Editor's Сhoice
April 18, 2025
© Photo: Public domain

By William J. JONES

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term, the world of international relations has been upended by dramatic shifts in US foreign policy. Trump’s on-again-off-again threats of tariffs on allies and adversaries aside, the most striking area of change has been his foreign policy stance toward the Ukraine war and treatment of erstwhile allies small states in America’s traditional sphere of influence.

Washington’s traditional North Atlantic allies in the European Union have been taken aback by Trump’s about-face foreign policy and reproachment of Russia. The 180-degree turn in policy should not have surprised Europeans given that Trump campaigned on transforming the Middle East and Eastern Europe from war and conflict to peace. His bellicose and braggadocio claims to ‘solve the Ukraine war in 1 day’ belie a very real commitment to get the U.S. out of this quagmire that the Biden administration caused and threatens the foundations of US global power.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled for the world to see that US foreign policy had changed in an interview with Megyn Kelly. He stated unequivocally that the era of Unipolar American dominance was over, and it was an idiosyncrasy of international relations in the first place. He further alluded to a multipolar world where ‘great powers’ would exercise ‘spheres of influence,’ harkening back to time previous. He did not elaborate on US conceptual notions of great power relations, but nonetheless, he clearly signaled the end of the post-Cold War order.

The prelude to Secretary Rubio’s multipolarity interview was Trump signaling in pressers and to Danish politicians his wish and intent to buy Greenland, to the horror of European officials. This was backed up by strong arms tactics to ‘take back’ the Panama Canal, tariff threats against Colombia to take back deportees, and antagonizing neighbors Canada and Mexico over trade imbalances. Finally, there were the spectacular events in the Oval Office when President Trump demonstrated clear power relations with Ukrainian President Zelensky, putting the US proxy in its subservient place and subsequently kicking Ukraine’s President out of the White House.

The United States is no longer following the foreign policy paradigm of liberal internationalism. Instead, realism and the practice of realpolitik have returned to Washington.

In mid-February, Americans and Russians met in Riyadh for high-level talks for the first time in over three years. Strikingly, the Europeans were not even invited to attend. The meeting highlighted a couple of very important contemporary realities. First, Europe, the originators of diplomacy and statecraft, has lost the ability to conduct rational, interest-and reality-based diplomacy. Since the start of Russia’s special military operation, no leader of a major EU state has called for a cessation of hostilities or attempted to broker peace. Instead, EU leaders, one after another, followed the Biden policy of maximum hostility towards Russia, notwithstanding the EU black sheep of Hungary and Slovakia. Second, the talks which took place in Riyadh, underline the undermining of neutrality in Europe. Most historical peace talks would take place in Vienna, Geneva, or another European capital. Not this time. Europe and its leaders have been sidelined and completely ignored.

This was repeated once again on March 11, with the Americans and Ukrainians meeting in Jeddah to hammer out a common position on minerals and a ceasefire. Again, the Europeans were not invited.

The European Response

The European response to President Trump’s peace initiatives toward Russia has been frantic to say the least. After the Riyadh meeting, UK and French Presidents Starmer and Macron both went to Washington to lobby for continued US war support and both were sent packing with a polite smile and no policy change. UK PM Starmer then proposed a European peacekeeping force for Ukraine which needed ‘an American backstop’ or security guarantee. Next was French President Macron, who signaled a possible French ‘nuclear umbrella’ to guarantee Ukrainian security along with a 30 day limited ceasefire, which was met coolly by both Russia and the U.S. EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas called for a unified European Defense while stating that Europe had to be at the negotiating table. While Danish PM Mette Frederikson stated oddly that ‘peace in Ukraine was more risky than war.’

The EU decided on March 6 that it would increase defense spending by €800 billion in a plan called ‘ReArm Europe.’ The problem with this is that some €650 Billion of the funding will come from debt instruments, and most major EU countries are already heavily indebted such that the notion of increasing defense spending to these levels is simply not an option, at least without major cuts to social spending. The latest European initiative was to call for a meeting of 32 NATO members to discuss a viable security framework for Ukraine amid shifting US policy. The rub is that Europeans did not invite the United States, the largest and most powerful member of the alliance.

These reactionary responses from EU leaders speak volumes as to the current state of mind, ideological bias, and lack of options facing the Europeans.

The first point is evidence of bewilderment as to US policy and disbelief about action. The lack of ability to alter the course of adapting to US foreign policy shift speaks to the European lack of acceptance that change is upon them and that the United States would finally expect Europeans to shoulder the burden of European security outside the US security blanket. They can be somewhat forgiven for this, as foreign policy shifts of this magnitude are not normal. However, politics is about reading tea leaves, gauging foreign sentiment and adapting when circumstances dictate. The change in position of the Americans has so far not sunk in, and European leaders are flailing.

Second is the hardening of positions Europeans appear to be taking by doubling down on war rather than opening channels of communication with Moscow to try and carve out an independent European arrangement which is inclusive of Ukrainian, Russian, and European interests.

Last is the simple fact that Europe has not and will not be able to find a unified security position nor coordinate its industrial production in any reasonable time to supply and save Ukraine if the United States pulls its support.

It has been argued correctly that Europe has a large industrial base to build upon if it can find policy coherence. The problem with this is that the EU is a collective of 27 different economies and not a single economic unit. It is a single market but not a single economy. The EU has never had a common industrial policy mirroring a state, nor does it have the capacity to manage supply chains and production. Plans for a European ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ have been in motion since Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac floated the idea in 1998. To this day, the EU’s CFSP is neither common nor European, as European defense industries have not standardized something as simple as small arms machine gun caliber ammunition. To think that miraculously the EU, a hodgepodge of 27 member states, will suddenly be able to match the Russian military machine or replace US arms in a rational manner is simply devoid of reality.

Europe’s Options Going Forward

The Ukraine war is heading towards its culmination with the ongoing collapse of Ukraine’s ill-advised Kursk incursion, at which point the Europeans will be left with limited to no options. If Europeans continue down the same path, they will be left with a shattered and bitter Ukraine on its eastern border. The United States pivoting to Asia, no security guarantees, a hostile and jaded Russian neighbor and an economy in tatters due to persistent high energy costs because Washington or Ukraine blew up Nordstream. Further, they will be left without a credible security guarantor as NATO will have lost its deterrence value with a Russian victory.

The Europeans can continue to cajole and try to convince President Trump to change track and conform to the Biden approach. This option looks unlikely to bear fruit as Trump has consistently signaled an unwillingness to do so. Furthermore, Trump has only begun taking an ax to his adversaries in the American ‘deep state’ by dismantling USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. More is likely to follow as Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel settle into their positions at the DNI and FBI.

European leaders could swallow their pride, accept current realities, and once again engage in their lost practice of diplomacy. This will necessitate large European states to change foreign policy direction and reengage with the Russians directly and on terms which are anchored in reality and not ideologically rigid. A functional approach of beginning small with confidence-building gestures such as reestablishing diplomatic relations and economic measures would do well to begin building trust where there is currently none. This will have to be undertaken by either France, Germany or Italy as small EU countries simply lack the weight to move the EU Commission from its ideological moorings of punishing Russia and continuing down the path of foreign policy irrelevance.

Enter President Trump’s recent ceasefire initiative. One can read the recent about-face of Ukraine endorsing Trump’s ceasefire initiative as one of acute pressure which began in the Oval Office and intensified with the cutting of American intelligence support prior to the Russian military offensive in Kursk. Once President Trump was able to get Ukraine to publicly shift its position, the UK quickly got behind the public ceasefire proposal, thus breaking European intransigence. Europeans quickly followed suit as everyone was on the same hymn sheet of talking points, echoing that the ‘ball was now in Russia’s court.’

Regardless of President Zelensky’s statement of maximalist positions afterward and Russia’s polite refusal, the policy ice has been broken on the Western side by President Trump’s pressure tactics.

Looking Ahead

European leaders face a steep learning curve to unmoor themselves from the liberal internationalist foreign policy paradigm of the post Cold War era. They must face the facts that the Americans are playing overtly realist realpolitik international relations. The EU has just been hit by Trump with tariffs on steel and aluminum to which the EU hit back, to which Trump will escalate, threatening massive tariffs on agricultural and beverage products.

European leaders need to get back to the roots of their strength of the old European Economic Community, their market power, and common positions based on common interests. All EU members cherish the common market as a keystone of their prosperity and north star of the European project. The further the EU has drifted from economics and trade into foreign and security policy the less unified the EU has become.

There needs to be a realization that Russia is the EU’s neighbor and this geographic fact will never change. Getting on and having stable relations with ones neighbors is a sine qua non of international affairs. Additionally, the resources of Russia dwarf that of Ukraine. As such the potential of economic synergies between Europe and Russia will always outweigh any Ukrainian potential. Economic and geographical facts need to be taken into consideration.

In the face of a realist United States, China and Russia, the EU and its member states need to shift their ideological stance to one of European interests first and stop to looking to their unreliable Transatlantic ally for security, prosperity and guidance. An EU first realist position would look towards rebuilding economic bonds of co-prosperity with Russia and common benefit which can be had from China’s BRI without sacrificing internal European values of liberalism. Secondly, it is the realization that a liberal internationalist foreign policy is one which is no longer viable and has brought more instability to Europe than benefits. This would help shield the EU, its member states and people, from the chaos and instability which is now the norm of US foreign policy and provide shelter not only from Trump but whoever succeeds him.

Original article: Geopolitical Monitor

The views of individual contributors do not necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.
Liberal dreams collide with geopolitical realities in Brussels

By William J. JONES

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term, the world of international relations has been upended by dramatic shifts in US foreign policy. Trump’s on-again-off-again threats of tariffs on allies and adversaries aside, the most striking area of change has been his foreign policy stance toward the Ukraine war and treatment of erstwhile allies small states in America’s traditional sphere of influence.

Washington’s traditional North Atlantic allies in the European Union have been taken aback by Trump’s about-face foreign policy and reproachment of Russia. The 180-degree turn in policy should not have surprised Europeans given that Trump campaigned on transforming the Middle East and Eastern Europe from war and conflict to peace. His bellicose and braggadocio claims to ‘solve the Ukraine war in 1 day’ belie a very real commitment to get the U.S. out of this quagmire that the Biden administration caused and threatens the foundations of US global power.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled for the world to see that US foreign policy had changed in an interview with Megyn Kelly. He stated unequivocally that the era of Unipolar American dominance was over, and it was an idiosyncrasy of international relations in the first place. He further alluded to a multipolar world where ‘great powers’ would exercise ‘spheres of influence,’ harkening back to time previous. He did not elaborate on US conceptual notions of great power relations, but nonetheless, he clearly signaled the end of the post-Cold War order.

The prelude to Secretary Rubio’s multipolarity interview was Trump signaling in pressers and to Danish politicians his wish and intent to buy Greenland, to the horror of European officials. This was backed up by strong arms tactics to ‘take back’ the Panama Canal, tariff threats against Colombia to take back deportees, and antagonizing neighbors Canada and Mexico over trade imbalances. Finally, there were the spectacular events in the Oval Office when President Trump demonstrated clear power relations with Ukrainian President Zelensky, putting the US proxy in its subservient place and subsequently kicking Ukraine’s President out of the White House.

The United States is no longer following the foreign policy paradigm of liberal internationalism. Instead, realism and the practice of realpolitik have returned to Washington.

In mid-February, Americans and Russians met in Riyadh for high-level talks for the first time in over three years. Strikingly, the Europeans were not even invited to attend. The meeting highlighted a couple of very important contemporary realities. First, Europe, the originators of diplomacy and statecraft, has lost the ability to conduct rational, interest-and reality-based diplomacy. Since the start of Russia’s special military operation, no leader of a major EU state has called for a cessation of hostilities or attempted to broker peace. Instead, EU leaders, one after another, followed the Biden policy of maximum hostility towards Russia, notwithstanding the EU black sheep of Hungary and Slovakia. Second, the talks which took place in Riyadh, underline the undermining of neutrality in Europe. Most historical peace talks would take place in Vienna, Geneva, or another European capital. Not this time. Europe and its leaders have been sidelined and completely ignored.

This was repeated once again on March 11, with the Americans and Ukrainians meeting in Jeddah to hammer out a common position on minerals and a ceasefire. Again, the Europeans were not invited.

The European Response

The European response to President Trump’s peace initiatives toward Russia has been frantic to say the least. After the Riyadh meeting, UK and French Presidents Starmer and Macron both went to Washington to lobby for continued US war support and both were sent packing with a polite smile and no policy change. UK PM Starmer then proposed a European peacekeeping force for Ukraine which needed ‘an American backstop’ or security guarantee. Next was French President Macron, who signaled a possible French ‘nuclear umbrella’ to guarantee Ukrainian security along with a 30 day limited ceasefire, which was met coolly by both Russia and the U.S. EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas called for a unified European Defense while stating that Europe had to be at the negotiating table. While Danish PM Mette Frederikson stated oddly that ‘peace in Ukraine was more risky than war.’

The EU decided on March 6 that it would increase defense spending by €800 billion in a plan called ‘ReArm Europe.’ The problem with this is that some €650 Billion of the funding will come from debt instruments, and most major EU countries are already heavily indebted such that the notion of increasing defense spending to these levels is simply not an option, at least without major cuts to social spending. The latest European initiative was to call for a meeting of 32 NATO members to discuss a viable security framework for Ukraine amid shifting US policy. The rub is that Europeans did not invite the United States, the largest and most powerful member of the alliance.

These reactionary responses from EU leaders speak volumes as to the current state of mind, ideological bias, and lack of options facing the Europeans.

The first point is evidence of bewilderment as to US policy and disbelief about action. The lack of ability to alter the course of adapting to US foreign policy shift speaks to the European lack of acceptance that change is upon them and that the United States would finally expect Europeans to shoulder the burden of European security outside the US security blanket. They can be somewhat forgiven for this, as foreign policy shifts of this magnitude are not normal. However, politics is about reading tea leaves, gauging foreign sentiment and adapting when circumstances dictate. The change in position of the Americans has so far not sunk in, and European leaders are flailing.

Second is the hardening of positions Europeans appear to be taking by doubling down on war rather than opening channels of communication with Moscow to try and carve out an independent European arrangement which is inclusive of Ukrainian, Russian, and European interests.

Last is the simple fact that Europe has not and will not be able to find a unified security position nor coordinate its industrial production in any reasonable time to supply and save Ukraine if the United States pulls its support.

It has been argued correctly that Europe has a large industrial base to build upon if it can find policy coherence. The problem with this is that the EU is a collective of 27 different economies and not a single economic unit. It is a single market but not a single economy. The EU has never had a common industrial policy mirroring a state, nor does it have the capacity to manage supply chains and production. Plans for a European ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ have been in motion since Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac floated the idea in 1998. To this day, the EU’s CFSP is neither common nor European, as European defense industries have not standardized something as simple as small arms machine gun caliber ammunition. To think that miraculously the EU, a hodgepodge of 27 member states, will suddenly be able to match the Russian military machine or replace US arms in a rational manner is simply devoid of reality.

Europe’s Options Going Forward

The Ukraine war is heading towards its culmination with the ongoing collapse of Ukraine’s ill-advised Kursk incursion, at which point the Europeans will be left with limited to no options. If Europeans continue down the same path, they will be left with a shattered and bitter Ukraine on its eastern border. The United States pivoting to Asia, no security guarantees, a hostile and jaded Russian neighbor and an economy in tatters due to persistent high energy costs because Washington or Ukraine blew up Nordstream. Further, they will be left without a credible security guarantor as NATO will have lost its deterrence value with a Russian victory.

The Europeans can continue to cajole and try to convince President Trump to change track and conform to the Biden approach. This option looks unlikely to bear fruit as Trump has consistently signaled an unwillingness to do so. Furthermore, Trump has only begun taking an ax to his adversaries in the American ‘deep state’ by dismantling USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. More is likely to follow as Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel settle into their positions at the DNI and FBI.

European leaders could swallow their pride, accept current realities, and once again engage in their lost practice of diplomacy. This will necessitate large European states to change foreign policy direction and reengage with the Russians directly and on terms which are anchored in reality and not ideologically rigid. A functional approach of beginning small with confidence-building gestures such as reestablishing diplomatic relations and economic measures would do well to begin building trust where there is currently none. This will have to be undertaken by either France, Germany or Italy as small EU countries simply lack the weight to move the EU Commission from its ideological moorings of punishing Russia and continuing down the path of foreign policy irrelevance.

Enter President Trump’s recent ceasefire initiative. One can read the recent about-face of Ukraine endorsing Trump’s ceasefire initiative as one of acute pressure which began in the Oval Office and intensified with the cutting of American intelligence support prior to the Russian military offensive in Kursk. Once President Trump was able to get Ukraine to publicly shift its position, the UK quickly got behind the public ceasefire proposal, thus breaking European intransigence. Europeans quickly followed suit as everyone was on the same hymn sheet of talking points, echoing that the ‘ball was now in Russia’s court.’

Regardless of President Zelensky’s statement of maximalist positions afterward and Russia’s polite refusal, the policy ice has been broken on the Western side by President Trump’s pressure tactics.

Looking Ahead

European leaders face a steep learning curve to unmoor themselves from the liberal internationalist foreign policy paradigm of the post Cold War era. They must face the facts that the Americans are playing overtly realist realpolitik international relations. The EU has just been hit by Trump with tariffs on steel and aluminum to which the EU hit back, to which Trump will escalate, threatening massive tariffs on agricultural and beverage products.

European leaders need to get back to the roots of their strength of the old European Economic Community, their market power, and common positions based on common interests. All EU members cherish the common market as a keystone of their prosperity and north star of the European project. The further the EU has drifted from economics and trade into foreign and security policy the less unified the EU has become.

There needs to be a realization that Russia is the EU’s neighbor and this geographic fact will never change. Getting on and having stable relations with ones neighbors is a sine qua non of international affairs. Additionally, the resources of Russia dwarf that of Ukraine. As such the potential of economic synergies between Europe and Russia will always outweigh any Ukrainian potential. Economic and geographical facts need to be taken into consideration.

In the face of a realist United States, China and Russia, the EU and its member states need to shift their ideological stance to one of European interests first and stop to looking to their unreliable Transatlantic ally for security, prosperity and guidance. An EU first realist position would look towards rebuilding economic bonds of co-prosperity with Russia and common benefit which can be had from China’s BRI without sacrificing internal European values of liberalism. Secondly, it is the realization that a liberal internationalist foreign policy is one which is no longer viable and has brought more instability to Europe than benefits. This would help shield the EU, its member states and people, from the chaos and instability which is now the norm of US foreign policy and provide shelter not only from Trump but whoever succeeds him.

Original article: Geopolitical Monitor