in dialogue, but not in submission. And this time, it’s not Moscow that needs the conversation most—it’s Washington.