“The agency’s mandate is to protect the constitutional order—not to carry out political vendettas.”

By Artur CIECHANOWICZ

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Hans-Georg Maaßen is a German lawyer and former senior civil servant who served as President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, from 2012 to 2018. He is known for his critical stance on government immigration policy and for publicly opposing the political instrumentalisation of intelligence services. Since leaving office, Maaßen has become an outspoken political commentator and a prominent voice within Germany’s conservative circles.

In early May, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), classified the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) as an extremist party. It later emerged that the justification relied largely on public statements and AfD official documents. Do you believe this decision was politically motivated?
I believe that then-Interior Minister Nancy Faeser either directly instructed the BfV to act or that the agency’s president, Thomas Haldenwang, took this step on his own initiative out of political motivation. Either way, it was supposed to lead to the surveillance of the AfD.

Back in 2013, when I was head of the BfV, I publicly stated that we would no longer monitor political parties. I was—and still am—convinced that this is not the role of an intelligence service in a democracy. Political parties should hold each other accountable, alongside the media and civil society—not secret services.

In no other Western democracy are political parties monitored by intelligence agencies, because these agencies are part of the executive branch and therefore answer to the government. That creates an obvious conflict of interest. Minister Faeser chose a different path, and in my view, it was purely political. One of the key aims of her tenure was to combat the Right. For her, the AfD was a political enemy. This is a clear case of using domestic intelligence services to suppress opposition.

Have you observed a broader trend in which the BfV is used to suppress inconvenient organizations or political movements—while turning a blind eye to others? What are the implications for democracy?

Absolutely. When I led the BfV, I was constantly under pressure from left-wing parties and the media to place the AfD under surveillance. In 2016, I made it clear: I am not a tool of the governing parties, nor is it the BfV’s job to undermine their political competitors.

The agency’s mandate is to protect the constitutional order—not to carry out political vendettas.

Many readers outside Germany might not be familiar with how your intelligence system is structured. Could you explain what the BfV actually does—and what its role should be in a democracy?

Germany has two main intelligence agencies: the BND (foreign intelligence) and the BfV (domestic intelligence). The foreign service collects intelligence abroad to inform government policy and military strategy. The BfV, on the other hand, is tasked with counter-espionage, preventing sabotage, identifying infiltration by hostile states or extremists, and protecting against terrorism.

In addition to these security tasks, the BfV also has a mandate to monitor extremism—this is where problems begin. Today, the interpretation of “extremism” has been stretched to the point where normal political parties and associations can be labeled as threats to the constitutional order.

But who defines what counts as a threat to the constitutional order? Ultimately, it’s the Interior Ministry—or the courts, if they’re even consulted. And the Interior Minister is always a politician with political interests.

In Bavaria, for example, the state-level intelligence service consistently targeted right-wing parties that were competitors to the ruling Christian Social Union (CSU). It’s no secret that the CSU doesn’t want competition to its right—just as left-wing parties dislike right-wing rivals. That’s the political landscape. But this dynamic clearly violates the constitutional principle of equal treatment for all parties.

Is this phenomenon limited to Germany, or do you see a wider European trend of intelligence agencies being used to suppress political opposition? Should we be concerned?

I don’t see a universal trend across Europe, but certain national contexts are concerning. Germany’s legal framework allows for this kind of misuse, which makes it a special case.

However, I am deeply alarmed by what’s happened in Romania and France. There, laws are being stretched or bent to isolate political opponents—who almost always happen to be on the right—and deprive them of any fair chance in the democratic process.

I fear that in any country where legal and political conditions permit, secret services will be used to push conservative or right-wing parties out of public life and keep them away from power.

The BfV’s report was legally and politically weak. What does this mean for the BfV’s reputation and effectiveness, especially in its core tasks like recruiting human intelligence sources?
After World War II, Germany’s intelligence services faced an uphill battle to distance themselves from the legacy of the Gestapo and build public trust. Establishing credibility—both among citizens and in the political mainstream—was always a challenge.

Some progress was made. But under minister Faeser and president Haldenwang, the BfV has been weaponised to attack political rivals in an unscrupulous way. This damages its public reputation and undermines its core mission.

An intelligence agency can only function effectively if it’s trusted—not just by the public, but also by those it relies on for information, such as informants. I genuinely don’t know how the BfV will recover from this crisis.

Original article: The European Conservative