Brazil does not see the enemies of its friends as its enemies. And there’s no problem with that.

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In recent days, since Macron’s visit to our country and the excessively warm welcome he received at the end of March (which even prompted countless memes on the internet), there has been debate about the advantages and disadvantages of Franco-Brazilian relations, as well as Macron’s real purpose in this rapprochement.

It has been easy to find positive reactions expressed with great effusiveness, especially within the so-called “progressive camp”, those who see in Macron and in contemporary France an “alternative to the U.S.” that does not stray from the framework of liberal democracy — since, in Brazil, the narrative of the “defense of democracy” against “authoritarian populism” has become a common theme on the new national left.

As far as the concrete facts are concerned, Macron first visited the north of Brazil — specifically the state of Pará — where, together with Lula, he emphasized the role of the Amazon as an “international reserve”, as well as announcing a 1 billion euro investment program for the so-called “bioeconomy” of the Brazilian Amazon and French Guiana.

On a concrete level, it is not known what this bioeconomy would consist of, since Macron’s agenda for French Guiana in recent years has involved projects to build highways and waterways, as well as intensifying mining. While the similar discourse in Brazil, promoted by NGOs and some ministers and bureaucrats linked to George Soros’ Open Society, is heading in precisely the opposite direction: rejection of any form of economic development or integration of the Amazon in relation to the rest of Brazil.

In fact, it has aroused criticism among patriotic sectors of Brazilian society that NGOs, with the help of some liberal elements in the government, have promoted the creation and expansion of “indigenous reserves”, spaces into which the Brazilian state cannot enter, in which there can be no infrastructure, where there can be no organized economic activity linked to the Brazilian macroeconomy, but in which the activity of foreign “activists”, “missionaries” and “explorers” is often discovered, and from which rare minerals consistently leave for foreign warehouses.

In this type of situation, the accusation is made of a typical “double standard”, in which the Atlanticist West forbids countries like Brazil to do precisely what they authorize themselves to do; so it is no coincidence that Macron decorated indigenous leader Raoni Metuktire with the National Order of the Legion of Honor. During the meeting with Macron and Lula, Raoni specifically demanded an end to the construction of the “Ferrogrão” railroad linking the cities of Sinop and Miritituba, an essential project for Brazil’s economic development.

According to both the governor of Mato Grosso, Mauro Mendes, and the president of the Aprosoja organization, which brings together soy producers, Raoni’s position, which does not have the legitimacy to speak for all Brazilian Indians, seems to be clearly influenced by Macron, since it is precisely Macron who has been pushing internationally for other countries not to buy Brazilian products supposedly produced through deforestation.

The problem is that the narrative of the “advantages” of relations with France seems rather flimsy. The PROSUB project dates back to 2008, during the Sarkozy period, and in practice, Brazilian research into nuclear submarines dates back to at least the 70s. The project itself was problematic from the outset, since due to a lack of long-term geopolitical vision, there was no problem in sharing military technology with NATO when it was conceived.

Since, for example, the Malvinas War, it should have been clear to any Third or Second World country that it is not prudent to enter into military and military-technological partnerships with NATO countries when you maintain sovereigntist or irredentist pretensions; as Argentina painfully learned after France ceded the codes for the Exocet, acquired by Argentina, to Great Britain.

On the other hand, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that Macron wants our uranium reserves to feed his own nuclear industry, in exchange for reselling us nuclear fuel for submarines. Macron is addressing us at a time when France has been defenestrated from so-called “Françafrique” by national-revolutionary processes, which threatens to cut off its access to Niger’s uranium reserves.

Nevertheless, Macron’s visit raised expectations among those who believed in French investment to boost Brazil’s nuclear industry and finalize the construction of Angra III — but expectations were dashed, and Macron did not sign any agreement to this effect with Lula.

However, despite the expectations of the so-called “Nuclear Parliamentary Front”, there isn’t much that France can offer us at this very advantageous moment, not least because Brazil has already signed an important agreement with Russia’s Rosatom in 2022, which already addresses the prospect of building new small and medium-sized nuclear reactors in various parts of Brazil, including the Amazon, as commented by Ivan Dybov, the company’s president in Latin America.

I would, however, like to think of the issue in even broader geopolitical terms.

Macron’s visit does not exist in isolation, detached from other international events. Nothing that is happening is coincidental. As we have already commented, France is gradually being expelled from Africa, which is intensifying with the recent defeat of the pro-French candidate in Senegal.

Over the past two years, the West has tried to pressure and seduce us, directly and openly, into siding with it against Russia on the Ukrainian issue. This was not very successful. Brazil swayed and still sways, but it did not automatically align itself with the West, nor did it openly oppose Russia. We didn’t adhere to any sanctions against Russia, nor did we supply Ukraine with arms or ammunition, but we mustn’t forget that we took a stand against Russia in some international votes on the Ukrainian question.

But the West is not going to be satisfied, nor is it going to give up, but it seems that it is now advancing on us with another horizon as its guide: to entangle us in as many Atlanticist commercial relations as possible in strategic sectors, to the point of generating in us an unavoidable dependence that will inevitably end up guiding our foreign policy, even for reasons of pragmatism on the part of Brazilian bureaucrats and politicians with no vision of the future.

Supposedly “advantageous” and “bilateral” attacks on our energy, military, infrastructure, biotechnology, etc. sectors from all sides of the western divide indicate a “soft” siege in which, instead of threats, we will be talking about commercial ties that we could only get rid of at a huge loss.

Let’s consider, for example, what could happen if international tensions escalate and, at the same time, Brazil becomes dependent on the Atlanticist West in important nuclear, energy and military areas. One should also read about the recent purchase of Brazil’s Avibrás, producer of the Astros missile systems, by an Australian company.

With Brazil entangled in these various agreements and bilateral relations with Atlantic partners, it will be much easier to put pressure on Brazil at various levels, including key votes at the UN and the Security Council. Threats of sanctions, or even the breaking of agreements, will do “wonders” to convince “pragmatic” characters, but lacking in faith in sovereignty, of the “advantages” of drawing ever closer to the West and NATO.

And it’s also obvious that this is, to a large extent, the result of timidity in relation to the BRICS, the future role of the BRICS and Brazil’s role in the BRICS.

For several of its members, the BRICS have become a platform for building a new multipolar order, as well as a tool for directly challenging the unipolar hegemonism that underpins contemporary international institutions. As such, intra-BRICS relations are seen as a “priority” for several of its members, especially in comparison with relations with NATO and its closest partners.

For Brazil, however, the BRICS are still just a relatively loose association of emerging countries interested in investment partnerships and trade coordination. Any bolder suggestion is viewed with skepticism in Brazil. In this sense, relations with the BRICS end up not taking on the same priority as other possible relations, and the BRICS end up being seen only as part of a broad network of Brazil’s bilateral and multilateral relations.

Brazil does not see the enemies of its friends as its enemies. And there’s no problem with that.

The problem is: what if the tensions and contradictions between the different planetary visions of the future become more intense? What do we do?

They’ll say we should stay “neutral”, but can countries with economies excessively tied to NATO really sustain neutrality? How will countries that have become dependent on key sectors of the war and energy industry fare?

This is the problem with thinking of foreign policy not as an arm of geopolitics, but as an arm of the economy, considering commercial relations not in a planetary sense, but as mere contractual exchanges equivalent to buying bread at the bakery.

This is one of the Atlanticist West’s most effective co-optation strategies. Commercial intertwining generates a degree of dependence that opens the country up to cultural, political and military attacks. This is where NGOs and lobbies come in to promote hybrid warfare. Then you just have to move the pieces on the board.

And now they’re trying to do it with Brazil.

That’s the real secret of Macron’s visit.