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On November 13, on the eve of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, a man used homemade bombs against the Supreme Federal Court (STF) in Brasília and, according to the official version, committed suicide with a final explosive.

The man in question was not only a neo-Pentecostal evangelical but also a Bolsonaro supporter. However, his family unanimously stated that he was neither a radical nor someone who endorsed violence. Nevertheless, he harbored deep resentment towards the STF justices.

His messages on social media and comments on messaging apps indicated that, from his perspective, Brazil was living under a “dictatorship” led by the Supreme Court. The vandals who invaded the Praça dos Três Poderes and destroyed public buildings and property on January 8 – fueled by faith in the imminent collapse of Lula’s government – were political prisoners, harshly punished for minor crimes.

In Francisco Wanderley Luiz’s view, Brazil had no future, especially as long as Justice Alexandre de Moraes remained alive.

As harsh and radical as these ideas may seem, they might be relatively common today, especially among Bolsonaro supporters. Many Bolsonaro supporters have alleged fraud in the 2022 presidential elections, and their leaders and spokespersons, instead of accepting defeat, fostered false hopes of an imminent military uprising to prevent Lula’s return to power. Camps sprang up outside nearly every military barracks and base in Brazil, some hosting hundreds of people. However, the expected “coup” never materialized, and after being pushed to the limit, the invasion of Brazil’s main public buildings occurred in early 2023, just days after President Lula’s inauguration.

The primary target of these attacks, however, was not even Lula but the STF, which had been accumulating exceptional powers in recent months under the justification of combating the spread of “disinformation” that allegedly threatened Brazilian “democracy.” Using these exceptional powers, the STF ordered the closure of several social media accounts and even ordered a handful of arrests.

During his presidency, Bolsonaro repeatedly attacked the STF, even hinting at shutting it down by force. It’s no surprise, then, that there is a palpable tension between the judiciary leadership and Bolsonaro and his supporters. It is even said that the Brazilian “establishment” does not intend to allow Bolsonaro to run for office again.

But as Francisco’s case demonstrates, this polarization affects all layers of society, not just political agents, with repercussions on social coexistence. Families, communities, and workplaces have become arenas of deep divisions, hindering dialogue and cooperation.

During the last presidential elections, there were 15 murders and 23 attempted murders in Brazil, along with 324 incidents of violence linked to the electoral process or ideological disagreements – five times more than in the 2018 elections.

It is common to attribute this increase exclusively to bolsonarismo, as in most cases where the perpetrators of violence were identified, they were Bolsonaro supporters. However, in any polarization, there are at least two sides, two poles. Even before the rise of bolsonarismo, Brazil had already witnessed a left-wing movement that accused even the most moderate right-wingers and social democrats of being “Nazis” and that advocated (and often practiced) political violence against them.

Thus, we have a situation where political violence is normalized and widespread.

What is even more dangerous is another aspect: the growing distrust in institutions and their regular functioning.

Among Bolsonaro supporters, there is a deeply ingrained belief that the 2022 presidential elections were fraudulent and that elections can always be rigged by the establishment because electronic voting machines are not trustworthy. This debate began long before the campaign started, and, in fact, electoral authorities (which include STF representatives) did little to demonstrate the reliability of the voting machines to the general public.

Instead, they chose to ignore the questions and punish those spreading distrust about the voting system. Naturally, such an approach only fosters greater mistrust rather than calming tensions.

This has been the tone of all authorities: excessive punitivism without any attempt to calm tensions or address demands from the opposing political sector, always “doubling down,” as if flaunting power in an almost obscene way was more valuable than considering the consequences of using a hammer to kill ants.

And what are these consequences if not the risk of national conflagration, ranging from widespread social chaos to something more severe?

Brazilian history records episodes of internal conflict, such as the 1930 Revolution and the 1964 Military Coup. However, the possibility of a civil war in the traditional sense is considered remote by experts. The country simply does not have two clearly demarcated and armed opposing sides. Nonetheless, the persistence of polarization could lead to localized conflicts, increased political violence, and a weakening of democratic institutions.

In situations like this, nothing is more necessary than national reconciliation, but doubts remain about the ability of the main opposing political forces (right/left) to pacify the country.

Perhaps this is why the “Centrão” (the centrist political bloc) might prove to be the third force needed to calm tempers and remind everyone that we are all Brazilians.