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To date, there is no plan showing how Europe – experiencing its greatest military crisis in 80 years – will jointly secure: funding, efficient equipment, and trained soldiers. Policymakers must act. Otherwise, they will cause monumental disillusionment that will pave the way for extremist parties, warns Franklin Dehousse. 

Listening to European politicians, one would think Europe has entered a grand revolutionary phase. A new era is dawning. Vast resources are being deployed to rapidly rebuild formidable European armies. The reality, alas, is very different. And it is crucial to recognize this.

Summit after summit in Paris, then London, then Brussels – it’s dizzying. But where are the real results? Reading the conclusions of the latest European Council, there are few. One could call it a scam. For example, the Union declares itself “ready to increase pressure on Russia.” Yet it knows full well its sanctions are full of holes and does nothing about it (liquefied gas and oil purchases, the shadow fleet, the massive surge in circumvention exports to Russia via Central Asia…). Europe postures as tough – but only so long as it doesn’t harm its trade. “Russian assets should remain frozen,” but “subject to EU law” – a masterful way of saying one thing and its opposite. Very tough, but only if it doesn’t hurt financial exchanges.

President von der Leyen grandly announces €800 billion in defense spending. Another sleight of hand. €150 billion might be loaned to member states. As for the remaining €650 billion? They’ll just raise the permitted deficit limits for states. In other words, there is absolutely no guarantee these billions will actually be borrowed. But this fanfare mainly serves to avoid any debate on joint European borrowing, which Germany does not want (yet).

In reality, despite all this noise and smoke, practically nothing has been decided so far, even as Europe faces its greatest military crisis in 80 years since Trump’s return. Europe is largely defenseless against Putin, who is rearming aggressively despite heavy losses. American support is no longer guaranteed at all. Trump’s promises are worthless. Europe’s arsenals are largely empty, its troops underdeveloped and inadequate, and its intelligence, communications, and heavy logistics barely exist without the U.S.

Zero plan

Yet nothing guarantees the rapid mobilization of the funds promised by von der Leyen. Nothing guarantees effective management of these funds. Nothing guarantees equipment interoperability. Nothing guarantees fair burden-sharing among member states – or between rich and poor. Nothing guarantees democratic oversight of the project. As usual with von der Leyen, we see a hastily cobbled-together pile of proposals from member states (especially the big ones, and even more especially Germany). Beyond that, there is no long-term vision and no institutional roadmap. Zero.

High Representative Kallas’ failed attempt

High Representative Kallas at least tried to get the Union to adopt something concrete immediately after Trump’s repeated threats against Zelensky. She proposed a new €40 billion European aid package for Ukraine in 2025. Yet this plan was gutted – first to €5 billion, then to a million shells, then to “further review.” Many governments criticized Kallas’ proposal, accusing her of acting like a prime minister (La Libre, 22/03/2025). In reality, they resent her mainly for exposing the harsh truth. On one hand, despite the massive U.S. shift – oscillating between disinterest and hostility toward Europe (and Ukraine) – few governments want to establish real European military independence. On the other, there are enormous disparities in the national aid provided to Ukraine so far.

The Kallas proposal was a Rorschach test for the European Union: it revealed the full extent of both its division and hypocrisy. It is split between frontline states (in the east and north), directly threatened by Russia’s rise, and the rest. The rest are themselves divided between:

• Russia sympathizers (Hungary, Slovakia, soon perhaps Czechia),
• Trump supporters (Italy),
• Neutrals (Ireland, Austria, Malta, Cyprus),
• And lukewarm Ukraine backers (France, Spain, and Benelux).

At the center of it all floats an uncertain Germany.

Yet weak solidarity among Europeans is nothing new.

On Ukraine, behind the ridiculous and dangerous bravado of figures like von der Leyen and Michel (“we stand with you,” “Ukraine will be a member by 2030”) lurk damning statements like Sánchez’s (“our threat is not Russian troops arriving in the Pyrenees”) or Meloni’s (“my greatest ally is President Trump”), justifying demands for European funds to be redirected away from defense (FT, 13 and 27/05/2025). Weak solidarity among Europeans, however, is nothing new. True, for now, Western and Southern Europe offer little solidarity to the East and North. But in 2010, at the height of the financial crisis, the opposite was true. The same happened during the migration crisis.

In reality, the spirit of solidarity has collapsed in the European Union over the past 30 years. Only the threat of an imminent shock (banking collapse, pandemic) still convinces governments to adopt serious collective responses – enough to patch up the system in crisis, but not to cure it.

European leaders are in denial – the public understands

Yet the real Putin-Trump alliance creates precisely such a threat. NATO is dead. Article 5, guaranteeing U.S. solidarity against aggression, is even deader, given its purpose. Over time, the former American partner has even emerged as a growing adversary in trade, finance, monetary policy, technology, and even territorial matters (see Greenland). Yet, as in many long marriages ending in death, Europe remains stuck in denial.

At least at the leadership level. The European public, however, seems to have grasped the situation better, thanks to Trump’s incessant provocations. According to a pan-European poll (Grand Continent, 20/03/25), Trump is overwhelmingly seen as a danger to Europe and democracy. From now on, Europeans have effectively become potential Ukrainians. The moment they need something, Trump will try to extort them, just as he is already doing to Ukraine. And he will try to change our governments, as he has already done in Romanian and German elections (see his new support for Le Pen).

A majority now supports common European defense

In many member states (especially in the West), a majority of public opinion now favors a common European defense. Only such a joint structure can truly rationalize production, concentrate research, and reduce costs – which otherwise will become exorbitant. Alas, European decision-makers remain far from accepting the necessary constraints. At the governmental and institutional level, there is no joint project in this direction – not even on paper. No joint funding. No shared definition of needs. No fair distribution of rearmament burdens. Very few joint orders. No integration of troops, even partial. The resistance of politicians and bureaucrats to real joint action is total. Another sign of widespread reluctance: several member states are already negotiating with the UK to create a joint military procurement bank (Politico, 03/04/2025).

As a result, the coming rearmament risks being chaotic, ineffective, and extremely costly. Any rearmament can quickly spiral out of control, caught between the obsessions of militaries, industrialists, and national politicians. Even before that, it must be accepted by the public. And they will quickly notice that the burdens are very unevenly distributed.

Inequitable burden-sharing among member states

First, there is inequality among member states. For example, Ireland, Austria, Malta, and Cyprus do not belong to NATO. These countries, however, are part of the EU and bound by the solidarity obligation of Article 42.7 TEU. Among NATO states, some contribute far less than others (notably Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg). Moreover, some are tax havens, siphoning off vast fiscal revenues that, under equal taxation, would fund other countries (which, of course, eases their own defense efforts).

The Irish case

Ireland is the textbook example (though far from alone). The diversion of trade flows it causes through tax breaks has reached such heights that it now has two separate GNPs. For instance, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry barely pays any taxes in America because it routes all its production through Ireland (which also fuels Trump’s tariff rage against all Europeans). Meanwhile, despite its artificially inflated revenues, Ireland’s military spending hovers around 0.2% of GNP, and its aid to Ukraine at 0.1% (compared to Poland’s 4% and 1.2%, respectively).

How to convince some countries to contribute two or four times more than others? Solving this problem is the hidden challenge of collective European funding for defense spending – particularly joint borrowing. Note that Kallas and von der Leyen offer opposing analyses on these issues, further adding to the general cacophony.

Tax havens must be tackled

Second, rearmament highlights inequality between social classes. Many argue for cutting social security to fund weapons. Yet no one talks about cracking down on tax havens, even though they play a central role in rising inequality – and in maintaining covert Russian (and mafia) financial presence in Europe.

Making the weakest foot the bill for rearmament is the best strategy to strengthen the far right in the coming years. Appeasing Putin and Trump at all costs will then become synonymous with increased social spending. True, real rearmament will require effort from all – but the wealthiest should contribute first. Hence the need for a genuine European initiative against tax havens; otherwise, these individuals will keep evading taxes. Historically, rationing has always been a key tool of war economies. In the U.S. during WWII, the top income tax rate reached 94% (heroes like John Wayne and Frank Sinatra, who avoided military service, spent much of their time dodging it). Oliver Cromwell funded his armies by taxing property at 20% and imposing forced loans on bankers.

The demand for fairness is all the more critical as consumption restrictions will be necessary. European countries are already saddled with debt at around 100% of GNP. There is very little room for new borrowing. Excessive borrowing will only fuel inflation and raise interest rates. The authorities do not mention this.

A “Savings Union”?

Moreover, the Commission is reviving old peripheral projects. To capitalize on the defense resurgence, the capital markets union has been rebranded as a “savings union” and presented as a funding avenue. Not false, but hardly essential. Meanwhile, the tax haven lobby is already working to block the parallel creation of a European financial regulator (a perfect strategy for triggering another financial crisis).

The Commission also mentions the need for a single defense market. Again, not false, but not essential either. In all major states, military production relies first and foremost on strong synergy between the state and a few oligopolistic producers. Rationalizing and integrating producers and research is, as we’ve seen, a vital need. Yet it will require difficult political choices. Who will manage all these changes? Again, the authorities are silent. Though very good on these needs, a recent Bruegel report for the Polish presidency (07/04/2025) underestimates – like everyone else – the institutional obstacles to achieving them.

A gift to extremist parties

In summary, proper defense requires money (and a lot of it, after letting the tools rust for a third of a century), efficient equipment, and trained soldiers. Right now, there is no plan showing how these will be obtained – let alone jointly. Implementing such a plan would also require effective institutions and competent managers. These are nowhere to be seen either. European policymakers must now act to define a real strategy and open a broad public debate, as this represents a true revolution in continental integration. Otherwise, the path to European defense will soon be littered with monumental disillusionment – paving the way for extremist parties.

Franklin Dehousse is a former professor at the College of Europe, former Belgian representative in European negotiations, former judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union

Published originally by La Libre.