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On 15 September 2021, flanked by the televised images of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and US President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the beginning of a new and comprehensive security pact–AUKUS.

A multipronged defence agreement that encompasses cooperation across cyber and artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter hypersonic, electronic warfare, information, and innovation sharing–AUKUS has become central to Australia’s defence architecture and will be for the foreseeable future.

At its heart, AUKUS will see Australia’s aging conventionally powered fleet of submarines retired. They will be replaced with three US supplied Virginia-class submarines powered by nuclear propulsion while Australia and the UK will jointly work on developing a new class of submarine based on the SSN(R) design. The cost of the new security arrangement for Australia has been pitched at an eye-watering AUD$368 billion.

To put this into perspective, the agreement struck by the Turnbull government for French-built, conventionally powered submarines in 2016 was projected to cost around AUD$90 billion. At the time, this was the biggest military acquisition by Australia and cost nearly AUD$3.4 billion to walk away from.

For Australia, AUKUS is a committal step in the future of its defence and security arrangements. Despite the significant financial commitment, AUKUS has been the subject of criticism among public intellectuals and former Australian politicians. Notably, concerns have emerged about the costs and the risks around the impending uncertainty in the relationship with the US, and what this means for Australia’s future sovereign and foreign policy independence.

So, what are the risks?

The obvious one is the AUD$368 billion price tag. Eight AUKUS submarines will cost Australia as much as it would have cost to acquire 40 boats from the French arrangement, which would have had far more operational capacity. As it is, Australia will have fewer boats, spend more running them, and for little strategic advantage. Not to mention that it will restrict flexibility on foreign and domestic policy initiatives for decades to come.

Second, Congress had to pass the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to allow the transfer of nuclear submarines to Australia. This passed, with a caveat. Prior to any transfer, the president must certify that the transfer of nuclear submarines will not come at the expense of the needs of the US Navy. Currently, they are not building submarines fast enough to meet their own needs meaning that Australia is unlikely to see submarines anytime soon. And even if submarines were to make it to Australian shores, they cannot be operated independent of the US.

Finally, the return of Donald Trump to the White House raises serious questions as to whether the US is still willing to remain engaged in the region. And more importantly, whether they can be relied on as a dependable ally.

It’s no secret that Trump held a general disdain for foreign alliances and commitments during his first administration. He threatened to withdraw the US from NATO and suggested South Korea should pay “rent” to host US forces as they served as a deterrent to attack from the North Korean neighbours–an idea he continued to push through the 2024 presidential campaign.

There’s no reason to think that the US relationship with Australia would be viewed any differently–especially in light of the recent wave of “reciprocal tariffs.”

So, why sign it?

Put simply, Australia has developed a habit.

Australia has a long history of reliance on “great and powerful friends” for its security. And for the latter half of the twentieth century, Australia has grown comfortable in its relationship with the US. To demonstrate the value of this friendship and commitment to the alliance, Australia followed their American allies into conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Australia did this even when their own interests in such conflicts were murky.

When Trump came to office in 2017 and began pushing back on the rules of the international order and questioned the value of alliances, not only were Australian policymakers reserved in their criticism–they were quietly terrified at the prospect of the US abandoning the alliance along with the rest of the world order.

Not only has the US alliance had important security benefits, but it has also allowed Australia to mitigate the fear of abandonment, provided a greater capacity to act as a regional middle power, and pursue the shared values of the rules-based order.

AUKUS is an effort to stabilise the relationship amid the uncertainty brought about by the first Trump presidency. By subsidising US submarine production, Australia advances US interests and, perhaps, demonstrates it’s continuing value as an ally. But this comes with no guarantees. Especially now that Trump is back.

Where to now?

Australia’s current predicament leaves two options in my view:

First, opt to remain in AUKUS. Accept whatever consequences arise including the possibility that Australia may never see a nuclear-powered submarine under its control. In doing so, Australia will surrender a good deal of its sovereignty and foreign policy independence in the hope that future US interests will align with its own. Simply put, Australia will be abdicating control of its future security arrangements.

Second, choose to retake control of its security interests by stepping back from Pillar 1 of AUKUS. Australia could instead seek conventionally powered submarines from elsewhere (probably going hat-in-hand back to the French). By doing so, Australia will maintain a level of independence in foreign policy while also retaining the capacity to assist the US in operations that align with Australian interests around the Indo-Pacific.

I am not advocating for the abandonment of the US alliance. However, Australian policymakers must recognise that the relationship is not what it was. This is not the 1950s, nor is it the 1990s.

The global landscape has changed. The US no longer holds the influence it once did, nor does it represent the same values or provide the same security guarantees. And to be frank, Trump’s return to the White House is the clearest indication that the US no longer covets its post-WWII leadership role.

While pursuing AUKUS in the hopes of holding on to the US as a dependable ally might quell short term anxieties of abandonment, doing so may serve to legitimise the weakening of international institutions, and weaken Australia’s long-term capacity to pursue its actual national interest given the limited strategic, material benefits of AUKUS itself.

It would be a grave error for Australia to ignore these facts. Putting all its eggs in the US security basket is not a path to foreign policy independence, or certainty. Maintaining the current path pins future security on the hopes and dreams that the US will not only remain engaged in the region, but pursue a foreign policy aligned closely to Australia’s own interests.

This is a defining period in Australian foreign policy. AUKUS is a huge gamble, and the payoffs are, at best, murky. It takes bold leadership to reverse course on a decision of this magnitude. But with the return of Trump to the presidency, Australian policymakers would be wise to seriously consider their options–even if it does mean short to medium term pain.

Original article: internationalaffairs.org.au