Featured Story
Ian Proud
March 2, 2025
© Photo: SCF

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

When western pundits resist efforts to bring an end to fighting in Ukraine, they never provide an alternative vision of what they would do differently.

A respected associate of mine asked me today if a ceasefire and peace process in Ukraine would simply embolden China and Russia to further aggression.

This is a line oft repeated among the majority of politicians, journalists and so-called academics in the west, who are opposed to an ending of the war. ‘We can’t stop the war, because if we do, China will invade Taiwan and Russia will invade Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland etc.’

My view, for what it’s worth, is that an end to the war in Ukraine might embolden China longer-term over Taiwan in particular. I’ve seen no evidence that it will embolden Russia to invade NATO, precisely because Russia sees itself, in large part, as a country of Europe, even if it has been excluded.

However, and critically, if both China and Russia were so emboldened, then should we not ask ourselves how we have ended up in this position?

Russia’s decision to go to war was driven by a belief that it’s core strategic interests in preventing NATO expansion to its border via Ukraine was being ignored, and that it was subject to permanent sanctions with no possibility of removal through any concessions it might make.

That’s my opinion and one I know that many ‘realists’ share.

But, in any case, the ‘what next’ question should have been considered as part of a longer-term strategic assessment when western nations pushed the NATO enlargement agenda.

We have known since at least 2008 that this was a redline for Russia.

Did we expect Russia’s position to change and if so, how? If Russia’s position did not change, how far would we go to advance Ukraine’s NATO aspiration, including through direct military confrontation?

I’m not aware that those questions were ever asked or, if they were, considered rather than dismissed. And I was at the heart of British government decision making from the latter part of 2013, before the Ukraine crisis started (and must therefore accept some of the blame).

Without the United States, a war in Ukraine was never going to be sustainable for Europe, financially, politically or militarily.

Yet no one thought this through. Or, if they did, they didn’t factor in the eminent risk of America doing an about face on policy one day, as is now happening.

With America now withdrawing, sustaining a losing war in Ukraine rather than calling a halt to the killing cannot be considered a legitimate strategy if its only goal is to avoid losing face.

That makes us look weaker and more feckless.

If other states are now emboldened by the failure of western policy in Ukraine, that is not a sufficient reason to avoid an end to the bloodshed now.

Our self-righteousness indignation to peace is merely a figleaf covering the deflated genitals of our policy failure.

The west so badly mishandled relations in the eight years between the flashpoint of the Maidan and the start of war, not thinking through the consequences.

Russian actions and reactions in Ukraine have always been predictable.

They were predictable in February 2014.

They were predictable in February 2022.

They were predictable in February 2025.

We were never going to fight for Ukraine.

I have heard senior British Ambassadors say that we were never going to fight for Ukraine. And we are the most hawkish nation in Europe.

Why were we never going to fight?

Because it would never be possible to ensure that the 27 nations of the EU or the 31 nations of NATO would come to a collective agreement to fight.

Someone would always block fighting.

Compromises would be made.

We would pursue a lowest common denominator. That led us to a sanctions-only approach.

As I have said many times before, in the game of geostrategic chess, President Putin always knew that large, chattering teams of politicians around the table couldn’t outmanoeuvre him.

In fact, they would take weeks and months just to agree on the meaning of pawn, let alone whether to move it on the board.

We lost through indecision and have yet to learn the lesson.

You can’t fight wars by committee. But you can make peace in a group.

As Albert Einstein said, ‘we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them’. That is seen by some as the source of the misattributed saying, ‘the definition of insanity is to do the same thing but expect a different result.’

As the war in Ukraine grinds towards its diplomatic denouement, those people who would like to avoid a negotiated settlement are not coming up with an alternative approach.

They are not introducing new ideas to up the ante, if that is what they want to do. In fact, I don’t know what they want to do, because they’ve been saying exactly the same things for three years and I am epically bored right now.

The problem here, is that neither are they advancing a credible argument against ending the war.

Their position seems to be, the war is bad, it’s all Russia’s fault and if we give in now, Russia will be emboldened to strike elsewhere.

Their defensive position is held together by straplines not substantive arguments.

In a recent speech, the veteran U.S. Democrat politician Bernie Sanders said,

‘Russia started the war, not Ukraine,

Putin is a dictator, not Zelensky.’

While I am sure he may believe that it’s just another banal outburst, intended more to rail against the political leaders in his own country, rather than to bring peace in Ukraine.

Of course, people view the origins of the war differently and people are entitled to their views.

Debate on the war in Ukraine has become reduced to ‘I’m right and you are wrong’ with voices of reason and realism in the west, like mine, stifled by the mainstream.

But we will never reach a position in which there is a universally accepted view of who was at fault and who was not.

Instead, let’s try to accept that every side in this conflict takes some share of the blame, be that Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., UK and everyone else.

Let’s have a frank but polite discussion about a way forward.

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting. British and European leaders can’t continue unchallenged, carrying on as if the world hasn’t changed.

They need to come up with genuinely new and constructive ideas, rather than continuing to say the same things. And reengage in dialogue with Russia.

The pro-war lobby in the West needs to come up with new ideas, rather than saying the same old things

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

When western pundits resist efforts to bring an end to fighting in Ukraine, they never provide an alternative vision of what they would do differently.

A respected associate of mine asked me today if a ceasefire and peace process in Ukraine would simply embolden China and Russia to further aggression.

This is a line oft repeated among the majority of politicians, journalists and so-called academics in the west, who are opposed to an ending of the war. ‘We can’t stop the war, because if we do, China will invade Taiwan and Russia will invade Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland etc.’

My view, for what it’s worth, is that an end to the war in Ukraine might embolden China longer-term over Taiwan in particular. I’ve seen no evidence that it will embolden Russia to invade NATO, precisely because Russia sees itself, in large part, as a country of Europe, even if it has been excluded.

However, and critically, if both China and Russia were so emboldened, then should we not ask ourselves how we have ended up in this position?

Russia’s decision to go to war was driven by a belief that it’s core strategic interests in preventing NATO expansion to its border via Ukraine was being ignored, and that it was subject to permanent sanctions with no possibility of removal through any concessions it might make.

That’s my opinion and one I know that many ‘realists’ share.

But, in any case, the ‘what next’ question should have been considered as part of a longer-term strategic assessment when western nations pushed the NATO enlargement agenda.

We have known since at least 2008 that this was a redline for Russia.

Did we expect Russia’s position to change and if so, how? If Russia’s position did not change, how far would we go to advance Ukraine’s NATO aspiration, including through direct military confrontation?

I’m not aware that those questions were ever asked or, if they were, considered rather than dismissed. And I was at the heart of British government decision making from the latter part of 2013, before the Ukraine crisis started (and must therefore accept some of the blame).

Without the United States, a war in Ukraine was never going to be sustainable for Europe, financially, politically or militarily.

Yet no one thought this through. Or, if they did, they didn’t factor in the eminent risk of America doing an about face on policy one day, as is now happening.

With America now withdrawing, sustaining a losing war in Ukraine rather than calling a halt to the killing cannot be considered a legitimate strategy if its only goal is to avoid losing face.

That makes us look weaker and more feckless.

If other states are now emboldened by the failure of western policy in Ukraine, that is not a sufficient reason to avoid an end to the bloodshed now.

Our self-righteousness indignation to peace is merely a figleaf covering the deflated genitals of our policy failure.

The west so badly mishandled relations in the eight years between the flashpoint of the Maidan and the start of war, not thinking through the consequences.

Russian actions and reactions in Ukraine have always been predictable.

They were predictable in February 2014.

They were predictable in February 2022.

They were predictable in February 2025.

We were never going to fight for Ukraine.

I have heard senior British Ambassadors say that we were never going to fight for Ukraine. And we are the most hawkish nation in Europe.

Why were we never going to fight?

Because it would never be possible to ensure that the 27 nations of the EU or the 31 nations of NATO would come to a collective agreement to fight.

Someone would always block fighting.

Compromises would be made.

We would pursue a lowest common denominator. That led us to a sanctions-only approach.

As I have said many times before, in the game of geostrategic chess, President Putin always knew that large, chattering teams of politicians around the table couldn’t outmanoeuvre him.

In fact, they would take weeks and months just to agree on the meaning of pawn, let alone whether to move it on the board.

We lost through indecision and have yet to learn the lesson.

You can’t fight wars by committee. But you can make peace in a group.

As Albert Einstein said, ‘we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them’. That is seen by some as the source of the misattributed saying, ‘the definition of insanity is to do the same thing but expect a different result.’

As the war in Ukraine grinds towards its diplomatic denouement, those people who would like to avoid a negotiated settlement are not coming up with an alternative approach.

They are not introducing new ideas to up the ante, if that is what they want to do. In fact, I don’t know what they want to do, because they’ve been saying exactly the same things for three years and I am epically bored right now.

The problem here, is that neither are they advancing a credible argument against ending the war.

Their position seems to be, the war is bad, it’s all Russia’s fault and if we give in now, Russia will be emboldened to strike elsewhere.

Their defensive position is held together by straplines not substantive arguments.

In a recent speech, the veteran U.S. Democrat politician Bernie Sanders said,

‘Russia started the war, not Ukraine,

Putin is a dictator, not Zelensky.’

While I am sure he may believe that it’s just another banal outburst, intended more to rail against the political leaders in his own country, rather than to bring peace in Ukraine.

Of course, people view the origins of the war differently and people are entitled to their views.

Debate on the war in Ukraine has become reduced to ‘I’m right and you are wrong’ with voices of reason and realism in the west, like mine, stifled by the mainstream.

But we will never reach a position in which there is a universally accepted view of who was at fault and who was not.

Instead, let’s try to accept that every side in this conflict takes some share of the blame, be that Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., UK and everyone else.

Let’s have a frank but polite discussion about a way forward.

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting. British and European leaders can’t continue unchallenged, carrying on as if the world hasn’t changed.

They need to come up with genuinely new and constructive ideas, rather than continuing to say the same things. And reengage in dialogue with Russia.

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

When western pundits resist efforts to bring an end to fighting in Ukraine, they never provide an alternative vision of what they would do differently.

A respected associate of mine asked me today if a ceasefire and peace process in Ukraine would simply embolden China and Russia to further aggression.

This is a line oft repeated among the majority of politicians, journalists and so-called academics in the west, who are opposed to an ending of the war. ‘We can’t stop the war, because if we do, China will invade Taiwan and Russia will invade Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland etc.’

My view, for what it’s worth, is that an end to the war in Ukraine might embolden China longer-term over Taiwan in particular. I’ve seen no evidence that it will embolden Russia to invade NATO, precisely because Russia sees itself, in large part, as a country of Europe, even if it has been excluded.

However, and critically, if both China and Russia were so emboldened, then should we not ask ourselves how we have ended up in this position?

Russia’s decision to go to war was driven by a belief that it’s core strategic interests in preventing NATO expansion to its border via Ukraine was being ignored, and that it was subject to permanent sanctions with no possibility of removal through any concessions it might make.

That’s my opinion and one I know that many ‘realists’ share.

But, in any case, the ‘what next’ question should have been considered as part of a longer-term strategic assessment when western nations pushed the NATO enlargement agenda.

We have known since at least 2008 that this was a redline for Russia.

Did we expect Russia’s position to change and if so, how? If Russia’s position did not change, how far would we go to advance Ukraine’s NATO aspiration, including through direct military confrontation?

I’m not aware that those questions were ever asked or, if they were, considered rather than dismissed. And I was at the heart of British government decision making from the latter part of 2013, before the Ukraine crisis started (and must therefore accept some of the blame).

Without the United States, a war in Ukraine was never going to be sustainable for Europe, financially, politically or militarily.

Yet no one thought this through. Or, if they did, they didn’t factor in the eminent risk of America doing an about face on policy one day, as is now happening.

With America now withdrawing, sustaining a losing war in Ukraine rather than calling a halt to the killing cannot be considered a legitimate strategy if its only goal is to avoid losing face.

That makes us look weaker and more feckless.

If other states are now emboldened by the failure of western policy in Ukraine, that is not a sufficient reason to avoid an end to the bloodshed now.

Our self-righteousness indignation to peace is merely a figleaf covering the deflated genitals of our policy failure.

The west so badly mishandled relations in the eight years between the flashpoint of the Maidan and the start of war, not thinking through the consequences.

Russian actions and reactions in Ukraine have always been predictable.

They were predictable in February 2014.

They were predictable in February 2022.

They were predictable in February 2025.

We were never going to fight for Ukraine.

I have heard senior British Ambassadors say that we were never going to fight for Ukraine. And we are the most hawkish nation in Europe.

Why were we never going to fight?

Because it would never be possible to ensure that the 27 nations of the EU or the 31 nations of NATO would come to a collective agreement to fight.

Someone would always block fighting.

Compromises would be made.

We would pursue a lowest common denominator. That led us to a sanctions-only approach.

As I have said many times before, in the game of geostrategic chess, President Putin always knew that large, chattering teams of politicians around the table couldn’t outmanoeuvre him.

In fact, they would take weeks and months just to agree on the meaning of pawn, let alone whether to move it on the board.

We lost through indecision and have yet to learn the lesson.

You can’t fight wars by committee. But you can make peace in a group.

As Albert Einstein said, ‘we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them’. That is seen by some as the source of the misattributed saying, ‘the definition of insanity is to do the same thing but expect a different result.’

As the war in Ukraine grinds towards its diplomatic denouement, those people who would like to avoid a negotiated settlement are not coming up with an alternative approach.

They are not introducing new ideas to up the ante, if that is what they want to do. In fact, I don’t know what they want to do, because they’ve been saying exactly the same things for three years and I am epically bored right now.

The problem here, is that neither are they advancing a credible argument against ending the war.

Their position seems to be, the war is bad, it’s all Russia’s fault and if we give in now, Russia will be emboldened to strike elsewhere.

Their defensive position is held together by straplines not substantive arguments.

In a recent speech, the veteran U.S. Democrat politician Bernie Sanders said,

‘Russia started the war, not Ukraine,

Putin is a dictator, not Zelensky.’

While I am sure he may believe that it’s just another banal outburst, intended more to rail against the political leaders in his own country, rather than to bring peace in Ukraine.

Of course, people view the origins of the war differently and people are entitled to their views.

Debate on the war in Ukraine has become reduced to ‘I’m right and you are wrong’ with voices of reason and realism in the west, like mine, stifled by the mainstream.

But we will never reach a position in which there is a universally accepted view of who was at fault and who was not.

Instead, let’s try to accept that every side in this conflict takes some share of the blame, be that Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., UK and everyone else.

Let’s have a frank but polite discussion about a way forward.

President Trump has advanced a new policy proposition that engagement and dialogue is vital if we are to bring an end to the fighting. British and European leaders can’t continue unchallenged, carrying on as if the world hasn’t changed.

They need to come up with genuinely new and constructive ideas, rather than continuing to say the same things. And reengage in dialogue with Russia.

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.

See also

See also

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.