Featured Story
Lorenzo Maria Pacini
February 27, 2025
© Photo: Social media

Călin Georgescu has been arrested. Now Romania has a great opportunity.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Every cloud has a silver lining

On February 26, 2025, Călin Georgescu – president-elect in the 2024 Romanian elections and then deposed under pressure from the EU by annulling the election results in violation of Romanian national laws – was arrested on his way to present his candidacy for the presidency of Romania. The car he was traveling in was blocked in traffic and he was taken for questioning at the Attorney General’s office.

There you have it, ladies and gentlemen, another exemplary episode of European democracy. When the arrogance and arrogance of democracy and information warfare are not enough, the henchmen of London, Washington and Tel Aviv resort to strong-arm tactics. It’s certainly nothing new, but what is striking every time is the total nonchalance with which such events are carried out, while the mass of citizens stand by and watch helplessly. Or not.

This time the situation is very, very heated. At the election, Georgescu had won 22.94% of the vote, beating former premier Marcel Ciolacu, who was considered the favorite, and Elena Lasconi (whose campaign was financed by USAID). In total, the Romanian right wing had won 55% of the vote. In Bucharest the crowds were celebrating. The problem is that Georgescu was accused of deception and propaganda, of being too pro-Russian: the accusers accused him of having received money from the Kremlin to make electoral propaganda on social media. He was therefore impeached by the European Union, to the point of arbitrarily canceling the election result.

A few weeks later, at the end of December, the truth emerged. The Romanian tax agency ANAF has established that the TikTok campaign of the winner of the annulment of the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, Kelin Georgescu, was not paid for by the Russians, as stated by Romanian intelligence (which was the formal reason for the annulment of the first round results), but by the pro-European National Liberal Party of Romania. The tax service has determined that Georgescu-Roegen’s social media campaign was paid for by the National Liberals, whose goal was to turn voters away from their rivals, the Social Democrats. Following investigations by Snoop investigators, the company hired by the Kensington liberals admitted that the campaign was paid for by the PNL, but claims that it was part of a larger campaign conducted “under the direction of the National Liberal Party to raise public awareness”.

A real electoral deception, in perfect novelistic style.

From that moment on, Romanian citizens began to protest the situation. Weeks and weeks of squares and streets full of demonstrators led President Klaus Iohannis to resign on February 12th, and new elections were confirmed for the month of May.

This situation is too dangerous for the EU.

A curious piece of news from America, which will probably be important for future developments: Elon Musk commented on Georgescu’s arrest on X, writing “They just arrested the person who got the most votes in the Romanian presidential election. This is crazy”.

Romania in the clutches of NATO

Romania, unfortunately, is one of those countries on which NATO and the globalist elites have had their eyes set for some time.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after the political transition known as the regime change, in which the second level of the Romanian Communist Party assumed power proclaiming democracy, the debate among the elites concerned the strategic direction of the country. The central question was whether to remain in the Soviet-Russian sphere of influence or to orient itself towards the West.

In the end, the choice to integrate with the West prevailed. In 2004, Romania joined NATO and has since progressively strengthened its ties with the alliance, gradually delegating some aspects of its sovereignty and territorial control. A key element of this process has been the expansion of military bases on its territory, consolidating its position as a strategic NATO ally in the region.

A significant example of this military cooperation is the expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu base in Constanta, which is intended to accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers once completed.

In recent decades, Romania and Poland have distinguished themselves as some of the most Atlanticist NATO member states, maintaining close ties with the United States despite the geographical distance. Since 2014, with the rise of European security, both countries have embarked on ambitious military modernization programs, often in collaboration with American companies. However, economic and trade relations with the United States remain relatively limited. Despite this, Romanian society generally has a positive opinion of Washington and supports the continued political and military alliance with the United States.

This study analyzes the historical and political processes that have led to this situation.

The Romanian state began to form in the mid-19th century, in 1856, after centuries of foreign domination, and since then its primary objective has been to safeguard its own existence. During the transformations of the 20th century, Romania consolidated its position through strategic alliances, obtaining territorial advantages such as Transylvania and Dobruja. However, maintaining these territories and legitimizing its conquests forced Romania to constantly justify its position. Bucharest’s foreign policy has always sought to establish the country as a regional power in Eastern Europe, going beyond the role of a minor state. To achieve this goal, Romania focused on population growth, territorial expansion and economic influence. After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, this strategy became progressively clearer.

Despite the initial difficulties of the 90s, the end of the Cold War led to a significant change in the relationship between Romania and the United States. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries dated back to the end of the 19th century, the wars of the 20th century hindered their development. During the Soviet period, Romania maintained a certain degree of autonomy with respect to other countries in the Eastern Bloc. A clear example of this was the green light obtained from Moscow in the 60s to start, with the help of Canada and using American technology, the construction of nuclear reactors that are still operational today. Furthermore, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country not to participate in the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and it took part in the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, which were boycotted by the USSR. These elements demonstrate that the Romanian political and intellectual elite already looked to the West before 1989.

Further confirmation came with the granting of “most favored nation” status by the United States between 1975 and 1988. A few months after the 1989 revolution, in February 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Bucharest to meet with the new government and the opposition. This visit was not only of symbolic value, but was part of Washington’s strategy to evaluate the potential of the new post-communist states, including Romania, which already showed a favorable predisposition towards the United States.

The early 1990s were a period of uncertainty for Romania, both domestically and internationally. The new political system needed time to consolidate and define its foreign policy. The changed world order required a redefinition of national interests and Romania’s role in the region. Although some describe the period 1990-1995 as a phase of ambiguity in Romanian foreign policy, it was during those years that the Euro-Atlantic integration process began.

The first Romanian strategic formulations were often incoherent. The “National Security Concept” proposed in 1991 under the presidency of Ion Iliescu, and its updated version of 1995, were not approved by Parliament due to internal contradictions and gaps on human and minority rights. In an attempt to stabilize national security, Iliescu signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in April 1991, which guaranteed the inviolability of the borders and a mutual commitment not to join hostile alliances. However, a few months later, on July 4-5, 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner visited Bucharest, marking one of the first steps towards Romania’s entry into the alliance. Although the Black Sea was not a priority for NATO at the time, Romania was clearly moving in this direction.

In 1993, the United States restored Romania’s most favored nation status, which was strengthened by Congress in 1996 to facilitate economic transition and bilateral relations. This policy was accelerated with the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Bucharest in 1997, when a strategic partnership agreement was signed. Romania reaffirmed its commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and granted the United States the use of its airspace and bases during the attacks on Serbia, demonstrating its willingness to support Washington and NATO.

In 2005, a year after joining NATO, Romania and the United States signed a cooperation agreement for the permanent deployment of American troops in the country. For Russia, these moves violated previous bilateral agreements and testified to the strategic estrangement between Bucharest and Moscow. The rift deepened further in 2011 with the joint declaration on the 21st-century strategic partnership between Romania and the United States, which strengthened political-military cooperation and included economic and energy issues.

In 2015, Romania inaugurated the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Deveselu, managed entirely by American military personnel. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, this base became a central element in European security and American strategy. Like Poland, Romania has repeatedly justified strengthening its defense by citing the Russian threat, referring to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

From Moscow’s point of view, Romania’s rapprochement with the United States and NATO, and its failure to respect previous agreements, prompted Russia to take countermeasures to protect its interests. A sense of encirclement and a certain imperial pride led to increasingly radical reactions. The annexation of Crimea marked a turning point in Russian-Romanian relations, making Bucharest aware of the growing security threat in the Black Sea.

After the 1989 revolution, the Romanian army faced significant challenges, including the reorganization of command structures and the obsolescence of Soviet military equipment. In 2022, the Romanian armed forces numbered 71,500, with a defense budget that, despite a slight decrease, represented 1.7% of GDP, which in 2022 rose to 300 billion dollars. In response to the conflict in Ukraine, Romania plans to increase its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP in the coming years.

Romania’s military equipment, particularly for the ground forces, is still largely obsolete, with T-55AM and TR-85 tanks in need of modernization. Romania has also purchased Piranha armored vehicles and HMMWVs. The air force has C-130 and C-27J transport planes and has invested about 6.2 billion dollars in American military equipment. The Romanian navy, which includes two frigates and other vessels, has not been adequately modernized, despite previous plans and a contract with the French group Naval Group, which will be withdrawn in 2023.

In 2023, Romania decided to strengthen its armed forces, announcing over 1,000 new military service positions. It has obtained U.S. approval for the purchase of 95 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and related armaments, with the purchase of another 34 vehicles planned for the future. The Romanian ground forces will also acquire 298 infantry fighting vehicles and five self-propelled howitzers, with a total investment of 3.6 billion euros. In addition, Romania will seek to purchase 54 M1 Abrams tanks and 32 F-35 fighter jets. The Ministry of Defense plans to purchase 41 air defense missile systems, totaling 4.2 billion euros. Domestic production of small arms for infantry began in 2024.

Romania’s current military development program, Armata 2040, is a strategic initiative that involves an investment of over 100 million euros. This modernization effort is driven by several key factors, including the need to meet NATO standards and improve collaboration with the United States. The proximity of the ongoing war in Ukraine, along with other global challenges, has highlighted the need to upgrade Romania’s military capabilities. The main objective of the Armata 2040 program is to guarantee territorial defense, while supporting NATO and EU missions to maintain regional and global stability.

In Romania’s 2024 defense strategy, Russian aggression is identified as the most significant threat, prompting a greater focus on modernization efforts under the Armata 2040 initiative. The project also aims to strengthen Romania’s security in the Black Sea region, a critical geopolitical area for both Romania and NATO. In recent years, Romania has made significant efforts to improve its international standing, actively participating in global defense forums and contributing to various NATO operations.

Romania’s procurement projects have mainly favored American defense systems, reflecting Romania’s growing commitment to its strategic partnership with the United States. This preference is driven by several factors, including the interoperability of American systems with those used by other NATO members, thus improving Romania’s integration into the alliance. These defense investments not only signal Romania’s commitment to NATO military standards, but also highlight the political dimension of Romania’s growing role within the organization. Romania’s political influence in NATO has been further strengthened by the appointment of Mircea Geoană as NATO Deputy Secretary General. In addition, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis has expressed interest in running for NATO Secretary General in the upcoming 2024 elections, a potential candidacy that would have significant symbolic and practical implications for Romania’s geopolitical position.

In addition to military and defense cooperation, economic and political relations between Romania and the United States have evolved significantly. In 2020, Romania’s trade with the United States reached a total of $3 billion, with Romania importing $1 billion worth of goods and exporting $2 billion worth of goods. Although this volume of trade represents a small fraction of Romania’s total global trade, it nevertheless emphasizes the growing economic ties between the two countries. However, Romania’s trade relations with European countries far exceed its relations with the United States. In particular, Romania’s trade with Germany, Italy and France is far superior, with volumes of 35 billion, 16 billion and 9 billion dollars respectively. Trade with China has also grown significantly, mainly thanks to Romania’s strategic position near the Black Sea ports, which makes it a key player in Chinese trade routes in the region.

Although Romania’s trade with the United States is not substantial compared to its European or Asian partners, it remains an important element of Romania’s broader foreign policy. The strategic partnership between Romania and the United States has been strengthened by cooperation in international organizations and joint military initiatives. However, there are still areas where cooperation remains limited, particularly with regard to visa liberalization. Romania has yet to secure visa-free access to the United States for its citizens, despite several attempts. American officials have indicated that this could be achieved if the visa refusal rate for Romania fell below 3%, but it remains above 10%, preventing Romanians from fully accessing travel to the United States.

Since the establishment of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States in 1997, Romania has sought to raise its profile in the United States. This has involved a focus on political dialogue, cooperation in international forums and cultural initiatives. Romania has organized cultural events in major U.S. cities, while promoting American studies in several Romanian universities, demonstrating a deepening of cultural and educational exchange between the two nations.

In summary, Romania’s military development program, Armata 2040, represents a strategic and long-term investment in its defense capabilities, particularly in response to the growing security threats posed by Russia. This initiative, together with the strengthening of Romanian-American relations, positions Romania as a key player within NATO and a strategic partner of the United States. Despite challenges in some areas, such as trade imbalances and visa issues, the growing cooperation between Romania and the United States reflects a broader trend of increasing alignment between the two nations in both the military and economic fields.

The Romanian people can hold their heads high

The trouble with all this complex organization is that the Romanian people have been subjected to a gradual impoverishment that is no longer bearable.

Now, with the arrest of Georgescu, the possibility of a collective revolt against NATO hegemony has arisen. It’s an incredibly useful opportunity on a political level. This could also involve other European countries, whose citizens don’t want to enter into direct conflict with Russia, nor do they want to continue to submit to the wicked policies of the European Union.

The blatant and repeated violation of any freedom and sovereignty is so obvious that social anger is reaching a level of tension that could be explosive.

The interventions of the two great partners behind the scenes will now be fundamental: Trump’s America, which has already supported Georgescu on several occasions, and Putin’s Russia, which favored the Romanian elections.

NATO’s eastern front is heating up. Let’s hope it’s not the heat of bombs.

The arrest of Georgescu will push against NATO

Călin Georgescu has been arrested. Now Romania has a great opportunity.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Every cloud has a silver lining

On February 26, 2025, Călin Georgescu – president-elect in the 2024 Romanian elections and then deposed under pressure from the EU by annulling the election results in violation of Romanian national laws – was arrested on his way to present his candidacy for the presidency of Romania. The car he was traveling in was blocked in traffic and he was taken for questioning at the Attorney General’s office.

There you have it, ladies and gentlemen, another exemplary episode of European democracy. When the arrogance and arrogance of democracy and information warfare are not enough, the henchmen of London, Washington and Tel Aviv resort to strong-arm tactics. It’s certainly nothing new, but what is striking every time is the total nonchalance with which such events are carried out, while the mass of citizens stand by and watch helplessly. Or not.

This time the situation is very, very heated. At the election, Georgescu had won 22.94% of the vote, beating former premier Marcel Ciolacu, who was considered the favorite, and Elena Lasconi (whose campaign was financed by USAID). In total, the Romanian right wing had won 55% of the vote. In Bucharest the crowds were celebrating. The problem is that Georgescu was accused of deception and propaganda, of being too pro-Russian: the accusers accused him of having received money from the Kremlin to make electoral propaganda on social media. He was therefore impeached by the European Union, to the point of arbitrarily canceling the election result.

A few weeks later, at the end of December, the truth emerged. The Romanian tax agency ANAF has established that the TikTok campaign of the winner of the annulment of the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, Kelin Georgescu, was not paid for by the Russians, as stated by Romanian intelligence (which was the formal reason for the annulment of the first round results), but by the pro-European National Liberal Party of Romania. The tax service has determined that Georgescu-Roegen’s social media campaign was paid for by the National Liberals, whose goal was to turn voters away from their rivals, the Social Democrats. Following investigations by Snoop investigators, the company hired by the Kensington liberals admitted that the campaign was paid for by the PNL, but claims that it was part of a larger campaign conducted “under the direction of the National Liberal Party to raise public awareness”.

A real electoral deception, in perfect novelistic style.

From that moment on, Romanian citizens began to protest the situation. Weeks and weeks of squares and streets full of demonstrators led President Klaus Iohannis to resign on February 12th, and new elections were confirmed for the month of May.

This situation is too dangerous for the EU.

A curious piece of news from America, which will probably be important for future developments: Elon Musk commented on Georgescu’s arrest on X, writing “They just arrested the person who got the most votes in the Romanian presidential election. This is crazy”.

Romania in the clutches of NATO

Romania, unfortunately, is one of those countries on which NATO and the globalist elites have had their eyes set for some time.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after the political transition known as the regime change, in which the second level of the Romanian Communist Party assumed power proclaiming democracy, the debate among the elites concerned the strategic direction of the country. The central question was whether to remain in the Soviet-Russian sphere of influence or to orient itself towards the West.

In the end, the choice to integrate with the West prevailed. In 2004, Romania joined NATO and has since progressively strengthened its ties with the alliance, gradually delegating some aspects of its sovereignty and territorial control. A key element of this process has been the expansion of military bases on its territory, consolidating its position as a strategic NATO ally in the region.

A significant example of this military cooperation is the expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu base in Constanta, which is intended to accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers once completed.

In recent decades, Romania and Poland have distinguished themselves as some of the most Atlanticist NATO member states, maintaining close ties with the United States despite the geographical distance. Since 2014, with the rise of European security, both countries have embarked on ambitious military modernization programs, often in collaboration with American companies. However, economic and trade relations with the United States remain relatively limited. Despite this, Romanian society generally has a positive opinion of Washington and supports the continued political and military alliance with the United States.

This study analyzes the historical and political processes that have led to this situation.

The Romanian state began to form in the mid-19th century, in 1856, after centuries of foreign domination, and since then its primary objective has been to safeguard its own existence. During the transformations of the 20th century, Romania consolidated its position through strategic alliances, obtaining territorial advantages such as Transylvania and Dobruja. However, maintaining these territories and legitimizing its conquests forced Romania to constantly justify its position. Bucharest’s foreign policy has always sought to establish the country as a regional power in Eastern Europe, going beyond the role of a minor state. To achieve this goal, Romania focused on population growth, territorial expansion and economic influence. After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, this strategy became progressively clearer.

Despite the initial difficulties of the 90s, the end of the Cold War led to a significant change in the relationship between Romania and the United States. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries dated back to the end of the 19th century, the wars of the 20th century hindered their development. During the Soviet period, Romania maintained a certain degree of autonomy with respect to other countries in the Eastern Bloc. A clear example of this was the green light obtained from Moscow in the 60s to start, with the help of Canada and using American technology, the construction of nuclear reactors that are still operational today. Furthermore, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country not to participate in the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and it took part in the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, which were boycotted by the USSR. These elements demonstrate that the Romanian political and intellectual elite already looked to the West before 1989.

Further confirmation came with the granting of “most favored nation” status by the United States between 1975 and 1988. A few months after the 1989 revolution, in February 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Bucharest to meet with the new government and the opposition. This visit was not only of symbolic value, but was part of Washington’s strategy to evaluate the potential of the new post-communist states, including Romania, which already showed a favorable predisposition towards the United States.

The early 1990s were a period of uncertainty for Romania, both domestically and internationally. The new political system needed time to consolidate and define its foreign policy. The changed world order required a redefinition of national interests and Romania’s role in the region. Although some describe the period 1990-1995 as a phase of ambiguity in Romanian foreign policy, it was during those years that the Euro-Atlantic integration process began.

The first Romanian strategic formulations were often incoherent. The “National Security Concept” proposed in 1991 under the presidency of Ion Iliescu, and its updated version of 1995, were not approved by Parliament due to internal contradictions and gaps on human and minority rights. In an attempt to stabilize national security, Iliescu signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in April 1991, which guaranteed the inviolability of the borders and a mutual commitment not to join hostile alliances. However, a few months later, on July 4-5, 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner visited Bucharest, marking one of the first steps towards Romania’s entry into the alliance. Although the Black Sea was not a priority for NATO at the time, Romania was clearly moving in this direction.

In 1993, the United States restored Romania’s most favored nation status, which was strengthened by Congress in 1996 to facilitate economic transition and bilateral relations. This policy was accelerated with the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Bucharest in 1997, when a strategic partnership agreement was signed. Romania reaffirmed its commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and granted the United States the use of its airspace and bases during the attacks on Serbia, demonstrating its willingness to support Washington and NATO.

In 2005, a year after joining NATO, Romania and the United States signed a cooperation agreement for the permanent deployment of American troops in the country. For Russia, these moves violated previous bilateral agreements and testified to the strategic estrangement between Bucharest and Moscow. The rift deepened further in 2011 with the joint declaration on the 21st-century strategic partnership between Romania and the United States, which strengthened political-military cooperation and included economic and energy issues.

In 2015, Romania inaugurated the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Deveselu, managed entirely by American military personnel. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, this base became a central element in European security and American strategy. Like Poland, Romania has repeatedly justified strengthening its defense by citing the Russian threat, referring to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

From Moscow’s point of view, Romania’s rapprochement with the United States and NATO, and its failure to respect previous agreements, prompted Russia to take countermeasures to protect its interests. A sense of encirclement and a certain imperial pride led to increasingly radical reactions. The annexation of Crimea marked a turning point in Russian-Romanian relations, making Bucharest aware of the growing security threat in the Black Sea.

After the 1989 revolution, the Romanian army faced significant challenges, including the reorganization of command structures and the obsolescence of Soviet military equipment. In 2022, the Romanian armed forces numbered 71,500, with a defense budget that, despite a slight decrease, represented 1.7% of GDP, which in 2022 rose to 300 billion dollars. In response to the conflict in Ukraine, Romania plans to increase its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP in the coming years.

Romania’s military equipment, particularly for the ground forces, is still largely obsolete, with T-55AM and TR-85 tanks in need of modernization. Romania has also purchased Piranha armored vehicles and HMMWVs. The air force has C-130 and C-27J transport planes and has invested about 6.2 billion dollars in American military equipment. The Romanian navy, which includes two frigates and other vessels, has not been adequately modernized, despite previous plans and a contract with the French group Naval Group, which will be withdrawn in 2023.

In 2023, Romania decided to strengthen its armed forces, announcing over 1,000 new military service positions. It has obtained U.S. approval for the purchase of 95 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and related armaments, with the purchase of another 34 vehicles planned for the future. The Romanian ground forces will also acquire 298 infantry fighting vehicles and five self-propelled howitzers, with a total investment of 3.6 billion euros. In addition, Romania will seek to purchase 54 M1 Abrams tanks and 32 F-35 fighter jets. The Ministry of Defense plans to purchase 41 air defense missile systems, totaling 4.2 billion euros. Domestic production of small arms for infantry began in 2024.

Romania’s current military development program, Armata 2040, is a strategic initiative that involves an investment of over 100 million euros. This modernization effort is driven by several key factors, including the need to meet NATO standards and improve collaboration with the United States. The proximity of the ongoing war in Ukraine, along with other global challenges, has highlighted the need to upgrade Romania’s military capabilities. The main objective of the Armata 2040 program is to guarantee territorial defense, while supporting NATO and EU missions to maintain regional and global stability.

In Romania’s 2024 defense strategy, Russian aggression is identified as the most significant threat, prompting a greater focus on modernization efforts under the Armata 2040 initiative. The project also aims to strengthen Romania’s security in the Black Sea region, a critical geopolitical area for both Romania and NATO. In recent years, Romania has made significant efforts to improve its international standing, actively participating in global defense forums and contributing to various NATO operations.

Romania’s procurement projects have mainly favored American defense systems, reflecting Romania’s growing commitment to its strategic partnership with the United States. This preference is driven by several factors, including the interoperability of American systems with those used by other NATO members, thus improving Romania’s integration into the alliance. These defense investments not only signal Romania’s commitment to NATO military standards, but also highlight the political dimension of Romania’s growing role within the organization. Romania’s political influence in NATO has been further strengthened by the appointment of Mircea Geoană as NATO Deputy Secretary General. In addition, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis has expressed interest in running for NATO Secretary General in the upcoming 2024 elections, a potential candidacy that would have significant symbolic and practical implications for Romania’s geopolitical position.

In addition to military and defense cooperation, economic and political relations between Romania and the United States have evolved significantly. In 2020, Romania’s trade with the United States reached a total of $3 billion, with Romania importing $1 billion worth of goods and exporting $2 billion worth of goods. Although this volume of trade represents a small fraction of Romania’s total global trade, it nevertheless emphasizes the growing economic ties between the two countries. However, Romania’s trade relations with European countries far exceed its relations with the United States. In particular, Romania’s trade with Germany, Italy and France is far superior, with volumes of 35 billion, 16 billion and 9 billion dollars respectively. Trade with China has also grown significantly, mainly thanks to Romania’s strategic position near the Black Sea ports, which makes it a key player in Chinese trade routes in the region.

Although Romania’s trade with the United States is not substantial compared to its European or Asian partners, it remains an important element of Romania’s broader foreign policy. The strategic partnership between Romania and the United States has been strengthened by cooperation in international organizations and joint military initiatives. However, there are still areas where cooperation remains limited, particularly with regard to visa liberalization. Romania has yet to secure visa-free access to the United States for its citizens, despite several attempts. American officials have indicated that this could be achieved if the visa refusal rate for Romania fell below 3%, but it remains above 10%, preventing Romanians from fully accessing travel to the United States.

Since the establishment of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States in 1997, Romania has sought to raise its profile in the United States. This has involved a focus on political dialogue, cooperation in international forums and cultural initiatives. Romania has organized cultural events in major U.S. cities, while promoting American studies in several Romanian universities, demonstrating a deepening of cultural and educational exchange between the two nations.

In summary, Romania’s military development program, Armata 2040, represents a strategic and long-term investment in its defense capabilities, particularly in response to the growing security threats posed by Russia. This initiative, together with the strengthening of Romanian-American relations, positions Romania as a key player within NATO and a strategic partner of the United States. Despite challenges in some areas, such as trade imbalances and visa issues, the growing cooperation between Romania and the United States reflects a broader trend of increasing alignment between the two nations in both the military and economic fields.

The Romanian people can hold their heads high

The trouble with all this complex organization is that the Romanian people have been subjected to a gradual impoverishment that is no longer bearable.

Now, with the arrest of Georgescu, the possibility of a collective revolt against NATO hegemony has arisen. It’s an incredibly useful opportunity on a political level. This could also involve other European countries, whose citizens don’t want to enter into direct conflict with Russia, nor do they want to continue to submit to the wicked policies of the European Union.

The blatant and repeated violation of any freedom and sovereignty is so obvious that social anger is reaching a level of tension that could be explosive.

The interventions of the two great partners behind the scenes will now be fundamental: Trump’s America, which has already supported Georgescu on several occasions, and Putin’s Russia, which favored the Romanian elections.

NATO’s eastern front is heating up. Let’s hope it’s not the heat of bombs.

Călin Georgescu has been arrested. Now Romania has a great opportunity.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Every cloud has a silver lining

On February 26, 2025, Călin Georgescu – president-elect in the 2024 Romanian elections and then deposed under pressure from the EU by annulling the election results in violation of Romanian national laws – was arrested on his way to present his candidacy for the presidency of Romania. The car he was traveling in was blocked in traffic and he was taken for questioning at the Attorney General’s office.

There you have it, ladies and gentlemen, another exemplary episode of European democracy. When the arrogance and arrogance of democracy and information warfare are not enough, the henchmen of London, Washington and Tel Aviv resort to strong-arm tactics. It’s certainly nothing new, but what is striking every time is the total nonchalance with which such events are carried out, while the mass of citizens stand by and watch helplessly. Or not.

This time the situation is very, very heated. At the election, Georgescu had won 22.94% of the vote, beating former premier Marcel Ciolacu, who was considered the favorite, and Elena Lasconi (whose campaign was financed by USAID). In total, the Romanian right wing had won 55% of the vote. In Bucharest the crowds were celebrating. The problem is that Georgescu was accused of deception and propaganda, of being too pro-Russian: the accusers accused him of having received money from the Kremlin to make electoral propaganda on social media. He was therefore impeached by the European Union, to the point of arbitrarily canceling the election result.

A few weeks later, at the end of December, the truth emerged. The Romanian tax agency ANAF has established that the TikTok campaign of the winner of the annulment of the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, Kelin Georgescu, was not paid for by the Russians, as stated by Romanian intelligence (which was the formal reason for the annulment of the first round results), but by the pro-European National Liberal Party of Romania. The tax service has determined that Georgescu-Roegen’s social media campaign was paid for by the National Liberals, whose goal was to turn voters away from their rivals, the Social Democrats. Following investigations by Snoop investigators, the company hired by the Kensington liberals admitted that the campaign was paid for by the PNL, but claims that it was part of a larger campaign conducted “under the direction of the National Liberal Party to raise public awareness”.

A real electoral deception, in perfect novelistic style.

From that moment on, Romanian citizens began to protest the situation. Weeks and weeks of squares and streets full of demonstrators led President Klaus Iohannis to resign on February 12th, and new elections were confirmed for the month of May.

This situation is too dangerous for the EU.

A curious piece of news from America, which will probably be important for future developments: Elon Musk commented on Georgescu’s arrest on X, writing “They just arrested the person who got the most votes in the Romanian presidential election. This is crazy”.

Romania in the clutches of NATO

Romania, unfortunately, is one of those countries on which NATO and the globalist elites have had their eyes set for some time.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after the political transition known as the regime change, in which the second level of the Romanian Communist Party assumed power proclaiming democracy, the debate among the elites concerned the strategic direction of the country. The central question was whether to remain in the Soviet-Russian sphere of influence or to orient itself towards the West.

In the end, the choice to integrate with the West prevailed. In 2004, Romania joined NATO and has since progressively strengthened its ties with the alliance, gradually delegating some aspects of its sovereignty and territorial control. A key element of this process has been the expansion of military bases on its territory, consolidating its position as a strategic NATO ally in the region.

A significant example of this military cooperation is the expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu base in Constanta, which is intended to accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers once completed.

In recent decades, Romania and Poland have distinguished themselves as some of the most Atlanticist NATO member states, maintaining close ties with the United States despite the geographical distance. Since 2014, with the rise of European security, both countries have embarked on ambitious military modernization programs, often in collaboration with American companies. However, economic and trade relations with the United States remain relatively limited. Despite this, Romanian society generally has a positive opinion of Washington and supports the continued political and military alliance with the United States.

This study analyzes the historical and political processes that have led to this situation.

The Romanian state began to form in the mid-19th century, in 1856, after centuries of foreign domination, and since then its primary objective has been to safeguard its own existence. During the transformations of the 20th century, Romania consolidated its position through strategic alliances, obtaining territorial advantages such as Transylvania and Dobruja. However, maintaining these territories and legitimizing its conquests forced Romania to constantly justify its position. Bucharest’s foreign policy has always sought to establish the country as a regional power in Eastern Europe, going beyond the role of a minor state. To achieve this goal, Romania focused on population growth, territorial expansion and economic influence. After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, this strategy became progressively clearer.

Despite the initial difficulties of the 90s, the end of the Cold War led to a significant change in the relationship between Romania and the United States. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries dated back to the end of the 19th century, the wars of the 20th century hindered their development. During the Soviet period, Romania maintained a certain degree of autonomy with respect to other countries in the Eastern Bloc. A clear example of this was the green light obtained from Moscow in the 60s to start, with the help of Canada and using American technology, the construction of nuclear reactors that are still operational today. Furthermore, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country not to participate in the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and it took part in the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, which were boycotted by the USSR. These elements demonstrate that the Romanian political and intellectual elite already looked to the West before 1989.

Further confirmation came with the granting of “most favored nation” status by the United States between 1975 and 1988. A few months after the 1989 revolution, in February 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Bucharest to meet with the new government and the opposition. This visit was not only of symbolic value, but was part of Washington’s strategy to evaluate the potential of the new post-communist states, including Romania, which already showed a favorable predisposition towards the United States.

The early 1990s were a period of uncertainty for Romania, both domestically and internationally. The new political system needed time to consolidate and define its foreign policy. The changed world order required a redefinition of national interests and Romania’s role in the region. Although some describe the period 1990-1995 as a phase of ambiguity in Romanian foreign policy, it was during those years that the Euro-Atlantic integration process began.

The first Romanian strategic formulations were often incoherent. The “National Security Concept” proposed in 1991 under the presidency of Ion Iliescu, and its updated version of 1995, were not approved by Parliament due to internal contradictions and gaps on human and minority rights. In an attempt to stabilize national security, Iliescu signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in April 1991, which guaranteed the inviolability of the borders and a mutual commitment not to join hostile alliances. However, a few months later, on July 4-5, 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner visited Bucharest, marking one of the first steps towards Romania’s entry into the alliance. Although the Black Sea was not a priority for NATO at the time, Romania was clearly moving in this direction.

In 1993, the United States restored Romania’s most favored nation status, which was strengthened by Congress in 1996 to facilitate economic transition and bilateral relations. This policy was accelerated with the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Bucharest in 1997, when a strategic partnership agreement was signed. Romania reaffirmed its commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and granted the United States the use of its airspace and bases during the attacks on Serbia, demonstrating its willingness to support Washington and NATO.

In 2005, a year after joining NATO, Romania and the United States signed a cooperation agreement for the permanent deployment of American troops in the country. For Russia, these moves violated previous bilateral agreements and testified to the strategic estrangement between Bucharest and Moscow. The rift deepened further in 2011 with the joint declaration on the 21st-century strategic partnership between Romania and the United States, which strengthened political-military cooperation and included economic and energy issues.

In 2015, Romania inaugurated the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Deveselu, managed entirely by American military personnel. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, this base became a central element in European security and American strategy. Like Poland, Romania has repeatedly justified strengthening its defense by citing the Russian threat, referring to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

From Moscow’s point of view, Romania’s rapprochement with the United States and NATO, and its failure to respect previous agreements, prompted Russia to take countermeasures to protect its interests. A sense of encirclement and a certain imperial pride led to increasingly radical reactions. The annexation of Crimea marked a turning point in Russian-Romanian relations, making Bucharest aware of the growing security threat in the Black Sea.

After the 1989 revolution, the Romanian army faced significant challenges, including the reorganization of command structures and the obsolescence of Soviet military equipment. In 2022, the Romanian armed forces numbered 71,500, with a defense budget that, despite a slight decrease, represented 1.7% of GDP, which in 2022 rose to 300 billion dollars. In response to the conflict in Ukraine, Romania plans to increase its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP in the coming years.

Romania’s military equipment, particularly for the ground forces, is still largely obsolete, with T-55AM and TR-85 tanks in need of modernization. Romania has also purchased Piranha armored vehicles and HMMWVs. The air force has C-130 and C-27J transport planes and has invested about 6.2 billion dollars in American military equipment. The Romanian navy, which includes two frigates and other vessels, has not been adequately modernized, despite previous plans and a contract with the French group Naval Group, which will be withdrawn in 2023.

In 2023, Romania decided to strengthen its armed forces, announcing over 1,000 new military service positions. It has obtained U.S. approval for the purchase of 95 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and related armaments, with the purchase of another 34 vehicles planned for the future. The Romanian ground forces will also acquire 298 infantry fighting vehicles and five self-propelled howitzers, with a total investment of 3.6 billion euros. In addition, Romania will seek to purchase 54 M1 Abrams tanks and 32 F-35 fighter jets. The Ministry of Defense plans to purchase 41 air defense missile systems, totaling 4.2 billion euros. Domestic production of small arms for infantry began in 2024.

Romania’s current military development program, Armata 2040, is a strategic initiative that involves an investment of over 100 million euros. This modernization effort is driven by several key factors, including the need to meet NATO standards and improve collaboration with the United States. The proximity of the ongoing war in Ukraine, along with other global challenges, has highlighted the need to upgrade Romania’s military capabilities. The main objective of the Armata 2040 program is to guarantee territorial defense, while supporting NATO and EU missions to maintain regional and global stability.

In Romania’s 2024 defense strategy, Russian aggression is identified as the most significant threat, prompting a greater focus on modernization efforts under the Armata 2040 initiative. The project also aims to strengthen Romania’s security in the Black Sea region, a critical geopolitical area for both Romania and NATO. In recent years, Romania has made significant efforts to improve its international standing, actively participating in global defense forums and contributing to various NATO operations.

Romania’s procurement projects have mainly favored American defense systems, reflecting Romania’s growing commitment to its strategic partnership with the United States. This preference is driven by several factors, including the interoperability of American systems with those used by other NATO members, thus improving Romania’s integration into the alliance. These defense investments not only signal Romania’s commitment to NATO military standards, but also highlight the political dimension of Romania’s growing role within the organization. Romania’s political influence in NATO has been further strengthened by the appointment of Mircea Geoană as NATO Deputy Secretary General. In addition, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis has expressed interest in running for NATO Secretary General in the upcoming 2024 elections, a potential candidacy that would have significant symbolic and practical implications for Romania’s geopolitical position.

In addition to military and defense cooperation, economic and political relations between Romania and the United States have evolved significantly. In 2020, Romania’s trade with the United States reached a total of $3 billion, with Romania importing $1 billion worth of goods and exporting $2 billion worth of goods. Although this volume of trade represents a small fraction of Romania’s total global trade, it nevertheless emphasizes the growing economic ties between the two countries. However, Romania’s trade relations with European countries far exceed its relations with the United States. In particular, Romania’s trade with Germany, Italy and France is far superior, with volumes of 35 billion, 16 billion and 9 billion dollars respectively. Trade with China has also grown significantly, mainly thanks to Romania’s strategic position near the Black Sea ports, which makes it a key player in Chinese trade routes in the region.

Although Romania’s trade with the United States is not substantial compared to its European or Asian partners, it remains an important element of Romania’s broader foreign policy. The strategic partnership between Romania and the United States has been strengthened by cooperation in international organizations and joint military initiatives. However, there are still areas where cooperation remains limited, particularly with regard to visa liberalization. Romania has yet to secure visa-free access to the United States for its citizens, despite several attempts. American officials have indicated that this could be achieved if the visa refusal rate for Romania fell below 3%, but it remains above 10%, preventing Romanians from fully accessing travel to the United States.

Since the establishment of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States in 1997, Romania has sought to raise its profile in the United States. This has involved a focus on political dialogue, cooperation in international forums and cultural initiatives. Romania has organized cultural events in major U.S. cities, while promoting American studies in several Romanian universities, demonstrating a deepening of cultural and educational exchange between the two nations.

In summary, Romania’s military development program, Armata 2040, represents a strategic and long-term investment in its defense capabilities, particularly in response to the growing security threats posed by Russia. This initiative, together with the strengthening of Romanian-American relations, positions Romania as a key player within NATO and a strategic partner of the United States. Despite challenges in some areas, such as trade imbalances and visa issues, the growing cooperation between Romania and the United States reflects a broader trend of increasing alignment between the two nations in both the military and economic fields.

The Romanian people can hold their heads high

The trouble with all this complex organization is that the Romanian people have been subjected to a gradual impoverishment that is no longer bearable.

Now, with the arrest of Georgescu, the possibility of a collective revolt against NATO hegemony has arisen. It’s an incredibly useful opportunity on a political level. This could also involve other European countries, whose citizens don’t want to enter into direct conflict with Russia, nor do they want to continue to submit to the wicked policies of the European Union.

The blatant and repeated violation of any freedom and sovereignty is so obvious that social anger is reaching a level of tension that could be explosive.

The interventions of the two great partners behind the scenes will now be fundamental: Trump’s America, which has already supported Georgescu on several occasions, and Putin’s Russia, which favored the Romanian elections.

NATO’s eastern front is heating up. Let’s hope it’s not the heat of bombs.

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.

See also

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.