Editor's Сhoice
June 2, 2024
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By Daniel CHRISTMAN

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The passage of new funding for military aid to Ukraine means that vital supplies for fending off the continuing Russian invasion will soon be on their way. Ukraine’s continuing shortages in bullets, artillery shells, vehicles, and air defense has shown that the United States and her allies were completely unprepared for the duration of a hot war with Russia. As Russia continues to throw a nearly inexhaustible supply of bodies and bullets against Ukraine, Ukraine’s western allies have been struggling to generate the physical capacity and until now, the political momentum necessary to meet demand. Subsequently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has admitted that his country would lose the war if the U.S. fails to provide sufficient supplies. To prevent a Russian victory, the U.S. must undertake efforts to boost and protect its production capacity.

Due to Ukraine’s growing deficit of 155mm artillery ammunition, its troops are increasingly forced to rely on small arms like rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, and pistols to fend off oncoming masses of Russian infantry. Nearly every soldier in Ukraine holds an automatic weapon, and when many sections of the front line have no artillery available at all, Ukrainian troops must expend significant amounts of small arms ammunition as a last line of defense. The U.S. has transferred 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades since February 2022, but it is not enough to sustain the long-term fight. For comparison, the U.S. required 1.8 billion rounds of small caliber ammunition during counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004 alone.

With all NATO member states facing difficulties in producing the amount of ammunition and equipment needed to support Ukraine’s continued self-preservation, allied countries should examine the manufacturing bottlenecks and vulnerabilities that could worsen the problem. One critical example is the dearth of companies that produce ammunition primers, which ignite the powder in an ammunition cartridge. There are only four fully operational manufacturers of primers in the U.S.: Winchester, which is owned by Olin Corporation, and Remington, Federal, and CCI, which are all owned by Vista Outdoor, Inc.

Another example is the lack of government ammunition production facilities. One facility, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant produces 85% of the military’s small caliber ammunition, making it a potential single point of failure in a crisis. Just as in the case of primer production, contracts to operate the plant traditionally alternate between firms now owned by the same two companies: Olin Corporation and Vista Outdoor.

In October 2023, Vista Outdoor announced a plan to be sold to Czechoslovak Group (CSG), a Czech arms manufacturer that purchased Italian ammunition brand Fiocchi Munizioni in 2022. Should CSG complete its purchase of Vista, 75% of fully operational domestically owned primer manufacturers would come under the control of a single foreign entity. In an effort to ease concerns, CSG released a statement on April 8 claiming the purchase of Vista Outdoor would allow it to increase its ammunition output to NATO and potentially expand its U.S. production capacity.

Even if output increases in the short term, consolidation increases procurement costs and reduces supply chain resilience in the long run. In 2022, a report by the U.S. Department of Defense noted that market consolidation of the military industrial complex poses a national security risk.  There are also foreign ownership concerns; when Olin-Winchester’s contract for operating Lake City Army Ammunition Plant expires, the U.S. could be left with only one domestically owned manufacturer capable of operating the plant.

CSG’s proposed acquisition of Vista Outdoor is currently under review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which determines whether foreign acquisitions pose a risk to national security. The CFIUS review will need to consider existing domestic ammunition manufacturing capacity in the United States and the risks of that remaining capacity coming under control of a foreign owner. For instance, would that owner prioritize production loyalty to the United States? Does that foreign owner also supply any adversaries, or could foreign adversaries exert undue influence? In what shape would it leave the dwindling repository of specialized skills and knowledge that remains in domestic industry?

With the deficiencies brought to light by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO countries should be looking for reasonable and efficient ways to boost their ammunition production and prevent it from falling victim to any single point of failure, whether that means a single point of production or a single point of ownership. With that in mind, what might a resilient and secure U.S. ammunition industry look like?

First, America should be able to maintain the capacity to produce in sufficient quantity to meet its own defense needs—and if it can, produce at a rate in line with its historical role as an arsenal of democracy. Second, it should be compatible and interoperable with our allies, to assist in the defense of those countries and to allow those allies to boost supplies for the U.S. when necessary. Third, it should be resistant to fluctuations in market demand, malign foreign influence, and supply chain insecurity—issues that have all become more prevalent in the 21st century.

Original article: RealClearDefense

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.
How the Ukraine war exposes vulnerabilities in U.S. ammo production

By Daniel CHRISTMAN

❗️Join us on TelegramTwitter , and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The passage of new funding for military aid to Ukraine means that vital supplies for fending off the continuing Russian invasion will soon be on their way. Ukraine’s continuing shortages in bullets, artillery shells, vehicles, and air defense has shown that the United States and her allies were completely unprepared for the duration of a hot war with Russia. As Russia continues to throw a nearly inexhaustible supply of bodies and bullets against Ukraine, Ukraine’s western allies have been struggling to generate the physical capacity and until now, the political momentum necessary to meet demand. Subsequently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has admitted that his country would lose the war if the U.S. fails to provide sufficient supplies. To prevent a Russian victory, the U.S. must undertake efforts to boost and protect its production capacity.

Due to Ukraine’s growing deficit of 155mm artillery ammunition, its troops are increasingly forced to rely on small arms like rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, and pistols to fend off oncoming masses of Russian infantry. Nearly every soldier in Ukraine holds an automatic weapon, and when many sections of the front line have no artillery available at all, Ukrainian troops must expend significant amounts of small arms ammunition as a last line of defense. The U.S. has transferred 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades since February 2022, but it is not enough to sustain the long-term fight. For comparison, the U.S. required 1.8 billion rounds of small caliber ammunition during counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004 alone.

With all NATO member states facing difficulties in producing the amount of ammunition and equipment needed to support Ukraine’s continued self-preservation, allied countries should examine the manufacturing bottlenecks and vulnerabilities that could worsen the problem. One critical example is the dearth of companies that produce ammunition primers, which ignite the powder in an ammunition cartridge. There are only four fully operational manufacturers of primers in the U.S.: Winchester, which is owned by Olin Corporation, and Remington, Federal, and CCI, which are all owned by Vista Outdoor, Inc.

Another example is the lack of government ammunition production facilities. One facility, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant produces 85% of the military’s small caliber ammunition, making it a potential single point of failure in a crisis. Just as in the case of primer production, contracts to operate the plant traditionally alternate between firms now owned by the same two companies: Olin Corporation and Vista Outdoor.

In October 2023, Vista Outdoor announced a plan to be sold to Czechoslovak Group (CSG), a Czech arms manufacturer that purchased Italian ammunition brand Fiocchi Munizioni in 2022. Should CSG complete its purchase of Vista, 75% of fully operational domestically owned primer manufacturers would come under the control of a single foreign entity. In an effort to ease concerns, CSG released a statement on April 8 claiming the purchase of Vista Outdoor would allow it to increase its ammunition output to NATO and potentially expand its U.S. production capacity.

Even if output increases in the short term, consolidation increases procurement costs and reduces supply chain resilience in the long run. In 2022, a report by the U.S. Department of Defense noted that market consolidation of the military industrial complex poses a national security risk.  There are also foreign ownership concerns; when Olin-Winchester’s contract for operating Lake City Army Ammunition Plant expires, the U.S. could be left with only one domestically owned manufacturer capable of operating the plant.

CSG’s proposed acquisition of Vista Outdoor is currently under review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which determines whether foreign acquisitions pose a risk to national security. The CFIUS review will need to consider existing domestic ammunition manufacturing capacity in the United States and the risks of that remaining capacity coming under control of a foreign owner. For instance, would that owner prioritize production loyalty to the United States? Does that foreign owner also supply any adversaries, or could foreign adversaries exert undue influence? In what shape would it leave the dwindling repository of specialized skills and knowledge that remains in domestic industry?

With the deficiencies brought to light by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO countries should be looking for reasonable and efficient ways to boost their ammunition production and prevent it from falling victim to any single point of failure, whether that means a single point of production or a single point of ownership. With that in mind, what might a resilient and secure U.S. ammunition industry look like?

First, America should be able to maintain the capacity to produce in sufficient quantity to meet its own defense needs—and if it can, produce at a rate in line with its historical role as an arsenal of democracy. Second, it should be compatible and interoperable with our allies, to assist in the defense of those countries and to allow those allies to boost supplies for the U.S. when necessary. Third, it should be resistant to fluctuations in market demand, malign foreign influence, and supply chain insecurity—issues that have all become more prevalent in the 21st century.

Original article: RealClearDefense