In Mexico and more broadly in Latin America intrusive involvement in such matters is the least promising way to win friends and influence people.
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In early October Claudia Sheinbaum was invested as Mexico’s new President, succeeding Andrés Manuel López Obrador (aka AMLO) at the expiration of his six-year term. Ms. Sheinaum is a member of Morena, the populist political party founded and led by AMLO. AMLO’s relations with the United States in general have not been smooth because of his fierce insistence on unconditional respect of Mexican sovereignty and the right of Mexico to pursue an independent course in domestic governance and foreign relations. Significantly, on his watch Mexico had expressed interest in associating itself more closely with the BRICS nations, and perhaps even applying to join the group at some stage.
Along the way, under López Obrador the Mexican government seemed never to miss a chance to annoy its neighbour to the north. (For an overview of these turbulent relations, see here and here.) That was graphically demonstrated in 2019 when Bolivian President Evo Morales sought and obtained asylum in Mexico after being illegally deposed in his country by North American corporate interests spearheaded by Elon Musk, with at least the tacit approval of the U.S. government.
Ms. Sheinbaum is publicly swearing fealty to AMLO’s legacy and so far the transition seems to have been executed with no visible indication of political disruption. That is all well and good, but in that regard Latin American politics offers some notable examples of post festum treachery. The turncoat performance of Argentina’s pseudo-Peronist President Carlos Menem, who betrayed his campaign commitments and switched to neoliberalism virtually the day after his inauguration is an illustration that promptly comes to mind.
A similar lack of ideological scruples was demonstrated by Ecuadorian politician Lenin Moreno, who was elected President by pretending to support the political agenda of his predecessor Rafael Correa, in whose administration he served as Vice President. He showed his true colours not long after taking office. In return for a hefty IMF loan extended to his government, Moreno was instrumental in the ejection of Julian Assange from the Ecuadorian embassy in London, which led to Assange’s ruthless persecution and incarceration. That scandal was only recently brought to a close with Assange’s release, but only after signing a plea agreement where, as he himself put, he was compelled to “plead guilty to practicing journalism” in return for regaining his freedom.
Ms. Sheinbaum has given no visible sign of reneging on the political commitments which ensured her landslide election, but just to be on the safe side it would be wise to keep an eye on the future direction of her policies.
On the domestic plane, the stand she ultimately takes on an intense controversy that marked the final months of AMLO’s presidency might turn into a litmus test of her inclinations. Invoking the alleged obstructionism and inefficiency of Mexico’s judiciary, which he accused of being excessively beholden to domestic oligarchic interests, and thus by extension also to the foreign forces with which those powerful local oligarchs are aligned (hint, hint) López Obrador used his comfortable legislative majority to push through an ambitious plan to structurally overhaul his country’s judicial system. Whether the drastic change, making all judicial offices from the lowest to the Supreme Court elective and no longer appointive, qualifies as a true reform is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. But two indisputable facts have emerged. The change in the procedure whereby Mexican judges shall henceforth be chosen, which became law in late September just days before AMLO left office, enjoys the overwhelming support of the citizenry, most likely on the strength of López Obrador’s immense personal popularity. The other salient fact which came to light when the new procedure was placed on the legislative calendar is that the new measure is extremely unpopular not just with the domestic entrenched interests, which have relied on the courts to block and cripple AMLO’s social agenda, but also with Mexico’s influential neighbour to the north.
So much so that it outdid itself in tactlessness. Ken Salazar, U.S. ambassador to Mexico, weighed in personally in the debate, as he put it “based on my lifelong experience supporting the rule of law,” by issuing a stern statement in opposition to the new dispensation mandating the selection of Mexican judges by popular vote. He rationalised his objections to the law with claims that it represented “a threat to Mexico’s democracy,” would “threaten relations between the two countries”, and ultimately a thinly veiled threat, that it could discourage foreign investors from risking their capital in the Mexican economy.
Why foreign investors would be put off by the manner in which Mexican judges are selected was not adequately explained. But the Mexican Foreign Ministry was quick to react (also here) to these “friendly suggestions” by pointing out that in at least 42 of 50 American states judges (and in some cases prosecutors as well, it might be added) are popularly elected without apparent harm to democracy.
One cannot but wonder at the diplomatic ineptitude of this ill-advised intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country which, moreover, for historical reasons is known to be exceedingly sensitive to attempts at interference in its domestic affairs. The poor impression created not just in Mexico but throughout Latin America by this diplomatic gaffe is enhanced by the glaring inconsistency between sermons preached abroad and what is practiced at home, especially given the current Administration’s efforts to impose term limits on Supreme Court judges. That is a measure that hardly promotes judicial independence. And adding insult to injury is the use for purposes of chastisement of a diplomatic official with a Hispanic surname, who can only be perceived as a Janissary, to lecture the host government on a domestic topic that is none of his business.
Plainly, former President López Obrador’s tinkering with Mexico’s judicial system has occurred within the context of an internal institutional power struggle. On the professional level, quite a few reasonable misgivings could be raised concerning the advisability and efficacy of the new mechanism he has chosen to introduce to replace the previous system. But that is a purely domestic issue which should remain outside the purview of prudent foreign actors. In Mexico and more broadly in Latin America intrusive involvement in such matters is the least promising way to win friends and influence people.