World
Ian Proud
March 6, 2025
© Photo: Public domain

If London really wants to sharpen up its armed forces, it should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body.

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Increasing defence spending to 2.5% will barely increase the size of Britain’s army. The UK should up its collaboration with Europe, create a DOGE like body and follow President Trump’s lead on diplomatic engagement.

On 25 February, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a plan to increase UK defence spending by 2027. Since Donald Trump spoke with Vladimir Putin on 12 February, European leaders have coalesced around the need to boost defence spending, with an American Article 5 defensive shield no longer guaranteed.

But with British defence spending already at 2.3% of GDP, talking up a 0.2% increase distracts from more significant issues. Britain’s military is tiny compared to Russia’s and we need to work in partnership with Europe.

Russia will spend twice as much as us on defence in 2025, but that money gives it ten times more troops than we have. Russia had over 400,000 troops in Ukraine at any time during 2024. When Britain went into Iraq in 2003, it did so with 46,000 armed forces personnel, our biggest deployment since the first Gulf War, when 54,000 UK personnel deployed.

We would struggle to muster anything near that number of troops to Ukraine in any future peacekeeping operation, even if Russia agreed, which isn’t assured. And despite armchair Adjutants like Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace claiming we should square up to the Russians and give them a bloody nose, Britain is too small to fight Russia alone.

Britain’s army today, includes around 132,000 regular service personnel. Russia’s numbers 1,320,000.

We get so few troops per pound because only 24% of the budget puts boots on the ground. In fact, the day-to-day budget this financial year to pay for the lads and lasses on the front line was cut by £2.5bn.

Many service personnel worry about whether they’ll have a house to live in. Submariners talk about the increased stress of longer deployments which have been driven by the need to cut costs. I would happily increase defence spending to redress these shortcomings.

But, across the MoD’s resource and capital budgets, Britain spends almost twice as much on equipment as it does on people. And that doesn’t include the £8.8bn worth of military equipment that is either written off or devalued each year. Yet despite this, the deployable equipment is decreasing all the time. For example, deployable anti-submarine forces are a 1/3rd of the size they were in 1985, when defence spending was around 4.1% of GDP.

Adding £6bn per year to UK defence spending – roughly an extra 0.2% of GDP – might just about reverse the 10,000 cut to British troops, baked into Boris Johnson’s 2021 Integrated Review.

But throwing money at the problem isn’t necessarily the right answer. In addition to working more closely with European defence partners, Britain desperately needs to tackle waste and inefficiency.

The MoD has a woeful track record in managing its equipment programmes: whether it’s a £430m overspend on the Warrior programme or £2.5bn overspent on the two new aircraft carriers, a 59% delay in delivering the Challenger 3 tank.

In March 2024, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee reported that the Ministry of Defence has been consistently unable or unwilling to control the spiralling costs and delivery schedules of its 1800 (yes, eighteen hundred) defence projects.

On 4 December 2023 the National Audit Office produced a review of the MoD’s equipment plan for the next decade concluding that it was ‘unaffordable and facing the largest budget deficit since the plan was introduced in 2012’.

According to the MoD’s estimates, the costs of the equipment programme shot up by 27% or £65.7bn between 2023 and 2024 alone. Add in the ‘worst case’, then the cost shoots up to over £104bn.

By far the biggest area of budgetary pressure is in the nuclear programme which is currently overspent by 62%. This programme includes the seven-year-delayed ‘Dreadnought’ submarine as a replacement for the SSBNSs that carry the UK’s nuclear missiles. There is a joint UK-U.S. project to build a new class of submarines to counter the apparent threat from China. We have a programme to design a nuclear warhead with the U.S., as if having 225 nukes wasn’t enough.

Before the war in Ukraine started, Britian spent a fraction over 2% of GDP on defence, in accordance with our NATO obligation. Ongoing support for the war in Ukraine and operations against the support to U.S. strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, added a further £3.9bn in spending in 2024/5. That bloated our spending, but gave us no more troops.

Even this meagre 0.2% increase in spending comes at the cost of cutting UK overseas aid by 0.5% of GNI to 0.3%. When the previous Conservative Government cut overseas aid from 0.7% to 0.5% in 2020, this was criticised by labour as damaging the UK’s reputation abroad. The Foreign Secretary David Lammy, in 2024 spoke of the embarrassment British Ambassadors felt at having to tell their hosts about aid cuts. I wonder how embarrassed he feels now; he certainly appears mendacious.

Spend 2.5% on defence if you want to. But if we really want to sharpen up our armed forces, the UK should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body. Turning the decrepit aircraft carrier of British government waste and graft will take many years. Before then and more immediately important, Kier Starmer might follow another of Donald Trump’s leads – by talking to Vladimer Putin and Russia.

Britian has avoided most attempts to engage in dialogue with Russia for over a decade already. The recent U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia focussed in significant part on re-establishing diplomatic ties in the respective capitals. The UK Embassy in Moscow is now a dusty Potemkin house with empty rooms inside. The cost of early investment in jaw jaw rather than war war could be counted in the millions rather than billions, and offer an immediate complement to the UK’s longer term boost in military capability.

Britain needs to DOGE its small army and reinvest in diplomatic engagement

If London really wants to sharpen up its armed forces, it should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Increasing defence spending to 2.5% will barely increase the size of Britain’s army. The UK should up its collaboration with Europe, create a DOGE like body and follow President Trump’s lead on diplomatic engagement.

On 25 February, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a plan to increase UK defence spending by 2027. Since Donald Trump spoke with Vladimir Putin on 12 February, European leaders have coalesced around the need to boost defence spending, with an American Article 5 defensive shield no longer guaranteed.

But with British defence spending already at 2.3% of GDP, talking up a 0.2% increase distracts from more significant issues. Britain’s military is tiny compared to Russia’s and we need to work in partnership with Europe.

Russia will spend twice as much as us on defence in 2025, but that money gives it ten times more troops than we have. Russia had over 400,000 troops in Ukraine at any time during 2024. When Britain went into Iraq in 2003, it did so with 46,000 armed forces personnel, our biggest deployment since the first Gulf War, when 54,000 UK personnel deployed.

We would struggle to muster anything near that number of troops to Ukraine in any future peacekeeping operation, even if Russia agreed, which isn’t assured. And despite armchair Adjutants like Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace claiming we should square up to the Russians and give them a bloody nose, Britain is too small to fight Russia alone.

Britain’s army today, includes around 132,000 regular service personnel. Russia’s numbers 1,320,000.

We get so few troops per pound because only 24% of the budget puts boots on the ground. In fact, the day-to-day budget this financial year to pay for the lads and lasses on the front line was cut by £2.5bn.

Many service personnel worry about whether they’ll have a house to live in. Submariners talk about the increased stress of longer deployments which have been driven by the need to cut costs. I would happily increase defence spending to redress these shortcomings.

But, across the MoD’s resource and capital budgets, Britain spends almost twice as much on equipment as it does on people. And that doesn’t include the £8.8bn worth of military equipment that is either written off or devalued each year. Yet despite this, the deployable equipment is decreasing all the time. For example, deployable anti-submarine forces are a 1/3rd of the size they were in 1985, when defence spending was around 4.1% of GDP.

Adding £6bn per year to UK defence spending – roughly an extra 0.2% of GDP – might just about reverse the 10,000 cut to British troops, baked into Boris Johnson’s 2021 Integrated Review.

But throwing money at the problem isn’t necessarily the right answer. In addition to working more closely with European defence partners, Britain desperately needs to tackle waste and inefficiency.

The MoD has a woeful track record in managing its equipment programmes: whether it’s a £430m overspend on the Warrior programme or £2.5bn overspent on the two new aircraft carriers, a 59% delay in delivering the Challenger 3 tank.

In March 2024, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee reported that the Ministry of Defence has been consistently unable or unwilling to control the spiralling costs and delivery schedules of its 1800 (yes, eighteen hundred) defence projects.

On 4 December 2023 the National Audit Office produced a review of the MoD’s equipment plan for the next decade concluding that it was ‘unaffordable and facing the largest budget deficit since the plan was introduced in 2012’.

According to the MoD’s estimates, the costs of the equipment programme shot up by 27% or £65.7bn between 2023 and 2024 alone. Add in the ‘worst case’, then the cost shoots up to over £104bn.

By far the biggest area of budgetary pressure is in the nuclear programme which is currently overspent by 62%. This programme includes the seven-year-delayed ‘Dreadnought’ submarine as a replacement for the SSBNSs that carry the UK’s nuclear missiles. There is a joint UK-U.S. project to build a new class of submarines to counter the apparent threat from China. We have a programme to design a nuclear warhead with the U.S., as if having 225 nukes wasn’t enough.

Before the war in Ukraine started, Britian spent a fraction over 2% of GDP on defence, in accordance with our NATO obligation. Ongoing support for the war in Ukraine and operations against the support to U.S. strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, added a further £3.9bn in spending in 2024/5. That bloated our spending, but gave us no more troops.

Even this meagre 0.2% increase in spending comes at the cost of cutting UK overseas aid by 0.5% of GNI to 0.3%. When the previous Conservative Government cut overseas aid from 0.7% to 0.5% in 2020, this was criticised by labour as damaging the UK’s reputation abroad. The Foreign Secretary David Lammy, in 2024 spoke of the embarrassment British Ambassadors felt at having to tell their hosts about aid cuts. I wonder how embarrassed he feels now; he certainly appears mendacious.

Spend 2.5% on defence if you want to. But if we really want to sharpen up our armed forces, the UK should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body. Turning the decrepit aircraft carrier of British government waste and graft will take many years. Before then and more immediately important, Kier Starmer might follow another of Donald Trump’s leads – by talking to Vladimer Putin and Russia.

Britian has avoided most attempts to engage in dialogue with Russia for over a decade already. The recent U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia focussed in significant part on re-establishing diplomatic ties in the respective capitals. The UK Embassy in Moscow is now a dusty Potemkin house with empty rooms inside. The cost of early investment in jaw jaw rather than war war could be counted in the millions rather than billions, and offer an immediate complement to the UK’s longer term boost in military capability.

If London really wants to sharpen up its armed forces, it should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Increasing defence spending to 2.5% will barely increase the size of Britain’s army. The UK should up its collaboration with Europe, create a DOGE like body and follow President Trump’s lead on diplomatic engagement.

On 25 February, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a plan to increase UK defence spending by 2027. Since Donald Trump spoke with Vladimir Putin on 12 February, European leaders have coalesced around the need to boost defence spending, with an American Article 5 defensive shield no longer guaranteed.

But with British defence spending already at 2.3% of GDP, talking up a 0.2% increase distracts from more significant issues. Britain’s military is tiny compared to Russia’s and we need to work in partnership with Europe.

Russia will spend twice as much as us on defence in 2025, but that money gives it ten times more troops than we have. Russia had over 400,000 troops in Ukraine at any time during 2024. When Britain went into Iraq in 2003, it did so with 46,000 armed forces personnel, our biggest deployment since the first Gulf War, when 54,000 UK personnel deployed.

We would struggle to muster anything near that number of troops to Ukraine in any future peacekeeping operation, even if Russia agreed, which isn’t assured. And despite armchair Adjutants like Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace claiming we should square up to the Russians and give them a bloody nose, Britain is too small to fight Russia alone.

Britain’s army today, includes around 132,000 regular service personnel. Russia’s numbers 1,320,000.

We get so few troops per pound because only 24% of the budget puts boots on the ground. In fact, the day-to-day budget this financial year to pay for the lads and lasses on the front line was cut by £2.5bn.

Many service personnel worry about whether they’ll have a house to live in. Submariners talk about the increased stress of longer deployments which have been driven by the need to cut costs. I would happily increase defence spending to redress these shortcomings.

But, across the MoD’s resource and capital budgets, Britain spends almost twice as much on equipment as it does on people. And that doesn’t include the £8.8bn worth of military equipment that is either written off or devalued each year. Yet despite this, the deployable equipment is decreasing all the time. For example, deployable anti-submarine forces are a 1/3rd of the size they were in 1985, when defence spending was around 4.1% of GDP.

Adding £6bn per year to UK defence spending – roughly an extra 0.2% of GDP – might just about reverse the 10,000 cut to British troops, baked into Boris Johnson’s 2021 Integrated Review.

But throwing money at the problem isn’t necessarily the right answer. In addition to working more closely with European defence partners, Britain desperately needs to tackle waste and inefficiency.

The MoD has a woeful track record in managing its equipment programmes: whether it’s a £430m overspend on the Warrior programme or £2.5bn overspent on the two new aircraft carriers, a 59% delay in delivering the Challenger 3 tank.

In March 2024, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee reported that the Ministry of Defence has been consistently unable or unwilling to control the spiralling costs and delivery schedules of its 1800 (yes, eighteen hundred) defence projects.

On 4 December 2023 the National Audit Office produced a review of the MoD’s equipment plan for the next decade concluding that it was ‘unaffordable and facing the largest budget deficit since the plan was introduced in 2012’.

According to the MoD’s estimates, the costs of the equipment programme shot up by 27% or £65.7bn between 2023 and 2024 alone. Add in the ‘worst case’, then the cost shoots up to over £104bn.

By far the biggest area of budgetary pressure is in the nuclear programme which is currently overspent by 62%. This programme includes the seven-year-delayed ‘Dreadnought’ submarine as a replacement for the SSBNSs that carry the UK’s nuclear missiles. There is a joint UK-U.S. project to build a new class of submarines to counter the apparent threat from China. We have a programme to design a nuclear warhead with the U.S., as if having 225 nukes wasn’t enough.

Before the war in Ukraine started, Britian spent a fraction over 2% of GDP on defence, in accordance with our NATO obligation. Ongoing support for the war in Ukraine and operations against the support to U.S. strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, added a further £3.9bn in spending in 2024/5. That bloated our spending, but gave us no more troops.

Even this meagre 0.2% increase in spending comes at the cost of cutting UK overseas aid by 0.5% of GNI to 0.3%. When the previous Conservative Government cut overseas aid from 0.7% to 0.5% in 2020, this was criticised by labour as damaging the UK’s reputation abroad. The Foreign Secretary David Lammy, in 2024 spoke of the embarrassment British Ambassadors felt at having to tell their hosts about aid cuts. I wonder how embarrassed he feels now; he certainly appears mendacious.

Spend 2.5% on defence if you want to. But if we really want to sharpen up our armed forces, the UK should, as Donald Trump has done, create a DOGE like body. Turning the decrepit aircraft carrier of British government waste and graft will take many years. Before then and more immediately important, Kier Starmer might follow another of Donald Trump’s leads – by talking to Vladimer Putin and Russia.

Britian has avoided most attempts to engage in dialogue with Russia for over a decade already. The recent U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia focussed in significant part on re-establishing diplomatic ties in the respective capitals. The UK Embassy in Moscow is now a dusty Potemkin house with empty rooms inside. The cost of early investment in jaw jaw rather than war war could be counted in the millions rather than billions, and offer an immediate complement to the UK’s longer term boost in military capability.

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.

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The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.